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RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLI #0071/01 0340735
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030735Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7339
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LISBON 000071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - 
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING 
 
REF: 07SECSTATE 133921 
 
¶1. (U) This message responds to the reftel questions 
concerning Portugal's information collection, screening, and 
sharing practices. 
 
¶A.  Watchlisting: 
-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many 
records does the watchlist contain, and how many are 
terrorist-related?  Which ministry or office maintains the 
watchlist? 
The Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Defense keep such 
records, however data on number of records and specific types 
are not made readily available and considered sensitive 
information not for distribution. 
 
¶B. Traveler Information Collection: 
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in 
the country? 
Decree Law 57/2007 from July 4, 2007 updates the border 
control legislation and three addenda approve information 
collection models for people entering Portugal, residing in 
Portugal as refugees, and requesting an extended stay 
(Portaria 395/2008, 396/2008, and 297/2008 respectively). 
Portuguese Immigration (Servico de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras 
- SEF) is responsible for all controls. 
 
-- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry 
and for domestic flights?  Since Portugal is a Schengen 
nation, there is no set border control for land entries.  Air 
and sea entry are treated as the same. 
 
-- Who collects traveler information? 
SEF is responsible for collecting and storing traveler 
information from the airlines, port authorities, travel 
agencies, and hotels.  According to Portuguese Law 57/2007, 
air transportation authorities are responsible for 
transmitting their final flight manifest including the name, 
travel documentation used, date of birth, entry point, and 
hour of arrival to SEF.  Sea transportation companies and 
fishing vessels that enter Portuguese territory from 
international waters are also required to submit their 
manifest to SEF and must notify SEF of stowaways up to 48 
hours before arriving and within two hours of departure. 
 
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that information with foreign governments? 
SEF may share the information, upon a foreign government 
request, pursuant to the domestic law on international 
judiciary cooperation. 
 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  Is 
this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes 
to screen travelers?  Does host government have any existing 
treaties to share PNR data? 
Yes, the Portuguese government does collect this data for 
intelligence and law enforcement purposes.  Portugal is 
included in the EU regulations on PNR data. 
 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems 
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been 
effective at detecting other national security threats, such 
as wanted criminals? 
Yes, we do not have statistical information on this issue, 
but believe the systems have been effective in screening 
passengers. 
 
¶C.  Border Control and Screening: 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest? 
The host government employs software to screen all 
non-Schengen travelers and the GOP recently requested CODIS 
software to enhance screening abilities.  However, Portugal 
is a member of the EU's Schengen Agreement, and under its 
provisions, Portugal, as well as the other Schengen 
participants, abolished routine immigration controls for 
persons traveling by air, sea or land between signatory 
States.  Portugal's only land border is with Spain, and 
border checkpoints between the two countries are normally no 
longer operational. 
 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host-country nationals?  What is the frequency of 
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what 
 
LISBON 00000071  002 OF 008 
 
 
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information 
is not actually recorded electronically?  What is the 
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and 
exits? 
All arrivals at airports and seaports are reviewed by SEF, 
but only foreigners from non-Schengen nations are recorded. 
At international ports of entry, SEF officers have access to 
computerized databases that contain information regarding 
outstanding warrants, criminal convictions, lost and stolen 
passports, and stolen blank passport data and persons who 
were previously denied Schengen visas or admission to a 
Schengen country.  Portugal's international airports are 
monitored by SEF and Customs officials.  A minimum check (a 
quick, straightforward verification of the validity of the 
document and an examination for signs of falsification or 
counterfeiting) is the rule for EU citizens and other persons 
enjoying the Community right of free movement (such as the 
family members of an EU citizen). 
Portuguese airports use an automated passport control system 
called "RAPID" for EU citizens over 18 years old holding 
biometric e-passports.  RAPID uses facial recognition 
technology and performs the same checks as a human 
immigration officer including check a database for stolen, 
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, review the 
validity of the travel document, and flag the presence of 
signs of falsification or counterfeiting. 
SEF controls entry and exit via Portugal's external borders 
and its operations follow guidelines from the Community Code 
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) established by the European 
Parliament and the EU Council on 15 March 2006.  External 
borders may be crossed only at border crossing-points. 
Operational cooperation is coordinated by the European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX). 
We cannot estimate the percentage of non-recorded crossings 
of the total entries because of the unrecorded land crossings 
due to the Schengen agreement. 
 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on 
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this 
authority (legislation, mandates, etc). 
Yes.  Under the Schengen Borders Code, the control of 
movement of persons across borders includes the mandatory 
check of all national and international criminal and police 
databases especially the SEF database and the national and 
Interpol fugitive intelligence database and the entry refusal 
Schengen Information System, which has information about 
individuals who are considered to be a threat to public 
policy, internal security, public health. 
 
