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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9143
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000120 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF EAID KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: DRC: A Look Back on 2008 and a Preview of 2009 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU) The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (GDRC) 
faced substantial challenges in 2008 but made tangible progress in 
dialogue with armed groups, judicial, decentralization, and economic 
reforms and development cooperation.  In 2009, the DRC faces many of 
the same challenges that it grappled with in 2008.  The peace 
process in Eastern Congo, which began so promisingly with the Goma 
Actes d'Engagements in January 2008, has come full circle.  The 
intense armed conflict, which began in October, gave way to renewed 
efforts to broker a political settlement between the GDRC and armed 
groups.  Laurent Nkunda's CNDP rebel group fragmented through 
internal division and UN-mediated talks.  Military cooperation with 
neighbors South Sudan and Uganda to neutralize the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) began at the end of 2008 and continued into 2009 followed 
by joint operations with Rwanda against the armed group FDLR.  The 
threat of a dispersed, but rampaging LRA presents the GDRC with a 
new variable in the East.  On the domestic political side, there is 
concern about the power of the Presidency, although parliament 
continues to display a growing streak of independence.  There are 
clear signs that the new GDRC will pursue a more active role in a 
variety of domains, including better coordination with international 
donors.  While the Congolese army's (FARDC) collapse in 2008 
provoked heightened security and human rights concerns, a change in 
the military's senior leadership presents the USG and its 
international partners with a fresh opportunity to intensify efforts 
to professionalize the FARDC and to move forward with a Rapid 
Reaction Force as a cornerstone of this process.  On the economic 
front, the GDRC missed many opportunities in 2008 and will face 
difficult questions in 2009.  Falling international commodities 
prices, endemic corruption, and regulatory and policy constraints 
remain impediments to economic growth.  In 2009, the GDRC should 
demonstrate greater political will to: re-establish an IMF program; 
give priority to regional economic development and concurrently 
address the problem of illegal economic activity in war-torn eastern 
DRC; and take measures to improve the investment climate.  USG 
assistance will continue to support USG policy goals in the DRC, 
including the promotion of peace and security in eastern DRC. 
Development programs will target the sectors of health, education, 
democracy and governance, economic growth, peace and security, 
environment, and social protection.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Political Developments 
---------------------- 
 
The East 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The 2008 political scene in the DRC was dominated by 
continued unrest and conflict in the eastern provinces.  Momentum 
from the January Goma Agreement, the resultant Amani Peace, Security 
and Development program and the associated cease-fire did not parlay 
into a lasting peace agreement and demobilization of armed forces. 
The peace process stalled amid cease-fire violations despite regular 
contacts between regional government delegations, international 
facilitators, MONUC, and civil society.  Despite moments of renewed 
optimism, such as the Kisangani Conference in May, during which 
dozens of FDLR-RUD fighters vowed to lay down their weapons and 
enter the demobilization process, in August the CNDP renewed 
hostilities with the DRC.  High intensity conflict erupted between 
FARDC, CNDP, FDLR and various Mai Mai groups, culminating in the 
CNDP's march on Goma in late October.  The DRC's participation in 
Operation Lightning Thunder, along with Uganda and South Sudan, 
demonstrated the resolve to take on the ever-present and serious 
threat posed by the LRA.  In a remarkable turn of events, DRC and 
Rwandan forces began joint operations in January 2009 to eliminate 
the presence of former Rwandan Army and genocide-era militia members 
(FDLR) in the DRC.  Widespread civilian displacement and human 
rights violations continue to occur in the heavily militarized 
eastern DRC. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The challenge in 2009 will be to intensify efforts to 
achieve a durable political settlement, which will enable the GDRC 
to extend state authority in the area.  The apparent rapprochement 
between Kinshasa and Kigali in January 2009, permitting joint 
Congolese-Rwandan military operations against the FDLR, is a first 
step to the re-establishment of Congolese state authority in the 
eastern DRC.  The USG should continue to support conflict 
mitigation, including: improved relations between the GDRC and its 
eastern neighbors; facilitating integration of Congolese armed 
groups and encouraging DDRRR options; mitigating the danger of 
ethnic conflagration; and initiating steps to address illegal 
economic activities, which continue to fund armed groups and deprive 
 
