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RR RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0252/01 0331531
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000252 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR MASS RS AF
SUBJECT: GOR SUPPORTS ISAF TRANSIT OF GOODS TO AFGHANISTAN, 
SEEKS EXPERTS MEETING 
 
REF: A. STATE 6471 
     ¶B. 08 MOSCOW 3655 
     ¶C. SZPILA-EMB MOSCOW E-MAIL JANUARY 29 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Action Request:  In response to ref A 
dipnote, the MFA has indicated that, provided all usual 
requirements for commercial shipments on Russia's rail 
network are met, there should be no difficulties with the 
proposed shipment of non-military goods to ISAF in 
Afghanistan using the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). 
However, MFA also urged that tranport experts meet on the 
margins of the February 10-11 Afghanistan meetings in Moscow 
to discuss details of the shipments to ensure they proceed 
smoothly.  In order to be as transparent as possible and to 
seek to avoid problems, we request details on the number and 
arrival date of the containers at the Russian border, as well 
as the specific route and entry and exit points into and out 
of Russia.  End Summary and action request. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Transit Deal Is Complete, Now Let's Talk About It 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) We delivered ref A dipnote to MFA Deputy Director of 
the Department of European Cooperation Yuriy Gorlatch and MFA 
North America Department on January 26, and followed up with 
meetings on January 27 and January 28.  At the meeting 
January 27, Gorlatch initially told us that we did not need 
to send the dipnote because the proposed shipment for 
non-military goods to ISAF in Afghanistan was being sent via 
commercial means, and was in accordance with the April 4 
letter from the GOR to NATO.  According to Gorlatch, NATO 
could begin shipping supplies to ISAF (not Operation Enduring 
Freedom) via the NDN immediately. 
 
¶3. (SBU) As we sought to ensure that, provided all commercial 
requirements were met, there would be no problem from the GOR 
with the shipment, Gorlatch suggested that expert-level 
meetings with USG transport agents and Russian customs and 
railroad officials be held in Moscow prior to sending the 
first shipment to avoid any "technical difficulties." 
Gorlatch stressed that the GOR wanted the first shipment to 
go smoothly, and without incident.  He suggested that 
officials from both sides should get to know each other so 
that, in case there are any problems with the shipments, they 
could call each other.  Recognizing the difficulty of 
arranging such a meeting prior to February 4, Gorlatch later 
invited Pol/DAOoffs to a meeting on January 28 with customs 
and railroad officials. 
 
------------------------------ 
Customs, Railroad Requirements 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) At an almost-two hour meeting January 28, Gorlatch 
and Deputy Directors and staff from Russian railroad 
authority and customs indicated that the initial shipment 
using the NDN should be okay, provided all the commercial 
requirements were met.  However, at that meeting and 
subsequently, MFA asked how many containers and how often we 
expected to ship, and what route would be used for shipments. 
 Per ref C e-mail, we said the original 90-container initial 
shipment was now likely to be closer to 100 containers, and 
would likely not reach the Russian border until o/a February 
13, and we believed it would be transiting through Latvia. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Deputy Director for Russian Railroad gave a very 
lengthy, detailed, briefing on the procedures for shipping 
commercial cargo through Russia.  She assured us that this 
was the standard procedure for commercial shipments, with no 
special requirements for the cargo we proposed to ship except 
that it should note that the final destination was 
Afghanistan.  Key elements were: 
-- The procedures conform to the Agreement on International 
Cargo Information and Shipment, which all of the relevant 
countries subscribe to.  She said all shipping companies and 
other railroads should know the procedures; 
-- The shipper needs to indicate intake and outtake points, 
point of destination (Termez), and physical or legal entities 
receiving the goods at every point, including Afghanistan, in 
the consignment bill; 
-- The consignment bill needs to indicate (para 20) who will 
pay (better that shipping payments have been made before 
 
MOSCOW 00000252  002 OF 002 
 
 
cargo reaches the RF border); 
-- Cargo we've specified does not need a person accompanying 
it, but it is up to us if we want someone; and 
-- It would be best if the containers were loaded on one 
platform, and it was recommended that one shipper be used 
from point of origin (e.g. Riga) to termination point (e.g. 
Termez). 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to our question about specific 
documentation for the shipments, the Customs representative 
told us these shipments were covered by usual customs rules 
and there were no special requirements for it.  She gave us a 
copy of the Russian regulations (in Russian) and said all of 
the requirements and specific documentation were listed in 
the document (faxed to EUR/RUS).  She added that Russian 
Customs had notified all their relevant offices of the NATO 
transit agreement.  She said Customs would respect the norms 
of international transit and not inspect the cargo, unless 
there was suspicion about the contents.  Also, no customs 
fees would be required for such a transit in accordance with 
international standards.  Gorlatch added that Russia wanted 
to avoid any problems with the shipment, and ensure it was 
fair and transparent.  At the time of the April 4 letter, 
Russia had requested guarantees that the route would not be 
used for "gray schemes," e.g. shipping of things like cognac, 
and NATO had provided those assurances. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Although both the railroad and customs 
representatives indicated that there was nothing needed 
beyond the normal information provided for a commercial 
transit, Gorlatch repeated that "it would be useful" to have 
the "facts" about the U.S. transit arrangements with all the 
other countries, as Russia "was hearing through the media" 
about such arrangements, but did not know the details.  While 
he did not specifically request copies of the U.S. agreements 
with other countries, he said it was important for Russia to 
know the terms of such arrangements, such as whether 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had the same list of excluded goods 
as Russia. 
 
------------------------ 
Follow up February 10-11 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Gorlatch agreed it would be useful for the 
Transcom/RR/Customs experts meet separately on the margins of 
the February 10-11 meeting on Afghanistan in Moscow. 
Gorlatch also suggested a meeting of the experts from all the 
potential transit countries be held, possibly in Brussels. 
We suggested these issues be discussed at February 10-11 
meeting. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) It appears that, as long as all the commercial 
requirements are met, the NDN shipments should be treated as 
would any commercial shipment.  That said, the GOR seems a 
bit nervous about ensuring they go smoothly, with no 
problems, so the more transparent and open we can be, the 
better.  We request details on the number and arrival date of 
the containers at the Russian border, as well as the specific 
route and entry and exit points into and out of Russia. 
BEYRLE