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into the country?  Which 
agency would question, detain, or deny entry? 
Portugal's policy on denying entry is outlined in Article 32 
of Portugal's Decree Law 57/2007.  In particular, the GOP 
reserves the right to deny entry to those who do not meet the 
legal entry requirements, who are on the Schengen "do not 
admit" list, who are on Portugal's national "do not admit 
list," are considered a danger or threat to public order, 
national security, public health, or against diplomatic 
interests.  SEF is the responsible agency for detentions and 
denied entries. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Portuguese immigration law, 
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question 
and deny entry into the country of any non-Portuguese 
nationals.  Additionally, SEF has the authority to detain an 
individual for the maximum period of 48 hours.  Detention 
will be subject to the scrutiny of a judicial authority 
within that 48 hour holding period.  During the review, the 
judicial authority hears the reasons for the detention, 
informs the person detained thereof and questions the 
detainee to allow him or her to present a defense. 
 
-- How well does information sharing function within the host 
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone 
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with 
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? 
Information sharing seems to work well, however the Judicial 
Police (FBI equivalent), the intelligence services, and SEF 
all report to different ministries in the Portuguese 
government.  In 2008, the Portuguese government established a 
new Secretary General to coordinate the various domestic 
security efforts. 
Additional background information: The Intelligence System of 
 
LISBON 00000071  003 OF 008 
 
 
the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) coordinates the two separate 
Portuguese intelligence services.  The Security Intelligence 
Service (SIS) guarantees Portugal's security against 
sabotage, terrorism, espionage and the practice of acts who, 
by their nature, could disrupt the rule of law.  The Defense 
Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) focuses externally to 
guarantee Portugal's national independence, national 
interests, and security.  Both intelligence services report 
to the Prime Minister. 
 
¶D.  Biometric Collection: 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? 
What are the systems and models used? 
Yes, international airports in Portugal use an automated 
passport control system called "RAPID."  The system is 
available only to EU citizens over 18 and holders of 
biometric e-passports.  RAPID uses facial recognition 
technology and performs the same checks as a human 
immigration officer, such as data base checks for stolen, 
misappropriated, lost and invalidated documents, reviewing 
the validity of the document authorizing the legitimate 
holder to cross the border, and flagging the presence of 
signs of falsification or counterfeiting. 
RAPID (Automatic Identification of Passengers Holding 
Traveling Documents) combines the operations of reading and 
checking electronic passports with an innovating feature for 
assessing biometric data which operates an automatic gate 
opening device.  This device checks whether the electronic 
passports is genuine, and validates the data stored on the 
chip.  It then appraises the passenger's identification by 
establishing a comparison between the photo stored on the 
chip and the information of the passenger in loco, 
automatically opening the border gate when the features of 
both images are coincident.  RAPID was made secure by an 
intelligent system that allows the entry of a single 
passenger each time and automatically adjusts the reading 
camera to his or her height. 
 
-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the 
host government target a specific population for collection 
(i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection 
systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the 
biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) 
or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented 
against a database of known biometrics)? 
All EU citizens with e-passports over eighteen years old are 
screened.  Portugal uses a system of one-to-many comparisons. 
 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host 
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or 
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? 
No, it is not aware of any. 
 
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? 
One program exists. Portugal has started in Dakar, Senegal a 
pilot program conducted on a voluntary basis only, called 
BIODEV.  BIODEV includes the capture of biometrics data (2D 
face, 10 fingerprints) of a visa applicant at a Portuguese 
consular post, forwarding the captured data to be stored and 
searched in a central AFIS, and the verification of the 
biometrics data of the visa holder at the port of entry. 
Portugal recently went live based on the complete biometric 
visa application process in Dakar, Senegal, with participants 
arriving at Lisbon airport. 
 
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's 
fingerprint system? 
Portuguese Immigration, SEF 
 
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UK1 or RTID compliant? 
The fingerprint program in place is the finger image data 
interchange format standard: ISO 19794-4 (code WSQ). 
 
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which 
agency collects the fingerprints? 
The fingerprints are collected digitally as flats. 
 
¶E.  Passports: 
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required to read the biometric 
information with any other governments?  If so, which 
governments? 
We attempted to contact authorities from the Portuguese Mint 
in charge of this program, but were unable to confirm at this 
 
LISBON 00000071  004 OF 008 
 
 
time.  It is likely that Portugal shares information with its 
Schengen partners. 
 
