VZCZCXRO4462
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0155/01 0481553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171553Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9201
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000155 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PGOV CG UG
SUBJECT: UNHCR ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST FDLR AND 
      LRA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) 
Deputy Representative, Mohamed Toure, recently met with PolCouns and 
PolOff to discuss security and humanitarian issues in Eastern DRC, 
as well as civilian protection challenges stemming from the separate 
joint operations against the LRA and the FDLR.  Toure identified the 
lack of communication amongst the UPDF, FARDC, and MONUC as the 
biggest impediment to civilian protection in Dungu Territory.  Toure 
also questioned UPDF techniques, which he claimed were the same 
techniques unsuccessfully employed against the LRA over the last 20 
years in Uganda.  On the situation in the Kivus, Toure expressed 
concern that the RDF and FARDC would not be ablQto fully respect 
the human rights of civilians when confronting the FDLR. 
Ninety-five percent of recent voluntary repatriations to Rwanda are 
made up of family members of FDLR combatants, according to UNHCR 
data.  Toure cautioned that the recent repatriations are most likely 
only temporary.  End summary. 
 
Protection Problems in Orientale Province 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) UNHCR's Deputy Representative for Protection, Mohamed 
Toure, recently met with PolCouns and PolOff to discuss civilian 
protection problems arising from the separate FARDC/UPDF and 
FARDC/RDF operations targeting the LRA and FDLR, respectively. 
According to Toure, one of the main problems with civilian 
protection in Dungu Territory, Orientale Province is the lack of 
coordination amongst the main actors.  Due to language and cultural 
barriers, the four MONUC battalions in Dungu Territory (from 
Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, and Guatemala), do not communicate 
well with each other or with the local population.  In addition, 
neither the UPDF nor the FARDC coordinates action or communicates 
well with MONUC.  On a positive note, Toure said that the FARDC 
troops in the area, many of whom were trained by MONUC, and the 
Republican Guard troops were very well disciplined. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Toure, UPDF techniques against the LRA are 
identical to the techniques it has unsuccessfully employed against 
the LRA over the last 20 years.  As a nomadic group, the LRA can 
very easily splinter into smaller groups when attacked, then 
subsequently regroup into a larger fighting force when it feels less 
threatened.  Another trademark of the LRA, which is repeating 
itself, is its tendency to exact reprisals on local populations. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Toure, who just returned from a trip to Dungu, estimated 
that there are 300 MONUC troops currently outside of Dungu guarding 
the airport.  Beyond guarding the airport and providing armed 
escorts to and from the city of Dungu, eight kilometers away, MONUC 
troops do not provide any active patrols for protecting civilians. 
He also estimated there were approximately 4,500 FARDC troops in and 
around the city of Dungu.  MONUC troops in Dungu currently do not 
have the capacity to facilitate the arrival or the distribution of 
large shipments of humanitarian aid.  The Swedish Government has 
reportedly pledged $1 million to construct a compound to house 
humanitarian workers and supplies. 
 
UNHCR Fears Exacerbation of Crisis in the Kivus 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Although he welcomed some kind of pressure against the 
FDLR, Toure shared UNHCR concerns about the joint FARDC/RDF 
operations.  He questioned their ability to fully respect human 
rights and their lack of coordination with MONUC.  MONUC's civil 
protection mandate becomes much more difficult if they are not kept 
abreast of military operations.  UNHCR estimQes that military 
operations against the FDLR may cause as many as 500,000 new 
displacements. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) With regards to news reports of a sharp rise in the number 
of FDLR members presenting themselves for repatriation to Rwanda, 
Toure estimated that 95 percent of recent voluntary repatriations 
were FDLR dependents and only 5 percent were actual combatants. 
UNHCR has 10 welcome sites set up in North and South Kivu for this 
purpose.  However, UNHCR does not receive combatants.  It refers 
them to MONUC DDRRR first.  UNHCR has set up an expedited process 
where it only keeps repatriation volunteers for two days at the 
welcome centers before transporting them to the repatriation exit 
points.  Within the last week, UNHCR has repatriated 200 people each 
day to Rwanda. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In Toure's opinion, it was very likely that FDLR 
combatants had opted to move their families to Rwanda temporarily to 
avoid anticipated heavy fighting with FARDC and RDF troops.  The 
border with Rwanda was very porous and it was likely that the 
families would return to the DRC once the fighting ended.  He called 
 
KINSHASA 00000155  002 OF 002 
 
 
on Rwanda to create more political space, which would facilitate 
permanent returns. 
 
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