VZCZCXRO9898
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0172/01 0541410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231410Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9234
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000172 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER: SITUATION FROM DUNGU 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Goma poloff recently traveled to Dungu in Haut 
Uele with MONUC escorts to gather information related to Operation 
Lightning Thunder.  All MONUC personnel remain garrisoned at the 
Dungu airstrip, which is well guarded by an unknown number of UPDF 
and FARDC battalions.  No MONUC forces are stationed outside of 
Dungu.  The head of OCHA in Dungu credited the FARDC with improving 
relations between MONUC and the community.  The FARDC soldiers in 
the region enjoy the support of the local population, and have 
reportedly successfully explained to civilians MONUC's vital 
supporting role.  Sources in Dungu and Goma credit the FARDC with 
deterring LRA attacks in villages where they deploy.  They seldom 
deploy to the most vulnerable smaller villages, however, until after 
the LRA has struck.  According to OCHA, residents want to be rid of 
the despised LRA and do not object to operations against them. 
However, there is a perception that the implementation of Operation 
Lightning Thunder was badly bungled.  IDP's in Dungu have received 
adequate assistance, but residents and displaced in other less 
accessible areas (including Faradje and Doruma) are reportedly still 
in need of food.  End Summary. 
 
The Long Journey North 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Goma poloff, accompanied by MONUC Deputy Chief of Staff 
Colonel James Cunliffe and two other MONUC officers, recently 
traveled to Dungu.  The long unpaved airstrip in Dungu can handle 
considerable traffic, and MONUC and other humanitarian agencies land 
up to ten flights a day.  Visitors, once rare, have become more 
frequent.  MONUC maintains a MI-24 and two MI-17 helicopters at 
Dungu and uses them to make frequent day trips to more remote 
villages such as Doruma.  All MONUC personnel (two companies of 
Moroccan peacekeepers at present) are garrisoned at the airstrip, 
which is well guarded by an unknown number of UPDF and FARDC 
battalions.  No MONUC forces are stationed outside of Dungu in Haut 
Uele. 
 
Origins of Current Conflict 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the extended village of Dungu, a 30-minute ride from 
the airstrip, poloff spoke with the head of the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, who set up the OCHA office in 
Dungu in September 2007.  MONUC engineers first arrived in June 2007 
to begin construction of the airstrip, which was intended to support 
MONUC/FARDC's Operation Rudia to contain LRA elements resident in 
the Garamba National Park.  OCHA Head of Office Dungu said the LRA 
largely remained in the park, but abducted several youths from 
nearby villages during 2007 and early 2008. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On September 17, 2008 the LRA launched simultaneous 
attacks on 20 villages in Haut Uele.  Several villages were burned 
and "dozens" of civilians were killed.  Forty-eight youths were 
abducted from Kilewa and another 60 from Dubua (as heard). 
Thousands of villagers fled to Dungu, and some vented their anger at 
MONUC for, in their view, not protecting them adequately.  A mob of 
protestors attacked a MONUC Military Observation Post in the village 
of Dungu, burning their vehicle and pillaging the outpost.  More 
IDP's arrived after LRA attacks in December and early 2009, 
eventually swelling the IDP population to the estimated current 
total of 160,000. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) OCHA Head of Office Dungu credited the FARDC with 
improving relations between MONUC and the Dungu community.  The 
FARDC soldiers in the region, which include Republican Guard and 
Angolan-trained battalions, enjoy the support of the local 
population, and have explained well MONUC's vital supporting role. 
Poloff heard no reports of FARDC looting or rape, but he did not 
venture into what are approximately a dozen smaller villages around 
Dungu and Faradje where the FARDC has deployed small units of 
soldiers.  OCHA and a number of UN offices and NGO's maintain 
contact with the FARDC force commander through a liaison officer, 
but OCHA reported it is possible to reach the commander on short 
notice even when the liaison officer is absent. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Goma poloff noted no interaction between the Moroccan 
MONUC escort and local residents, who observed the UN Humvees with 
sullen expressions  (Comment: Poor and/or distant relations with the 
locals is normal for MONUC forces, who do not speak the local 
language and have no public outreach programs.  End comment). 
Communication may, however, improve soon; poloff spoke to a 
three-person MONUC MILOBS advance team, who said they would 
recommend that MILOBS be returned to the village of Dungu. 
According to OCHA, residents want to be rid of the despised LRA and 
do not object to operations against them, but believe the 
implementation of Operation Lightening Thunder was badly bungled. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000172  002 OF 002 
 