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for 
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the 
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? 
The government issues a new passport for full validity. 
 
-- Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of 
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen 
multiple times? 
Yes.  The adjudicators report the situation to the police for 
possible investigation and, if necessary, judicial action. 
 
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have 
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration 
passports)? 
There are no replacement passports. In exceptional 
circumstances, namely, the adjudicating entity has no 
authority to issue regular passports (as is the case of 
Portuguese consular offices overseas) or the electronic 
passport system is down, a temporary passport may be issued 
to the applicant.  This passport is an eight-page document 
valid for six months only, and is neither biometric nor 
machine readable. 
 
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? 
Emergency passports do not contain biometric information. 
 
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior 
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? 
No, we have not seen any increase. 
 
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number 
series or otherwise identified? 
No, they do not have any special numbers or identification. 
 
¶F. Fraud Detection 
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud involving documents followed up? 
Portuguese Immigration (SEF) is responsible for the 
investigation and detection of fraudulent documents.  Fraud 
detection is taken very seriously and instances involving 
recent bank fraud cases and large company malfeasance have 
been aggressively pursued.  The fraud detection department 
and forensic lab conduct highly sensitive investigations. 
Once an investigation is completed, it is turned over to the 
courts for prosecution.  The Embassy has visited the 
facilities and finds it both professionally run and capable 
of handling sensitive investigations. 
 
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of circulation, or made harder to use? 
Portugal is one of the better EU nations in making its 
documents safer and more difficult to forge by way of various 
up to date security document features (i.e. holographic, 
light latent imagery, etc.). SEF is also involved in the 
process of establishing document security features.  Whenever 
fraudulent documents are found, they are confiscated and 
voided. 
 
¶G. Privacy and Data Security 
-- What are the country's policies on records related to the 
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the country? 
Pursuant to Portuguese immigration law, Portuguese 
Immigration (SEF) has the authority to question and deny 
entry into the country of any non-host country nationals.  If 
admission into the country is denied on grounds of fraudulent 
documents, the document is confiscated and the individual is 
immediately returned pursuant to the Chicago Convention.  If 
the individual cannot be deported within 48 hours, he or she 
must appear before a judicial authority for a hearing. 
SEF will question and interview the individual and where 
necessary, will call the Judicial Police (PJ) to intervene 
and interrogate the more serious cases.  An illegal entry 
into Portugal often requires repatriation of the individual 
by the same airline. These individuals are often held at 
detention centers at the airport. 
Aliens removed from Portuguese territory by SEF are banned 
from returning to the country for a minimum of five years. 
 
-- How are those records stored, and for how long? 
 
LISBON 00000071  005 OF 008 
 
 
The Portuguese government stores records in the National 
Integrated Information System.  Personal information is kept 
in a temporary file by SEF for 48 hours unless needed for 
legal reasons, as outlined in law 67/1998 governing personal 
information.  Transportation companies must delete the 
information within 24 hours of transmitting the data to SEF. 
Personal data entered into the Schengen Information System 
for the purposes of tracing persons is kept only for the time 
required to meet the purposes for which they were supplied 
and/or for legal proceedings.  Alerts inserted by any EU 
Schengen member state must be reviewed after three years of 
entry of the alert in order to evaluate the need for 
continuing storage of such data. 
 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive data? 
Only cleared law enforcement personnel may access the data. 
The name and official purpose from the officer are required 
as well to view any records.  Collection or use of sensitive 
data relating to the movement of persons using information 
from the European Union's Schengen Information System was 
established by law in 1994, pursuant to the Schengen 
Convention.  The law created the control and monitoring 
mechanisms for the Schengen Information System.  A central 
Schengen database facility operates under the direction of 
Portuguese Immigration Service (SEF) and a designated 
official at the Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI). 
The Data Protection National Commission (Comissao Nacional de 
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD) is the national control 
authority entrusted with the supervision of the national part 
of the Schengen Information System, and with the verification 
that the processing and use of the data does not violate the 
rights of the person. The rights to access, alter records, 
and delete information shall be exercised by a person 
demonstrating a legitimate, direct and personal interest, as 
provided in the Schengen Convention, by means of the national 
control authority. 
 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the implementation of new databases of records? 
The Portuguese Constitution has extensive provisions on 
protecting privacy, secrecy of communications and data 
protection.  The law on personal data protection established 
the conditions applicable to automatic processing, 
connection, transmission and use of databases and guarantees 
its protection by means of an administrative body, the 
National Data Protection Commission (Comissao Nacional de 
Proteccao de Dados, or CNPD). The Commission is an 
independent agency that is directly responsible to 
Parliament.  Its must register existing databases with 
private data, authorize and control such databases, issue 
directives, and oversee the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). 
Implementation of new databases of records is sent by the 
executive branch to the Portuguese Parliament for approval. 
When the new database is authorized, it becomes public 
through the publication of the law in the Government Official 
Gazette. 
 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information? 
There are varied levels of access to security features and 
these are normally held in government protected computer 
systems. 
 