KINSHASA 00000120  002 OF 007 
 
 
the GDRC of legitimate state revenues.  It will be necessary to 
exhort the DRC to improve its dismal human rights situation in the 
East, partially a byproduct of incessant conflict.  On the LRA 
question, the USG should encourage the GDRC to stay the course with 
Operation Lightning Thunder, aiming to capture LRA leaders or 
persuade them to opt for a genuine political solution. 
 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) A MONUC investigative report criticized as "excessively 
violent" the reaction of the central government to incidents of 
unrest and insurrection committed by the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 
separatist movement members in Bas-Congo in January, February, and 
March 2008.  Hundreds of civilians were killed and BDK places of 
worship were razed during operations led by the national police 
(PNC).  The opposition and many international observers criticized 
President Kabila's use of executive privilege to dismiss and appoint 
magistrates and prosecutors in February, and again in October when 
he appointed hundreds of sub-provincial civil administrators.  The 
appointments precede national preparations for the 
constitutionally-mandated process of decentralization and 2009 local 
elections. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The September resignation of Prime Minister Antoine 
Gizenga ended a long period of absentee government.  One month 
later, on the eve of nominating Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito, 
Kabila made a rare television appearance, calling for unity as the 
country mobilized against threats in the east.  The Muzito 
government retained key economic and fiscal figures, including the 
Ministers of Economy, Finance, and Plan.  Notable changes occurred 
at Defense and Interior, likely a consequence of the FARDC poor 
performance in the east.  The new government also included three new 
posts for Vice Prime Ministers, whose dossiers reflected Kabila's 
campaign-winning slogan touting development priorities.  Renewed 
engagement by DRC Ministers in the last quarter of the year with 
foreign donors, regional neighbors, and international organizations 
has inspired optimism that the government has assumed a more active 
role, which it was unwilling or incapable of doing during Gizenga's 
tenure. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Parliament met in regularly scheduled spring (March-June) 
and fall (September-December) sessions, both sessions followed by 
30-day extensions.  Parliament passed and Kabila promulgated the law 
establishing the judicial oversight commission, prerequisite laws 
for decentralization and local elections, the law on the protection 
of children, and a law establishing the media regulatory body.  Key 
omissions in 2008 included the law establishing general amnesty for 
crimes of insurrection in the Kivus, the creation of the permanent 
successor to the national electoral commission, the establishment of 
the courts and judicial order, and additional laws establishing 
local jurisdictions ahead of decentralization and local elections. 
The National Assembly enthusiastically engaged in oversight 
responsibility, frequently questioning government officials and 
national deputies, although little official censure resulted from 
the proceedings.  The National Assembly also lifted immunity from 
prosecution for 12 deputies who allegedly took payments to influence 
their votes on the 2009 National Budget.  In December, the National 
Assembly and Senate Presidents refused a call to join the GDRC team 
in the bilateral Nairobi talks with the rebel group CNDP. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Despite promising diplomatic and military cooperation 
between the DRC and Rwanda in January 2009, ongoing conflict and 
human displacement in the east will be compounded by the 
implementation of the decentralization process and anticipated local 
elections.  The USG can use these challenges as opportunities to 
assist the DRC in the following areas: 
 
-- further entrench and legitimatize the USG presence in Goma as a 
symbol and hub of US commitment to ending the crisis in the short 
term and continued engagement in the region in the long term; 
 
-- intensify diplomatic engagement to push for action against GDRC 
and FARDC involvement in illicit mining activities, sexual and 
gender-based violence, trafficking in persons and child labor; 
 
-- continue USG mediation and facilitation in regional conflict 
resolution forums such as the Tripartite Plus Commission; 
 
-- remain engaged with the GDRC leading up to local elections and 
decentralization, encouraging the GDRC to move forward with these 
efforts in a consistent and democratic manner; 
 
-- remain engaged in justice reform, ensuring this will be a key 
pillar in the development of democratic institutions through 
continued funding of training and delivery of legal services; 
 
KINSHASA 00000120  003 OF 007 
 
 
 
-- persuade the GDRC to stay the course on developing democratic 
institutions and practices, allowing political space for an 
opposition and proceeding with local elections, as scheduled. 
 
