VZCZCXRO4983
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0278/01 0581347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271347Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3108
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000278 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KPKO UNSC ASEC MARR MOPS SU
 
SUBJECT: JIU DISARMAMENT IN UPPER NILE STATE 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 250 
 
1.(SBU) SUMMARY: A curfew remains in effect in Malakal following 
forty-eight hours of sporadic looting in and around the Upper Nile 
state capital. The death toll from  the February 24 violence 
officially stands at 31, and is expected to rise. GOSS Vice 
President Riek Machar and GNU State Minister for Humanitarian 
Affairs Ahmed Haroun finalized an agreement on February 26 barring 
JIUs from being armed while not on active duty, and initiating the 
"immediate" transfer of SAF JIU elements formerly aligned with SAF 
MG Gabriel Tanginiya and former SSDF Commander Thomas Mabior.  SPLA 
shared with UNMIS copies of documents indicating that NISS 
orchestrated Tanginiya's return to the South, reinforcing GOSS 
claims of NCP subterfuge.  Despite Machar's efforts in Malakal, GOSS 
officials in Juba remain skeptical of the agreement's staying power. 
 SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng Nhial notes the likelihood of a 
SAF-generated challenge at the March Joint Defense Board, and 
stressed the communication between Juba and Machar has been 
inconsistent since the latter's arrival in Upper Nile on February 
¶24. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
MALAKAL VIOLENCE: ECHOES OF 2006, AND ABYEI 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Malakal's stadium lights were left on throughout the night 
of February 26 in an attempt to reassure the civilian population of 
the violence-scarred town.  The new stadium - and its lights - were 
a "peace dividend" erected in advance of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement's (CPA) fourth anniversary this year. Its illumination 
provided a sadly ironic backdrop to Juba's allegations that Khartoum 
is actively attempting to undermine the peace.  SPLA officers showed 
senior UNMIS officials on February 26 documents that indicate the 
National Intelligence Security Service (NISS) ordered Tanginiya to 
return to Malakal. A widely-circulated February 27 SPLM press 
release describing the violence stated that  "the SAF tore down one 
the largest billboards bearing Kiir's image."  UNMIS/Juba Civil 
Affairs Deputy Chief Diane de Guzman told ConGen PolOff that 
targeted acts of vandalism against SPLM symbols, the party's Malakal 
office, and other structures in town appeared "eerily reminiscent" 
of the destruction of the SPLM's offices in Abyei last May. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While UNMIS terms the situation in Malakal stable as of 
February 27, they caution that it is far from normal. T-55 tanks 
under command of SAF JIU elements had plowed into a series of the 
town's new electrical poles, destroying a swath of newly-erected 
street lights and impairing the town's two-month old electrical 
grid, simultaneously disrupting the town's ability to directly 
supply households with water and electricity.  (NOTE: Until February 
24, Malakal was only the second town in all of Southern Sudan to 
have electricity. END NOTE.) Looting continued for forty-eight hours 
once the town was plunged into darkness. SPLA officials acknowledge 
both JIU and "confirmed SPLA" were involved in criminal acts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
HAROUN/MACHAR AGREEMENT TARGETS OAG JIU ELEMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the evening of February 26, GOSS Vice President Riek 
Machar and GNU State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun 
agreed on a series of resolutions to restore civilian confidence and 
restore the peace.  The agreement includes three provisions directly 
addressing past SPLA allegations that the SAF JIU element violates 
the CPA's Security Arrangements by not being "true" SAF, but 
remnants of Khartoum-aligned militias left in the South following 
the SAF's 2007 redeployment. According to UNMIS officials who have 
reviewed the document, to include Ceasefire Joint Military 
Commission Head BG Mac Paul, one resolution specifies that JIU is to 
be disarmed throughout Upper Nile State, with arms stored in a 
yet-to-be established or identified armory, and issued to soldiers 
only when they report for duty.  Additionally, all SAF JIU soldiers 
with ties to either former SSDF Commander Thomas Mabior or Tanginiya 
are to be transferred to Joint Integrated Units outside of the Upper 
Nile region and excluding Abyei. 
 
¶5. (SBU) An investigation also will be conducted to identify and 
expel from the JIU SAF soldiers implicated in this week's violence 
and that of 2006.  UNMIS/Juba Deputy Civil Affairs Chief Diane De 
Guzman noted to ConGen PolOff that there were parallel, ongoing 
discussions about the need to carry out forced civilian disarmament 
in Malakal's peri-urban areas and in the vicinity of Fangak in order 
to ensure that Tanginiya's relatives' weapons caches were similarly 
confiscated. . Further to reftel reports of SAF JIU splintering 
amidst the mutiny of "Tanginiya's men," SAF JIU elements formerly 
 