 
Current Security Situation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Sources in Dungu and Goma credit the FARDC with deterring 
LRA attacks in villages where they deploy.  They seldom deploy to 
the most vulnerable smaller villages, however, until after the LRA 
has struck.  OCHA advocated wider deployment of MONUC troops in 
three key towns: Dungu, Doruma and Faradje, as villagers from 
outlying areas tend to flee to these areas when they perceive a 
threat from the LRA (Comment:  MONUC opposes the concept of "safe 
haven" areas, and SRSG Doss stated that to employ wider protection 
services, MONUC needed to deploy the recently approved 3,000 
additional peacekeepers.  End comment). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Several sources in Dungu and Goma state that many small 
villages have begun to organize self-defense units.  An AP reporter 
in Dungu said he has heard that locals have begun to manufacture 
home-made guns, and he was able document primitive gun manufacturing 
in progress.  Such self-defense units have reportedly successfully 
defended their villages from LRA attacks and the AP reporter 
provided specific and credible details of one such defense that led 
to many LRA deaths (although the precise numbers were unverified). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) While MONUC handles logistics through Dungu and the FARDC 
deploys to some vulnerable villages, the Ugandan People's Defense 
Force (UPDF) is reportedly tracking groups of LRA fighters in the 
forests.  UPDF Commander Brigadier General Patrick Kankiriho told 
Cunliffe that UPDF pressure has caused the LRA to split into many 
small groups, some as small as two or three men.  Other sources 
claim at least one larger group of LRA still occupies the vast 
Garamba National Park.  Kankiriho has collected several recent media 
reports about LRA killings which followed the launch of Operation 
Lightning Thunder.  He claimed (somewhat defensively) that the 
figure of 900 civilian deaths was exaggerated. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Kankiriho said the UPDF would welcome a Joint Operations 
Center with MONUC and the FARDC to facilitate broader information 
sharing.  MONUC will follow up aggressively on this.  The UN will 
soon deploy a Protection Response Team to Dungu with representatives 
of the Political, Child Support, and Civil Affairs units.  UNHCR and 
UNICEF are already present in Dungu. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Contacts in Goma and Dungu reported no massacres in 
recent days, but the LRA is still active.  An FARDC patrol was 
reportedly "ambushed" approximately 16 kilometers south of Faradje 
on February 10.  Six FARDC soldiers were wounded, two seriously.  A 
FARDC source claimed they killed 11 of the LRA attackers, but this 
has not been verified.  Additionally, a priest in Dungu told poloff 
that two youths were abducted (presumably by the LRA) 26 miles east 
of Dungu on February 1, and that there had been "problems" in Gilima 
(north of Dungu) within the past week. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) OCHA has a detailed map for conducting humanitarian 
missions outside of Dungu and reported the road north to the border 
with Sudan is generally safe, but assistance teams can only travel 
12 kilometers to the east in safety.  IDP's in Dungu have received 
adequate assistance, but residents and displaced in other less 
accessible areas (including Faradje and Doruma) are reportedly still 
in need of food. 
 
Rescued Abductees 
----------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) UPDF forces provided MONUC officers access to four 
children who had been abducted by the LRA, then rescued by the UPDF. 
 MONUC officers estimated that the youths were between 8 and 18 
years of age, and severely traumatized, with the "thousand yard 
stare" of victims of extreme violence.  Only one was willing to talk 
about his experiences, saying that he had seen "bad things 
everywhere."  Two of the abductees were from Sudan and two from DRC. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) This report tracks with information from several other 
sources, including humanitarian organizations, which described the 
FARDC (and Republican Guard) as well-disciplined.  As for MONUC, its 
role is clearly limited for the moment and is unlikely to increase, 
absent a significant infusion of forces.  The GDRC, for its part, 
would like for the UPDF to exit Congolese territory expeditiously 
for political reasons, but this operation continues to attract far 
less attention (positive or negative) than do more pressing problems 
in the Kivus. 
 
GARVELINK