----------------------------- 
Security and Defense Aspects 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Three interrelated issues dominated the military situation 
in the DRC in 2008, and they will present potential challenges and 
opportunities in 2009.  First, a culture of impunity and corruption 
have made the FARDC an army in name only, and one whose human rights 
record is so abysmal that the DRC's citizenry are at more risk from 
it than from many of the extralegal armed groups in the country. 
Second, this factor contributed to the military stalemate in eastern 
DRC, as the FARDC remains as likely to collaborate with or flee from 
illegal armed groups in the region as it is to fight them.  Finally, 
change in FARDC leadership at both the civilian (Minister of Defense 
- MOD) and military levels (Chief of Defense - CHOD) has the 
potential to improve the military situation if they are given 
adequate political and fiscal resources. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The FARDC's new leadership is taking steps to address 
these problems, although it is uncertain whether or not it will have 
adequate will or political and financial capital to make the 
fundamental changes necessary to address the military's significant 
challenges.  With the assistance of the European Union's Security 
Mission in Congo (EUSEC), the FARDC has completed a bio-metric 
census of its membership and appears poised to implement a chain of 
payment separate from the chain of command.  The FARDC is also 
focusing on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force composed of up to 
twelve infantry battalions with supporting air and riverine 
capacity, which it views as a "model army" for the rest of the 
military and intends to use to end the military stalemate in the 
Kivus.  Making the FARDC a professional force, or even settling for 
one that is merely harmless, will require more than structural 
change, however.  President Kabila and the new MOD and CHOD will 
have to take meaningful steps to reduce corruption and impunity at 
all levels of the FARDC and establish a systematic professional 
military education program that will forge and sustain a generation 
of leaders who will institutionalize a professional military ethic 
into its organizational culture. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The USG has an important role to play in the FARDC's 
reform effort, but the complex nature of the problem and limited 
resources militate for a response based on persistence, precision, 
and presence.  Consistent presence is required to demonstrate the 
USG's commitment to security sector reform (SSR), to make continuous 
guidance available to the FARDC, and to provide an example of the 
professional military ethic in action.  Precise targeting of USG 
military assistance resources is also necessary to address the 
fundamental problems facing the FARDC and maximize their impact by 
carefully coordinating them with other USG agencies, EUSEC, the 
United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), and other states and 
entities involved in SSR.  Lastly, the USG must be persistent in the 
face of fluctuations inherent in complex, dynamic situations, such 
as the current situation in the DRC, and offer its consistent 
support to those areas in which it chooses to engage while firmly 
holding the GDRC's leadership accountable for the FARDC's behavior. 
 
---------------- 
Economic Outlook 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The DRC's economic environment changed dramatically 
during the course of 2008 as a result of the global recession in the 
final quarter of 2008.  Double-digit GDP growth projections for 
2008, forecast as recently as October, have been revised downward to 
8 percent.  GDP growth for 2009 is projected at below 5 percent. 
The once robust mining sector significantly contracted towards the 
end of the year due to falling international commodities prices, 
tightening international credit, and dampened investor confidence in 
the sector.  International reserves reached a five year low.  Within 
this rapidly changing landscape, there are several key economic 
developments of note in 2008: the conclusion in early 2008 of a $9 
billion Sino-Congolese agreement to exploit mining resources and 
develop Congolese infrastructure; the completion by mid-December of 
mining contract reviews for all but six of the 61 companies; 
progress, albeit incomplete, toward the re-establishment of an IMF 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF); the passage of a 
record, if  unrealistic, $5 billion budget for 2009; an August 2008 
meeting on development cooperation between President Joseph Kabila, 
Ambassadors from donor countries and representatives of multilateral 
aid organizations; and renewed engagement with traditional donors 
under the new leadership of Prime Minister Muzito.  Progress was 
 