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access 
data that homeland security agencies hold about them? 
The Schengen Convention itself recognizes the rights of 
individuals.  These include the right to access information 
in the Schengen Information System (SIS); the right to 
correct data where there is a de jure or de facto mistake; 
the right to apply to the courts or competent authorities to 
demand that data be corrected, deleted or that damages be 
awarded; the right to ask that data to be checked and to 
question the reason for data collection.  Since Portugal is a 
signatory to the Schengen Convention, all requests for access 
to personal data must follow the provisions of the Schengen 
Convention's article 109, article 6 of Portuguese Law 2/94, 
and/or article 11 of Portuguese Law 67/98.  Any citizen or 
alien may request verification on whether there is an alert 
in his or her name in the Schengen database.  In addition, 
he/she may request a correction or deletion of personal data, 
in accordance with article 110 of the Schengen Convention. 
 
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
 
LISBON 00000071  006 OF 008 
 
 
enforcement actions)? 
No, all records fall within the same database.  Cases under 
investigation or considered highly confidential will be kept 
in a separate database only with written agreement from the 
prosecutor's office. 
 
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data? 
Yes, in accordance with data protection principles, 
individuals have specific rights under the Schengen 
Convention, whether they are nationals of Schengen nations or 
not. The rights include the right of access to personal data 
stored in the SIS, the right to a rectification when data are 
factually inaccurate or unlawfully stored, the right to bring 
before the courts or competent authorities an action to 
correct or delete incorrect data or to obtain compensation. 
 
¶H.  Immigration Data Bases: 
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track 
entries and exits? 
The Schengen Information System and national Portuguese 
databases are used to track entries and exits. 
 
-- Is the immigration database available at all ports of 
entry (POEs)?  If immigration databases are available at some 
POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which 
POEs will receive the tool? 
Databases are available at all ports of entry but not at all 
potential land border crossings. 
 
--  What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems?  For example, limited training, power brownouts, 
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? 
No problems. 
 
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? 
Databases are updated daily with new information. 
 
¶I.  Watchlist and Information Sharing: 
-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs? 
Yes, at border checkpoints and in the general watchlist 
computer database that only police can access. 
 
-- What domestic sources of information populate the 
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, 
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? 
Name and date/place of birth are included. Other identifiers 
include: parents' names, marital status, home address, 
national identity card number, social security number, Prior 
criminal offense records, traffic offense data (to include 
unpaid tickets, DUIs), non-compliance with court-related 
summons, wants/warrants and some child predator information 
at a different access level. 
 
-- What international watchlists does the host government use 
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, 
UN, etc.? 
INTERPOL, EUROPOL and other international intelligence 
sources. 
 
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist 
between host government and its neighbors? 
Agreements exist with all EU nations as well as others with 
the US, Spain, and Brazil.  Agreements with Spain and Brazil 
are in response to Spanish terrorist group ETA and North 
African terrorists transiting the area and drug 
producing/transiting in the case of Brazil. 
 
¶J.  Biometrics: 
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, 
land, sea)?  If no, does host government have plans to 
install such a system? 
Biometric systems are in place for air and sea entries as 
outlined above. 
 
-- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not 
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will 
receive the tool? 
All but land entries are in use as a result of the Schengen 
agreement. 
 
--  What biometric technologies, if any, does the host 
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial 
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal 
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, 
gait analysis?  Are the systems ICAO compliant? 
 
LISBON 00000071  007 OF 008 
 
 
At this time, Portugal uses facial recognition and 
fingerprint identification in Senegal only. 
 
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information?  If e-Passports are issued, 
what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. 
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc?  If not, does 
host government plan to issue a biometric document in the 
future? 
Yes, Portugal issues a machine-readable passport with 
biometric information.  E-passports have been issued since 
2006 with facial recognition techology. 
 