KHARTOUM 00000278  002 OF 003 
 
 
under the control of Gordon Kong Chuol will be permitted to remain 
at the Malakal JIU.  (NOTE: Kong was actively involved in the 2006 
Malakal violence that left more than 150 dead and remains on 
Khartoum's payroll to this day. END NOTE.)  Minister for SPLA 
Affairs Nhial Deng Nhial told ConGen PolOff on February 27 that 
while the resolutions were positive, he is less optimistic about 
their viability.  "Neither the Vice President nor Haroun have the 
ability to determine courses of action affecting JIUs - that is a 
duty of the Joint Defense Board.  While SPLA would support such 
decisions remaining in place, I'm dubious of our partner's 
commitment," he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to de Guzman, a livid Upper Nile Governor Gatluak 
Deng (NCP) dressed-down SAF JIU officers attending UN-facilitated 
crisis management meetings, and ordered the immediate confiscation 
of all SAF JIU property outside of the SAF's barracks along the 
Nile.  Gatluak apparently justified the order as a means to prevent 
SAF "from recklessly using my town's infrastructure to wage war 
against peace-loving citizens in the South." (NOTE: The SAF JIU 
"barracks" in Malakal, in contrast to its other holdings, consist of 
little more than four small dilapidated buildings and a series of 
tents. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------- 
MISCOMMUNICATION CONTINUES 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) GNU State Minister for Energy and Mining Angelina Teny 
Machar told AEC Ambassador Plumbly on February 26  that SPLA (likely 
from the First Division, in Renk) still remained in control of the 
airport at Paloich following the February 24 murder of a petroleum 
policeman by SPLA JIU forces traveling towards Malakal.  UNMIS 
reports that the JIU soldiers had ordered the petroleum police off 
the road.   During the argument that followed due to the police 
officers' refusal to obey the JIU soldiers, the latter shot three 
officers, wounding two and killing one.  The surviving police 
transported the body of those killed  to the WNPOC mortuary at 
Paloich and arranged for the medevac of the two wounded to Kosti. 
According to UNMIS, in another incident SPLA soldiers not affiliated 
with the JIU commandeered a vehicle being operated by SAF in Malakal 
town on February 25, killing all four occupants. 
 
---------- 
DEATH TOLL 
---------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The death toll continues to rise, with an official count 
being released by SPLA and state government officials February 26 
and CJMC officials in the process of verifying SAF totals. 
Officially, the death toll stands at 31, with four military 
fatalities.  However, bodies were still be collected from the 
streets of Malakal as of late February 26, according to Ambassador 
Riek Puok Riek, the Governor's Executive Director.  Malakal Teaching 
Hospital reports 37 civilian and 3 military casualties, and 22 dead, 
including four SAF officers.  SPLA reports a different figure: 14 of 
its soldiers were killed, and 40 wounded, and it maintains 14 SAF 
were killed, 24 wounded SAF were medevaced from Malakal, and six 
remain at Malakal Teaching Hospital. 
 
---------------------------- 
DISTRUST OF MACHAR CONTINUES 
---------------------------- 
 
. (SBU) Machar's efforts have not yet changed opinions in Juba, 
where news of his resolutions with Haroun was first conveyed to 
senior GOSS officials via discussions with ConGen Juba and UNMIS 
officials.  SPLM Deputy Secretary General Anne Itto echoed the 
sentiments of others, to include GOSS President Kiir, in a February 
26 meeting with ConGen PolOff, that Machar is grandstanding in 
advance of a campaign for the GOSS Presidency.  Itto allowed that a 
re-evaluation fMachar's standing was permitted under the SPLM 
Constitution, and there has been talk of doing so on the margins of 
the past  two Political Bureau meetings.  "But for now we are 
concentrating on making sure the NCP does not use the events of 
Malakal to further distort and detract from the agenda of CPA 
implementation - although Machar's mistakes are mounting," she said. 
Queried as to his thoughts on the Vice President's presence in 
Malakal, SPLA Affairs Minister Nhial Deng let out a lengthy sigh. "I 
am hoping that we are not looking at a rebirth of the Nasir 
faction," he said, in reference to the Nuer-dominated, Machar-led 
faction that split from the SPLA in 1991. 
------- 
COMMENT 
 
KHARTOUM 00000278  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
¶10.  (SBU) The Haroun/Machar agreement cuts the cancer of 
SAF-aligned militias out of Upper Nile's already beleaguered JIUs. 
Had SAF been pressed to abide by CPA provisions on JIU formation, 
history has now demonstrated that Sudan might have avoided the 
violence in  Malakal in 2009 and in Abyei in  2008.  Instead, these 
outbursts of violenae once again demonstrate the hair-trigger danger 
that a seemingly minor incident poses against the backdrop of 
disingenuous CPA implementation, and can erupt into violent 
conflict. 
¶11. (SBU) It remains to be seen if Machar  can weather his return to 
Juba.  Practical impediments (lack of an armory and the March Joint 
Defense Board meeting) exist that could derail the implementation of 
the February 26 resolutions.  Machar has, in the past, been accused 
of being overly optimistic in negotiations (such as the LRA peace 
talks and the most recent rounds of the joint SPLM/NCP Executive 
Committee talks in Khartoum.)   That he has been less-than 
communicative with key GOSS counterparts as events in Malakal have 
unfolded remains a point of concern, and is unlikely to improve 
Kiir's opinion of his deputy. 
FERNANDEZ