P 171341Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO DSCA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 8446
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
COMUSNAVCENT

UNCLAS MANAMA 000090 
 
 
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS MARR PGOV BA
SUBJECT: ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR MK 54 TORPEDO CLASSIFIED 
BRIEF AND SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITON 
 
¶1. (U) Summary:  This country team assessment anticipates a 
request from the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) to have a 
classified brief regarding the MK 54 Torpedo and its eventual 
procurement. 
 
¶2. (U) Reason Kingdom of Bahrain may desire a classified 
brief for the MK 54 Torpedo:  During the recent MK 46 Torpedo 
Program Management Review (PMR), the Bahrain Defense Force 
(BDF) showed strong interest in reconfiguring its current 
inventory of MK 46 Torpedoes to the MK 54 Torpedo.  The USN 
is transitioning from the MK 46 to the MK 54 and it will 
discontinue MK 46 maintenance in 2014.  The BDF stated it 
would therefore make sense to start planning for 
reconfiguring its inventory to the MK 54 Torpedo. 
 
¶3. (U) How the MK 54 Torpedo would affect Bahrain's force 
structure:  Release of information in the MK 54 classified 
brief and the eventual acquisition of the MK 54 Torpedo will 
not affect the number of ships or their missions, but will 
support the Royal Bahrain Navy's procurement process and 
would eventually enhance Bahrain's ability to counter 
maritime threats. 
 
¶4. (U) How the MK 54 Torpedo would contribute to both the 
U.S. and Bahrain's defense/security goals: The eventual 
procurement of the MK 54 Torpedo will increase Bahrain's 
ability to contribute to coalition operations. 
 
¶5. (U) Justification for the type and quantity of articles 
requested:  The anticipated request of converting their MK 
46s to MK 54s will not increase the number of torpedoes in 
Bahrain's inventory, and will be adequate to meet the needs 
of the BDF. 
 
¶6. (U) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction 
of a new warfighting capability to the Kingdom of Bahrain: 
Combatant Commander will provide assessment separately. 
 
¶7. (U) Anticipated reaction from neighboring governments: 
Embassy Country Team anticipates no negative reaction from 
neighboring Arab states.  Other Arab countries in the region 
plan to procure the MK 54. 
 
¶8. (U) Assessment of Bahrain's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain and support the MK 54:  On 
January 17, 1988, the GOB signed a General Security of 
Military Information Agreement.  In addition, the GOB hosted 
a favorable NDPC Security Survey in March 2000 and received a 
favorable CIA Risk Assessment, dated April 8, 1999. 
Furthermore, the GOB has a proven track record of maintaining 
security of sensitive programs regarding research, 
development and production, with no known cases of any 
Bahraini compromise of U.S. technology. 
 
¶9. (U) Training required either in-country or in the United 
States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence 
of U.S. trainers in the country:  Educational courses and 
training exercises are routinely conducted between the BDF 
and U.S. military.  Bahrain maintains a robust U.S. military 
and defense contractor presence; post anticipates no adverse 
reaction to U.S. trainers in Bahrain. Training regimen, 
whether in the U.S or in Bahrain, will be determined later. 
 
¶10. (U) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition:  Funds for future purchases of the MK 
54 will come from the Bahraini national budget.  Economic 
impact would be low. 
 
¶11. (U) Human rights consideration relevant to proposed brief 
and eventual acquisition: There are no human rights 
considerations relevant to the proposed classified briefing 
or potential future acquisition of the MK 54 system. 
 
¶12.  (U) Plan for end-use monitoring (EUM) for sensitive and 
advanced warfighting technology and the OMC's plan for 
compliance verification:  Bahrain will require continued 
education on the End-Use Monitoring Program, as applicable. 
Bahrain will comply with end-use monitoring as outlined in 
Chapter 8, DOD 5105-38-m, Security Assistance Management 
Manual, 3 October 2003, as necessary.  OMC Bahrain will 
fulfill its responsibility and ensure compliance with end-use 
monitoring requirements under the Golden Sentry Program, 
including periodic accountability inventories, monitoring 
operational use and control during day-to-day 
military-to-military contact, when required. 
 
¶13.  (U) Conclusion:  Embassy Manama Country Team recommends 
approval for requested classified briefing and eventual 
transfer of the MK 54 system to Bahrain.  This assessment has 
been fully coordinated within the Country Team. 
 
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Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
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HENZEL