¶K.  Identifying Appropriate Partners: 
-- Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether 
host government would be an appropriate partner in data 
sharing. Considerations include whether host government 
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in 
addition to terrorists), and whether host governments would 
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. 
Post recommends sharing information with Portugal.  Portugal 
has professional, capable, and well-trained law enforcement 
officials who would use the information to locate and detain 
terrorist suspects.  We have no reason to believe that 
Portugal would include political dissidents in any listing or 
use the list inappropriately. 
 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement 
with the U.S? 
No, none. 
 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information? 
Yes, the legal system is well developed and able to handle 
the information, as outlined above. 
 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally?  Is there a single consolidated database, for 
example?  If not, do different ministries share information 
amongst themselves? 
Ministries and law enforcement agencies do share information 
with each other upon official request, or in accordance with 
the laws governing that criminal offense.  Law enforcement is 
particularly willing to share information about major crimes, 
terrorism, and narcotics suspects.  There is no single 
information sharing hub.  Different agencies have access to 
information that relates to their area. 
 
-- How does the country define terrorism?  Are there legal 
statutes that do so? 
In broad terms, Portuguese Law 52/2003 defines terrorism as, 
"All the acts that aim to facilitate, either directly or 
indirectly, any act committed for terrorism purposes."   In 
this context, it penalizes terrorist acts themselves and any 
instrumental offenses, such as theft or document forgery, 
connected with a terrorist act. 
Before 2003, the Penal Code had a couple of provisions with 
respect to terrorism and terrorist association crimes.  Those 
provisions were partly revoked by Law 52/2003 (Law on 
Combating Terrorism) which transposed European Union 
Framework Decision 75/JAI/2002 into the Portuguese legal 
system. 
 
The added value of this new Law is making individuals liable 
and criminalizing so-called "instrumental crimes" such as 
theft or document forgery, regardless of where it occurs.  It 
also punishes the activities of groups, terrorist 
organizations and terrorist associations and criminalizes 
terrorist acts perpetrated in country as well as abroad. 
Additionally, the law contains some exceptions to the 
principle of territoriality, established in the Penal Code. 
Portuguese penal law may therefore be applied to acts that 
occur outside Portuguese territory, unless otherwise stated 
in an international treaty or convention, when the crimes 
constitute terrorist offenses committed by individuals, 
domestic or international organizations, provided that the 
agents are found on Portuguese territory and cannot be 
extradited to the requesting state. 
 
Another important aspect of the law is that it envisages the 
criminal liability of legal persons or their equivalent 
(corporate and mere de facto associations) for offenses 
connected to terrorism when carried out on their behalf and 
in the interest of their organs or representatives. 
 
 
LISBON 00000071  008 OF 008 
 
 
Apart from Law 52/2003, there are several other laws aiming 
at combating terrorism: 
 
Law 5/2002 ) Special regime of proof collecting and breach 
of professional silence regarding serious crimes; 
 
Law 101/2001 ) Infiltrated agents -Juridical regime of 
undercover actions regarding prevention and criminal 
investigation; 
 
Law 104/2001 ) Interception of communications; controlled 
deliveries; undercover actions; 
 
Law 144/99 of 31 August (Law of International Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters) applies to cooperation in 
criminal matters.  It governs extradition, transfer of 
proceedings in criminal matters, enforcement of criminal 
judgments, transfer of persons sentenced to any punishment or 
imprisonment, supervision of conditionally sentenced or 
conditionally released persons, and mutual legal assistance 
in criminal matters. 
 
Law 65/2003 regarding the European Arrest Warrant regime. The 
European Arrest Warrant is an important cooperation tool 
between European Union countries and it is applicable in 
terrorism cases. 
 
Law 10/2002 ) Monitoring mechanisms of money laundering and 
financing of terrorism. 
 
Law 11/2004 ) Prevention and repression of money laundering 
law, which establishes penalties for the laundering of assets 
from an illicit source. This law also establishes control 
mechanisms to prevent crimes and terrorism. 
 
International Instruments: In addition to the legislation 
cited above, Article 8 of the Portuguese Constitution states 
that the rules and principles of general international law 
are an integral part of Portuguese law.  Rules provided for 
in international conventions that have been duly ratified or 
approved, shall apply in national law, following their 
official publication, so long as they remain internationally 
binding with respect to the Portuguese state.  Portugal is 
therefore bound to the international legal instruments, which 
serve as a reference to the international community in its 
combat against terrorism.  The following are several of the 
multilateral and international agreements that Portugal has 
signed and ratified: 
 
- UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2003) 
- International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (2002) 
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings (2001) 
- Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime (1993) 
- International Convention against Taking of Hostages (1983) 
-Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents (1973) 
 
Portugal also signed, but not yet ratified, the following: 
 
- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (2001)  signed in 2002 
 
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (2005). Signed in 2005. 
STEPHENSON