VZCZCXRO0710
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0098/01 0331228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021228Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9115
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000098 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - FEBRUARY 2 
 
¶1.  (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of 
spot information from various sources.  This report is not 
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be 
confirmed at this time. 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) During a February 1 press conference, President Kabila 
defended his decision to allow Rwandan troops to enter the DRC to 
pursue the FDLR.  According to Kabila, RDF troops would leave the 
DRC by the end of February.  Kabila also defended the GDRC's 
cooperation with CNDP renegade Bosco Ntaganda, against whom the ICC 
has an arrest warrant, emphasizing peace and security in the Kivus 
was more urgent than international justice concerns.  The lack of 
military engagement with the FDLR has led some MONUC contacts to 
assume that the joint operations are concentrating on psychological 
operations, apparently with success: 214 Rwandan rebels have 
recently surrendered to UNHCR and DDRRR reports that it successfully 
repatriated 47 combatants and their dependents on February 1.  The 
security and humanitarian situation in Orientale Province remains 
very precarious, with residents in Dungu and Doruma towns fearing 
renewed attacks by the LRA.  In response to these fears, a very thin 
MONUC presence, and increasing FARDC exactions, residents are 
forming self-defense militias.  SRSG Alan Doss acknowledged that 
MONUC could not carry out its protection mandate adequately in 
Orientale Province until additional troops, authorized by the UNSC, 
arrive in the DRC.  End Summary. 
 
 
LRA: Operation Lightning Thunder 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) MONUC continues to play a very limited role in Operation 
Thunder.  SRSG Doss stated that MONUC cannot adequately perform its 
protection mandate in Orientale Province until it receives the 
additional 3,000 troops, which the UNSC has authorized.  UN contacts 
in Goma and Kinshasa have voiced concerns to Emboffs that the LRA 
may try to request support from traditional sources in the 
Government of Sudan. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) USAID/DART Deputy Team Leader, who recently visited the 
area as part of an assessment team, reported that, although Dungu 
remained calm, residents fear LRA attacks, as well as FARDC looting. 
 There have been reports of FARDC soldiers perpetrating rapes and 
extortion in Dungu.  FARDC troops reportedly also levy informal 
"taxes" on individuals entering the town, threatening those who are 
unable to pay. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Dungu residents expressed a lack of confidence in the 
abilities of MONUC, the FARDC, or the UPDF to adequately protect the 
population.  MONUC forces are based 13 kilometers outside of Dungu, 
entering the town only when escorting UN staff.  Accordingly, 
self-defense militias have been formed, with more weapons on the 
street. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Further north in Doruma, the security situation remains 
very precarious due to continued LRA attacks in the vicinity.  Less 
than 50 FARDC troops and approximately five UPDF soldiers are 
stationed in Doruma, with no MONUC presence.  IDPs in the area told 
USAID/DART Deputy Team Leader that Doruma is a likely LRA target 
because of insufficient military protection and the town's 
geographic vulnerability. 
 
 
Operation Lightning Thunder-Humanitarian Issues 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) According to Caritas, 10,370 IDP households, or 
approximately 51,850 people, reside in and around Dungu, far below 
previous OCHA estimates.  Only Solidarites and Medecins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF) operate in Dungu.  Caritas and UNHCR's local NGO 
partner, ADSSE deliver assistance to outlying villages and conduct 
field assessments. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) As of January 29, 17,050 IDPs reside in Doruma and within 
a 20-kilometer radius, according to local authorities.  The 
assessment team received reports of high numbers of IDPs in the 
isolated villages of Bangadi, Nbilima, Nanzali, and Ndedu near 
Dungu; and in the villages of Naparka and Gangala in near Doruma. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Food insecurity remains a concern for villages attacked 
and at-risk of attack by the LRA due to restricted access to 
agricultural fields and the depletion of food stocks by the rebels. 
 
KINSHASA 00000098  002 OF 003 
 
 
However, food assistance remains a lower-priority need in Dungu, 
Doruma, and in villages that the LRA has not attacked.  Non-food 
items, particularly in Doruma, are urgently needed. 
 
