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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000203 
 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: GON/FSLN: ON ELECTIONS, IT'S TIME TO MOVE ON 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 96 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 80 
     ¶C. 2008 MANAGUA 1505 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Nearly four months after the governing 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) claimed "victory" 
in the November 2008 municipal elections, there has been no 
indication that the Nicaraguan government intends to address 
the credible allegations of fraud or complaints regarding the 
partisan manipulation of the electoral system.  Government 
officials, including Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) staff, 
privately have admitted to us electoral fraud but downplayed 
suggestions that some CSE magistrates would be removed prior 
to the end of their terms in 2010.  Up until mid-January 
opposition parties in the National Assembly were attempting 
to annul the elections through the enactment of legislation, 
but that initiative ended when the FSLN gained control of the 
legislature through agreements with the Constitutional 
Liberal Party (PLC) (ref A).  The GoN's position regarding 
the stolen elections was neatly stated by Deputy Foreign 
Minister Valdrek Jaentschke who told Managua's suspected 
mayor-elect Eduardo Montealegre, to "get over" the election 
fraud.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
CSE Admits Fraud, GoN Takes No Action 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In two meetings since the November 2008 elections, 
CSE Chief of Staff Barreto, with surprising candor, 
acknowledged that the FSLN had stolen the elections.  Barreto 
suggested that the FSLN, through the CSE, had rigged the 
electoral system throughout the year prior to the local 
contests, but that election-day results were not as planned 
leading to gross alterations of the tally sheets in order to 
give the FSLN the huge win the CSE announced.  Despite the 
massive fraud, Barreto stated the CSE magistrates would not 
make any "corrections" to the election results and believed 
it unlikely that any other branch of government would address 
the fraudulent outcome.  Additionally, he found it unlikely 
that any of the CSE magistrates would be removed from their 
position before their terms expired.  (Note: All the CSE 
magistrates' terms end in 2010.  The removal of any 
magistrate prior to the end of his/her term would require 56 
votes in the National Assembly, which implies the votes of 
FSLN deputies.  This seems highly unlikely.  End Note.) 
Moreover, Barreto thought that CSE President Roberto Rivas 
would likely maintain a seat on the electoral authority body 
after his term expired because Rivas served as a "bridge" 
between the FSLN and the PLC and was able to cater to the 
needs of both parties. 
 
¶3.  (C) The GoN's public response to the domestic and 
international criticism of elections fraud has been to 
dismiss the reports citing a history of "flawed" elections in 
Nicaragua while simultaneously pushing forward quickly to 
claim victory and install their candidates.  On November 21, 
a day after the CSE announced the official results, President 
Ortega presided over a FSLN street party to celebrate the 
FSLN's "victory" at the polls.  A week later First Lady 
Rosario Murillo met with all the mayors-elect to set the 
agenda for the municipal governments' plan of "citizen power" 
(the FSLN's patronage system based around the Citizen Power 
Councils, CPC).  On January 14, Ortega presided over the 
CSE's swearing in of the new municipal governments (ref C). 
Murillo again met with the mayors on February 19 in a 
'Citizen Power' working session.  Since the installation of 
the new mayors, the FSLN has publicly and privately urged the 
opposition and the international community to accept the 
official results as a political fact.  This was clearly 
stated by Deputy Foreign Minister Jaentschke.  In a 
conversation with the Ambassador, Eduardo Montealegre, and 
Jaentschke to celebrate the U.S. innauguration of President 
Obama, Montealegre alluded to the fact that the GoN had 
robbed him of the Managua mayorship.  Jaentschke's response 
(in English) was simply, "Oh Eduardo, get over it." 
 
¶4. (U) In its final report on the elections, the domestic 
observer NGO Ethics and Transparency (EyT) determined that 
the CSE orchestrated fraud in at least 40 municipalities. 
EyT documented a string of abuses including the failure of 
the CSE to accredit domestic and international observers, 
closing polling stations early to prevent opposition 
sympathizers from voting, and the expulsion of party poll 
watchers from the voting and counting places.  EyT also 
documented enormous irregularities in the counting process, 
including some places where more votes were counted than 
there were eligible voters.  EyT Executive Director Roberto 
Courtney, in summing up the accounts of fraud, commented that 
"Nicaragua cannot go into future elections with this 
Electoral Law and this CSE."  In response to the report, CSE 
spokesman Felix Navarrette told the media that the complaints 
had no basis in fact and the elections were a "closed case." 
 
