VZCZCXRO1860
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0108/01 0341422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031422Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9130
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000108 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - FEBRUARY 3 
 
REFS: A) Kinshasa 98  B) Kinshasa 92  C) Kinshasa 85 
 
 
¶1.  (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of 
spot information from various sources.  This report is not 
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be 
confirmed at this time. 
 
 
Human Rights Watch on Bosco 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a February 1 open letter to President Kabila (emailed 
to AF/C and DRL), Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the GDRC to 
extradite CNDP renegade Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC.  HRW criticized 
the GDRC for its recent open collaboration with Bosco, including his 
appointment as the deputy commander of the DRC-Rwandan joint 
operations.  HRW maintained that peace and justice "should be seen 
as complementary, not contradictory," as President Kabila had 
implied in a January 31 press conference (ref A).  HRW noted that, 
in May 2007, the DRC reportedly asked MONUC for assistance in 
arresting Bosco. 
 
 
DRC-Rwandan Joint Operations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Despite its frustrations with the Joint Operations Center 
(JOC), MONUC reported that the JOC was useful to corroborate field 
information with the FARDC.  For example, MONUC and the FARDC concur 
that approximately 800-1,000 FDLR troops are present at Kashabere, 
northwest of Masisi; 1,200-1,500 FDLR soldiers are at Katoyi, south 
of Masisi; two FDLR battalions totaling 700-800 are deployed at 
Bushalinga, west of Kanyabayonga; and another FDLR battalion is 
southwest of Ishasha.  MONUC sources reported a possible firefight 
in the Virunga Park, west of Rugari.  After several days of 
remaining stationary, RDF forces are on the move again, with one 
group bypassing Masisi heading towards Walikale. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Despite earlier doubts about CNDP willingness to integrate 
into the FARDC (refs B and C), MONUC reported significant numbers of 
CNDP troops reporting for integration: approximately 600 CNDP at 
Rutshuru; and 366 CNDP and 111 Pareco at Rumangabo.  CNDP officers 
reportedly refused to present child soldiers for demobilization, 
allegedly threatening to withdraw from the integration program if 
MONUC insisted on including the child soldiers in the process. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) MONUC has been unable to verify media reports that the 
FDLR killed 36 civilians in villages between Masisi and Walikale. 
The FDLR announced that it "has never committed a single abuse 
against civilians in the DRC."  An FDLR website reportedly claimed 
that the majority of the RDF soldiers participating in the joint 
operations are FDLR members who defected through the DDRRR process. 
There were also unconfirmed allegations of an FDLR reprisal attack 
against civilians at Minova in South Kivu, as well as allegations of 
an RDF attack on villagers between Rutshuru and Ishasa. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to UNHCR, approximately 5,000 people fled 
Makobola, south of Uvira in South Kivu, after Mai Mai militia 
blocked a road.  Fearing possible fighting, an estimated 1,300 
Congolese crossed into Uganda January 26-30, bringing the total 
refugee flow to Uganda to 4,500 in January.  UNHCR reported that 
approximately 40,000 Congolese have fled to Uganda since the latest 
round of fighting erupted in August 2008. 
 
 
DDRRR Process Continues 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) MONUC reported that increasing numbers of FDLR troops have 
surrendered.  Fifty combatants surrendered to MONUC at Nyabiondo, 
northwest of Masisi, and smaller groups have reportedly trickled in 
at other North Kivu locations.  DDRRR Head of Office Bruno Donat 
told the International Facilitation (IF) team that his office did 
not have enough trucks to handle the flow.  Donat noted that, if 
current trends continue, the numbers could be in the "thousands" 
this month.  (Note: Prior to the operations, DDRRR repatriations 
averaged about 150 per month.  End Note.)  The DDRRR office has 
printed flyers in various languages, indicating where the nine 
repatriation centers in North Kivu are and informing FDLR troops and 
dependents that they can repatriate without fear.  According to 
Donat, Rwandan CHOD James Kabarebe fully supports the DDRRR program, 
but DRC National Security Advisor Prince Lafunda Kaumba, who handles 
DDRRR issues, is reportedly less enthusiastic. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Most of the people arriving at DDRRR sites are dependents, 
 
KINSHASA 00000108  002 OF 002 
 
 
although Donat opined that some may indeed be ex-combatants in 
civilian clothes.  Technically, UNHCR has responsibility for 
civilians, so Donat has contacted ICRC and UNHCR for assistance. 
However, Donat told the IF team that he does not want to screen the 
ex-combatants "too closely."  Donat appealed to the international 
community for resources, particularly transport, arguing that the 
time was propitious to "kick DDRRR efforts into full gear." 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Donat said he accompanied six RUD ex-combatants back to 
Kisiki following a one-week visit to Rwanda.  In Donat's view, the 
group appeared reassured and open to the idea of repatriating. 
However, another source told Goma PolOff that the Rwandans had 
tightly controlled the visit, raising doubts as to whether the 
ex-combatants would actually agree to repatriate. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In a January 17 statement, North Kivu tribal leaders 
(Mwamis) called for a sensitization campaign, with Mwami 
involvement, to encourage the peaceful repatriation of Rwandan 
combatants and their dependents. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Donat undoubtedly has a motive to tout DDRRR successes, 
but the program is unarguably a key component for long-term peace in 
the East.  Repatriation efforts appear to be working hand-in-hand 
with the threat of military operations.  With President Kabila 
proclaiming that Rwandan forces must leave the DRC by the end of 
February, there may be a limited window of opportunity to use the 
carrot-and-stick approach to promote DDRRR. 
 
GARVELINK