 
DRC-Rwandan Joint Operations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) MONUC reports that RDF troops have not moved since 
January 26.  The RDF has positioned itself along three axes in the 
Petit Nord area of North Kivu, apparently reinforcing logistical 
supply lines and waiting for FARDC/CNDP forces to deploy alongside. 
There have been few clashes with the FDLR, leading some MONUC 
officials to speculate that, currently, the joint operations are 
primarily psychological operations in nature.  This approach may 
have already paid dividends: 214 FDLR troops have surrendered to 
UNHCR, while MONUC reported that other FDLR elements had even 
abandoned control of certain mining sites. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) MONUC has investigated several allegations of FDLR 
kidnappings/atrocities against the local population; in all cases 
abducted civilians were subsequently released or the reports 
appeared to be groundless.  Nevertheless, MONUC continues to deploy 
forces to areas in North and South Kivu where the civilian 
population could be vulnerable to FDLR reprisals.  A senior MONUC 
commander told Goma PolOff privately that MONUC's protection mandate 
was "unmanageable."  Priority areas include Kanyabayonga, Walikale, 
and Masisi.  Second tier priority areas are Pinga and Nyamilima. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) According to MONUC contacts, the Joint Operations Center, 
set up to coordinate MONUC, FARDC, and RDF planning, is basically 
non-functional.  MONUC will therefore limit its operational support 
to logistical assistance, which currently encompasses only CNDP 
integration into the FARDC.  Integration centers have been 
established at Rumangabo, Kimoka and Mumbambiro (for PARECO), but 
MONUC confided that the CNDP response has been "underwhelming." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In a February 1 press communiqu, MONUC stated that it 
would not participate in any operations in which Bosco Ntaganda also 
participated.  According to one MONUC source, Bosco "was not welcome 
in Goma or Gisenyi." (Note: MONUC has, however, stressed, that it 
has no mandate to arrest Bosco.  End Note.)  Bosco, who was recently 
named the Deputy Commander for the joint operations, reportedly 
spends considerable time in Goma.  Deputy SRSG Ross Mountain 
cautioned that, although the UN would be embarrassed to collaborate 
with Bosco, "where peace and justice conflict, we will choose 
peace." 
 
 
Kabila on Rwandan Presence and Cooperation with Bosco 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) During a February 1 press conference (septel), President 
Kabila characterized FDLR presence in the DRC as the root cause of 
instability, justifying the joint FARDC-RDF operations.  Kabila said 
the operations should end by February 10, allowing Rwandan troops to 
return to Rwanda by the end of February, as well as Ugandan forces 
fighting the LRA.  (Note and Comment: some wire services reported 
Kabila stated Ugandan forces would leave by February 15, but Digital 
Congo-close to the GDRC-and other media report an end of February 
deadline.  Kabila is under enormous political pressure to limit the 
duration of the RDF operations in the Kivus.  Post suspects that 
these "deadlines" may be fungible, depending on the situation on the 
ground.  End Comment.) 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Regarding GDRC cooperation with the ICC-indicted Bosco, 
Kabila said that if it is a question between international justice, 
which would probably not be expedient, and peace and security for 
the population of Eastern DRC now, "the choice was clear."  Kabila 
noted that the GDRC's cooperation with the ICC had been exemplary. 
 
 
 
The Quiet Success of DDRRR 
-------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) According to Bruno Donnat, Head of MONUC's DDRRR program, 
approximately 200 Rwandan combatants in Eastern DRC voluntarily 
repatriated to Rwanda during the month of January, compared to 70 in 
January 2008.  During a Saturday press conference, Donnat stressed 
that, despite the on-going military operations against the FDLR, 
DDRRR would continue its activities. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) On February 1, DDRRR repatriated 13 combatants and 34 of 
their dependents near Bukavu.  The group reportedly reached the 
Bunyakiri transit camp after walking two days through the Numbi 
 
KINSHASA 00000098  003 OF 003 
 
 
Forest and the Haut Plateau. 
 
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