¶5.  (C) The National Assembly had been the only branch of 
government likely to address the fraud.  On November 16 the 
opposition parties in the National Assembly introduced 
legislation to annul the election results, which led to the 
paralyzation of the legislature (ref C).  However, on January 
16, through a FSLN-PLC agreement, the Assembly elected a new 
executive committee which gave administrative control of the 
legislature to the FSLN, and as a result effectively ended 
the possibility that the draft legislation would make it to a 
floor vote.  FSLN deputies have publicly stated their 
opposition to the bill.  Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) 
deputies, now voting with the FSLN, also have stated that 
they will not vote for the legislation, ensuring the 
opposition will not have the necessary votes to pass the 
legislation. 
 
--------------------------- 
FSLN Seeks Cosmetic Changes 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In private discussions, the FSLN and the PLC have 
proposed two scenarios for addressing the electoral fraud, 
both of which are fraught with difficulties and are likely to 
weaken democracy further: a FSLN-PLC negotiated agreement to 
return a number of mayorships to the PLC; and, 'reform' of 
the electoral law.  Contacts within the PLC and in the media 
have reported that Aleman was negotiating with Ortega for the 
return of 15-20 mayorships throughout Nicaragua.  Rommel 
Moreno, opposition mayoral candidate in Corinto (Department 
of Chinandega), told the Ambassador that Aleman had told 
Moreno that Corinto was one of the cities Aleman was trying 
to get back.  Embassy contacts have stated that neither 
Managua, Leon, nor any "big" city would be returned in such a 
negotiation, but that most of the cities "returned" to the 
opposition would be in the PLC's traditionally strong region 
of the north (Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, etc.).  The likelihood 
of an Ortega-Aleman agreement on mayorships is increasingly 
low as time passes, and Aleman himself has stated recently 
that the FSLN will not return any mayorships.  Regardless, 
such an agreement would not resolve the broader concerns 
about electoral fraud and would strengthen the "pacto" 
between the FSLN and PLC. 
 
¶7.  (C) Reform of the electoral law has been proposed as the 
other method by which the government might address the 
November 2008 electoral fraud.  The PLC has been vocal in 
promoting electoral reform that would break up the power of 
the CSE, but without changing the ability of the FSLN and PLC 
to divide control of the new institution among themselves.  A 
broad coalition of civil society groups is working on 
proposals for more genuine electoral reform but are reluctant 
to press forward out of concern that that electoral reform 
would open the door to broader constitutional reform (a key 
FSLN goal).  Electoral reforms would require 56 votes in the 
National Assembly, thereby opening the potential of another 
FSLN-PLC negotiated agreement to divide power.  Second, many 
are concerned that reforming the Constitution for electoral 
reform would open the door to the FSLN's main objective of 
reforming the Constitution, which also requires 56 votes, to 
allow for presidential re-election and/or a semi-parlimentary 
system, with the FSLN being the main beneficiary.  Once the 
56 votes are in place to pass electoral reform there would be 
little to stop them from also passing sweeping constitutional 
changes as well. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The governing FSLN admits electoral fraud and expects 
(or maybe hopes) the opposition and the international 
community will accept it and move on.  Aware that the donor 
community has suspended assistance as a result of the 
election fraud, Ortega and his government decided to pay the 
price rather than admit fraud or return any local power to 
members of the opposition.  Civil society, including NGOs, 
independent media and the Catholic Church, has kept up 
demands for the government to address the fraud, both 
retroactively through an internationally monitored audit and 
forward-looking by addressing the deeper problems of the 
partisan CSE and the flawed electoral system.  As with most 
crises, Ortega and the FSLN believe they can ride out this 
problem and in the end come out on top.  Should the pressure 
continue, however, Ortega has hedged his bets by proposing a 
"national dialogue" to address the political and financial 
crises affecting Nicaragua.  FSLN leaders have avoided 
specifics on the terms of the "dialogue" and, while it is 
possible they would use it to offer some concessions on the 
electoral system, any changes would be part of a broader 
package that advanced Ortega's longer-term political goals, 
including constitutional reform and re-election. 
 
 
CALLAHAN