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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM273, JEM RETREATS TOWARDS CHAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM273 2009-02-26 13:24 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3334
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0273 0571324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261324Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3103
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000273 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JEM RETREATS TOWARDS CHAD 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 259 
 
1. (SBU) Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels have retreated 
towards Chad, according to according to UNAMID and GOS sources. A 
source at UNAMID told poloff on February 26 that approximately 60 
vehicles crossed into Chadian territory on February 24 carrying 
wounded fighters, and were headed towards JEM's base in Um Jaras. An 
additional 100 vehicles followed during the morning of February 25, 
but it was unclear whether they actually crossed the border, he 
said.  He added that given its claim to be the most powerful rebel 
movement in Darfur, JEM would likely need to maintain a token 
presence in Darfur during the course of the Doha talks. 
 
2. (SBU) Chadian rebels based in Khartoum, in contact with their 
fighters amassed along the Sudan-Chad border, confirmed to poloffs 
February 26 the information about JEM crossing into Chad.  They 
claimed that President Deby is planning a preemptive attack on the 
Chadian rebels within the next week or two, and that JEM will help 
Deby in this attack against them (septel). 
 
3. (SBU) On February 25 MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq told CDA Fernandez 
that JEM is in the area of Wadi Howar on the Chad-Sudan border. 
(Note: Wadi Howar is a large dry river system that stretches over 
1,100 km from its source area in eastern Chad to the Nile. JEM is 
said to camp at the Wadi Howar area on the Chad-Sudan border on its 
forays into Darfur. End Note.) Siddiq confirmed that JEM had clashed 
with the forces of Minni Minnawi (reftel), noting that JEM had 
narrowly escaped an ambush. Though Minnawi's forces got the better 
of JEM and inflicted some damage, JEM was "not hurt that much," 
according to Siddiq. 
 
4. (SBU) Reflecting upon SLA/Minnawi's relative success against JEM 
(where the SAF has failed,) CDA Fernandez remarked to Siddiq that it 
reminded him of the proverb, "It takes a thief to catch a thief." 
Siddiq agreed, and noted that the political leadership of the NCP 
has been telling SAF the same thing; in order to defeat JEM, SAF 
needs to adopt new tactics and emulate the raider campaigns of 
Zaghawa movements. But the SAF remains inflexible, he said, 
admitting that "on the ground, the other movements are more 
dangerous to JEM than we are."  But he quickly added that only JEM 
represents both a political and a military challenge to the NCP 
among the Zaghawa-based movements. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: It appears JEM has been driven towards Chad by its 
long supply line, SLA/Minnawi ground attacks and/or SAF bombings, 
though hostility from the Maidob tribe, which controls swaths of 
territory in North Darfur, might have also forced a complete JEM 
withdrawal into Chad (JEM may have killed up to 150 Maidob tribesmen 
in early January).  In view of the Doha talks and its repeated claim 
to be the only significant force in Darfur, a total withdrawal into 
Chad would certainly discredit JEM's negotiating position, so future 
forays into Darfur remain highly likely. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment Cont.: Given Chadian rebel mobilization and the 
Chadian rebels' contention that an attack by the Chadian forces is 
coming soon, it is entirely possible that JEM retreated fully at the 
behest of the Chadian government to reprise its role as a defensive 
force. Given President Deby's strong rhetoric during his visit to 
eastern Chad this week, and Chadian rebel preparations (all Chadian 
rebel leaders have now returned to the field) we expect some sort of 
confrontation between Chadian forces and the rebels in the near 
future. 
 
FERNANDEZ