KINSHASA 00000120  004 OF 007 
 
 
made in implementing several key economic reforms during 2008, 
including: higher than anticipated revenues due to improved 
mobilization efforts and continuing reforms in the tax and customs 
administrations; improvements to the budget-execution system, 
including through implementation of a reporting mechanism within the 
public finance management system; and establishment, in coordination 
with international donors, of more specific and coherent policies to 
support infrastructure development.  Overall, the DRC's economic 
record for 2008 was mixed, with missed opportunities by the GDRC to 
improve its investment climate, diversify its economy, and undertake 
necessary reforms that would have reduced the country's 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) As the DRC braces for a challenging economic outlook in 
2009 -- including significantly lower economic growth, significant 
balance of payments and financing gaps and unrealistic spending 
levels in its 2009 budget -- the USG has an opportunity to advocate 
and engage in several key economic areas.  These include: 
 
-- Re-establishment of a formal IMF program: The GDRC has shown 
greater political will to revisit the Sino-Congolese agreement with 
the aim of establishing an IMF PRGF and accelerating Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point.  The USG should 
continue to advocate, both with the GDRC and the PRC Government, the 
importance of making the Chinese agreement compatible with debt 
sustainability. 
 
-- Support for immediate financial assistance: Post encourages USG 
support at the IMF Board level for immediate IMF financial 
assistance through the IMF's Rapid Access Component of its Exogenous 
Shock Facility.  Support for this facility would provide critically 
needed fiscal space for the GDRC and provide leverage for us to push 
the DRC to work towards a formal IMF agreement and key reforms, 
including more transparent emergency spending.  Without emergency 
financial support, the GDRC could face a financial crisis as early 
as the first quarter of 2009, possibly derailing prospects for the 
IMF program, further deepening the country's grinding poverty and 
potentially destabilizing the Government. 
 
-- Regional Integration: There has been growing recognition, by the 
GDRC and donors, that economic integration can serve as a positive 
mechanism to reduce illegal trade and exploitation of natural 
resources by supporting legitimate commerce in the Great Lakes 
region.  The USG should look for ways to reinvigorate existing 
regional economic institutional mechanisms and promote legitimate 
economic activities within the sub-region. 
 
-- An improved investment climate: The DRC must do more to 
facilitate trade and investment, including reducing bureaucracy and 
corruption and resolving key outstanding investment disputes.  A key 
goal for the GDRC in 2009 must be to improve its position from 
dead-last on the World Bank's Doing Business rankings.  The USG 
should continue to engage with the GDRC at the highest levels to 
advocate for specific improvements in the investment climate. 
Working level GDRC officials have indicated a willingness to engage 
on these issues through a bilateral commercial dialogue. 
 
-- Food Security: The International Food Policy Research Institute's 
Global Hunger Index ranks the DRC last among 88 countries surveyed. 
The country has much untapped agricultural potential but is overly 
reliant on food imports, including food aid, while agricultural 
production and market access are severely depressed.  The USG should 
support development of the GDRC's strategic policies in this sector 
in the context of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Program (CAADP); increased support for the agricultural sector, and 
seeking to leverage other donors' support to reduce the DRC's import 
and aid dependence and promote growth of incomes in this sector. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Social and Human Development Aspects 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The DRC ranked 177 out of 179 countries on the 2008 
update of the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI).  The HDI 
ranks countries according to life expectancy at birth; adult 
literacy rates and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary 
gross enrollment ratios; and standard of living by GDP per capita. 
For the first time, a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was 
conducted in the DRC in 2007, with nearly 10,000 women and nearly 
5,000 men between the ages of 15 and 49 interviewed in all 11 
provinces. 
 
-- Health: The DHS shows a continued high fertility level, with an 
average of 6.3 children per mother.  Results show that only one in 
five married women are using any form of family planning, and only 
one in five women indicated she would not want more children. 
 
KINSHASA 00000120  005 OF 007 
 
 
Childhood mortality remains extremely high in the DRC with 92 
children per 1,000 live births dying before their first birthday. 
Maternal mortality also remains high, according to the DHS, with 549 
maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births.  Less than one in 
five children between the age of one and two received any childhood 
immunizations.  Less than 10 percent of households own an 
insecticide treated mosquito net (ITN).  One quarter of children 
under the age of 18 are considered to be orphans or vulnerable 
children.  The HIV prevalence rate was 1.3 overall, with almost 90 
percent of those tested unaware of their HIV status.  Prevalence 
rates were higher in urban areas than in rural zones. 
 
-- Education: The DHS revealed elevated literacy rates, expressed as 
a 27.7 percent illiteracy rate for women, and a 13.6 percent 
illiteracy rate for men.  Only 46 percent of the population attended 
primary schooling, 30 percent secondary schooling, and 3 percent 
completed university-level education. 
 
-- Gender Based Violence: The DHS reported that nearly 75 percent of 
women have suffered from spousal or partner abuse, whether physical, 
emotional, or sexual.  Nearly two thirds of women reported suffering 
from physical violence since age 15, and nearly half of women 
suffered violence during the past 12 months, with married women 
reporting higher levels of violence.  Sixteen percent of women have 
been forced to have intercourse against their will at some point in 
their lives. 
 
-------------- 
USG Assistance 
-------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) USAID/DRC continued to implement development programs in 
the sectors of health, education, democracy and governance, economic 
growth, peace and security, environment, and social protection in 
¶2008.  The major challenge facing U.S. foreign assistance programs 
in fiscal year 2008 was ongoing tension and conflict in the eastern 
DRC, which not only fueled a humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds 
of thousands of people, but also distracted the GDRC from fully 
focusing on the country's development agenda.  In response to the 
crisis, humanitarian programs, including both food aid and non-food 
assistance, provided life-saving support.  Overall, direct U.S. 
foreign assistance to the DRC totaled approximately $215 million, 
including $125 million in development assistance and military 
cooperation, and $90 million in humanitarian assistance funding, 
including emergency food aid.  Funding for 2008 included $12.5 
million in supplemental assistance. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Support for a negotiated end to conflict received strong 
support in 2008, with programs in conflict mitigation, community 
stabilization, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) building a foundation for an eventual end to hostilities. In 
2008, U.S. foreign assistance included over $9 million dollars in 
National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207) resources for 
support to military justice, civilian justice, and local government 
strengthening activities and $12.5 million in fiscal year 2008 
Supplemental Economic Support Funds for return, reintegration and 
recovery activities.  In 2009, assistance will continue for 
stabilization activities as the central cross-cutting theme for U.S. 
assistance. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Embassy Kinshasa was one of three embassies in Africa to 
develop a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) in 2008, a 
whole-of-government strategic planning document that summarizes the 
direction and design of U.S. foreign assistance to the DRC for 
2009-2013.  The new CAS provides a tool to better communicate and 
plan for U.S. assistance activities to the DRC.  The negotiation and 
signature of a new bilateral framework agreement -- the first 
rewrite since the 1948 accord with Belgium --provides the basis for 
strengthening coordination and cooperation with the government of 
the DRC in programming these resources.  In 2009, USAID will develop 
sector-specific assistance agreements with the GDRC in order to gain 
increased commitment and participation in the implementation of 
foreign assistance, while at the same time ensuring that resources 
are in line with the DRC's development agenda and the Country 
Assistance Framework endorsed by 19 multilateral and bilateral 
partners, including the United States. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) At the end of 2008 the DRC faced a severe budget crisis 
caused by the sharp decline in commodity prices, particularly for 
industrial metals that are the basis of the country's revenue 
earnings.  U.S. foreign assistance will increasingly focus on the 
DRC's economic growth needs, in particular through support for a new 
agricultural development activity to support job creation and 
address the country's severe food insecurity problem.  Although it 
has vast areas of arable land, the DRC is limited in agricultural 
production by a lack of infrastructure, endemic corruption, and a 
 
KINSHASA 00000120  006 OF 007 
 
 
policy and regulatory environment that discourages investment.  In 
2008, nearly 30,000 rural households benefited from U.S. assistance 
in agriculture.  The assistance also supported the creation of over 
50 small and medium enterprises. 
In 2009 a new agricultural development program will focus on 
processing and marketing issues in addition to increased production, 
but the more challenging issues of corruption and economic policy 
will remain high-level issues for engagement. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In 2008, highlights in the democracy and governance area 
included the training of 275 national legislators and legislative 
staff on key issues such as financial procedures, and support in 
drafting eight key pieces of legislation, including decentralization 
legislation.  In 2009 assistance will focus on improving governance 
and the rule of law, as the country implements an ambitious 
decentralization program and puts in place constitutionally-mandated 
judicial institutions.  Further assistance will encourage civic 
participation in political processes, including planned 2009 local 
elections. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Assistance in the social sectors, including health, 
education, and programs targeting survivors of gender-based violence 
and vulnerable children, continued to be an important focus of U.S. 
foreign assistance in 2008.  In health, USAID supported the delivery 
of a package of basic health services for over 10 million people in 
82 health zones, including a focus on maternal and child health; 
prevention and treatment of malaria, TB, and HIV/AIDS; and family 
planning and reproductive health.  In education, enrollment rates 
increased in USAID-supported schools by 22 percent, with over 
600,000 students and 21,000 teachers benefiting from education 
programs.  USAID provided critical care and treatment services to 
more than 20,000 vulnerable people, including survivors of sexual 
and gender based violence (SGBV) and abandoned and at-risk children. 
 Under the new CAS, the health and education portfolios will begin 
new activities in 2009 to address critical needs in these areas. 
Programs targeting the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, in 
particular, will be implemented with increased PEPFAR resources. 
Programs targeting survivors of gender-based violence will continue, 
though limited resources will not expand activities responding to 
this growing crisis. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) U.S. military assistance to the DRC increased in 2008, in 
recognition of the central role of a strengthened armed forces in 
the DRC's stability and long-term development.  The U.S. is 
supporting the establishment of a rapid reaction force battalion to 
enable the DRC to respond to pressing security threats from illegal 
armed groups and develop a model around which future professional 
units can be formed.  Congolese institutional military capacity was 
improved by providing a senior advisor to the Ministry of Defense, 
and by supporting professional training for 650 brigade and 
battalion level officers in leadership, decision making, human 
rights and basic staff skills training.  U.S. assistance also 
supported refurbishment of an officer training center in Kinshasa. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Environment, Forest Conservation, and CARPE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) The GDRC made important strides in forestry management 
and environmental conservation in 2008, notably the final conversion 
of forest logging titles into concessions in conformance with the 
2002 forestry code.  An inter-ministerial commission, with local 
community representation, reduced legal concessions from 156 to 49, 
with a corresponding 75 per cent reduction of area allocated for 
logging.  The national park service approved three new protected 
areas to bring the total protected area of national territory to 
over ten percent (Note: the government target is 15%.  End Note) 
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry adopted an ambitious legal 
reform agenda and improved coordination with the donor community 
through regular and well structured thematic donor group meetings. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) In 2009, the decentralization process will challenge the 
DRC's capacity to manage protected areas.  DRC conservation 
financing through the Bali Global Climate Change Road Map envisions 
carbon market payments to the GDRC within the global reduction of 
deforestation and degradation (REDD) framework.  The USG has a 
massive investment in tropical forest and biodiversity conservation 
through the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the Central Africa 
Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE).  USG support 
contributes to improved management of 45 zones totaling 24 million 
hectares in the DRC.  These investments can facilitate DRC 
participation in future carbon markets and support poverty reduction 
at local levels. 
 
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KINSHASA 00000120  007 OF 007 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Recent diplomatic and military cooperation with Uganda, 
South Sudan, and Rwanda underpin optimism for security and 
pacification in the eastern DRC in 2009.  The USG should capitalize 
on these developments to support the demobilization and integration 
of armed groups and the professionalization of the national army. 
Regional cooperation will be a cornerstone of DRC national security 
and economic reform.  DRC coordination with regional partners, 
international donors, and international institutions such as the IMF 
will simultaneously address short-term responses to the global 
economic downturn and promote long-term financial assistance and 
development programs.  Cessation of armed conflict in the east would 
allow development assistance to take hold and permit the transition 
from costly defense spending to desperately needed infrastructure 
investment.  The development of effective checks and balances within 
the national government is a work in progress which will be further 
complicated by the decentralization process, and continued USG 
assistance and oversight is essential to prevent a return to the 
centralized regimes of the past.  Guarded optimism and focused 
engagement, tempered by memory of recent military and economic 
reverses, should guide the USG policy towards with the DRC in 2009. 
End Comment. 
 
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