VZCZCXRO0961
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0255 0551333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241333Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3077
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000255 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT, AND NOT JUST EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, IS NEEDED 
IN DARFUR, SAYS REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER 
 
¶1. (SBU) On February 23, Ibrahim Musa Madibbo, Chairman of the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority's  Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Commission, presented his institution's work to CDA 
Fernandez.  The stack of books in Arabic included: a study 
documenting the root causes of the conflict in Darfur; an analysis 
of IDP camps and proposed areas for voluntary return; and three 
separate development studies on farming, water and sanitation, and 
schools. Most startling is a seemingly precise accounting of 
hundreds of Darfur villages destroyed during the years of the 
violence. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Madibbo emphasized that much of his Commission's work is 
groundbreaking in its detail, scope, and timing.  Now that the 
preliminary studies have been completed, the Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Commission will continue to seek funding for the 
implementation of its projects, stated Madibbo.  Although the Arab 
League, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Government of Saudi 
Arabia have all pledged significant funding on numerous occasions, 
none of these institutions and states has delivered on its 
promises. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As an example of his work, Madibbo said his Commission has 
advocated for the voluntary return of IDPS to a limited number of 
rural villages.  Rather than return to the over two thousand very 
small villages scattered throughout all Darfur, IDPs should return 
to larger, rural towns where they will receive better protection, 
services, and infrastructure.  Madibbo stated that this solution for 
voluntary return could be considered a compromise between the forced 
urbanization of the IDP camps and the unrealistic notion that all of 
the IDPs will return to their original, remote, vulnerable, and 
almost completely destroyed homelands.  Other examples of the 
Commission's work include: a proposal for aiding recent immigrants 
from West Africa to return to their countries of origin; 
agricultural projects for Darfur's farmers (which comprise over 80% 
of Darfur's population;) and plans for the largest water project in 
the history of Darfur. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Madibbo stated that now is the time to start moving from 
disaster relief to development.  CDA Fernandez replied that the U.S. 
would like to eventually move in that direction in Darfur, but that 
in order for this to occur the Government of Sudan (and especially 
the Humanitarian Affairs Commission) must demonstrate that it is 
willing to work with the U.S. as a partner.  The GoS looks at 
international development and humanitarian assistance as a blank 
check and complains when there is accountability and oversight of 
aid and development programs.  CDA Fernandez stated that the arrival 
of the new USAID Director in Sudan will present the opportunity to 
raise the issue of development programs with senior GOS officials 
again but the regime needs to change its attitude towards the 
international community and the US if it expects more partnership. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Madibbo responded that there are certain officials within 
the GoS who are more problematic than others.  Madibbo then added 
that he would personally discuss this with senior GoS officials such 
as Vice President Ali Osman Taha (who he claimed holds the 
humanitarian and development portfolio in Darfur, while Nafie Ali 
Nafie remains in charge of Darfur negotiations.)  CDA Fernandez 
ended the meeting by asking Madibbo to brainstorm about a 
non-controversial development pilot project that would test the 
GOS's openness to a U.S. partnership and build trust between the 
U.S. and GoS.  Madibbo agreed to think about the issue and mentioned 
the devasted Fur area of Shattay as a possibility.  He then 
concluded by stating that the potential ICC arrest warrant for 
President Bashir remains a problem for the GOS, and "if there is a 
solution you can offer, it would change our relationship 100%." 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Madibbo's Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Commission appears to be much further along in its work compared to 
other TDRA commissions.  (NOTE: The Compensation Commission and Land 
Commission, for example, have only begun their preliminary studies 
and are far away from producing or recommendations for moving 
forward. END NOTE.)  The interests of both the GOS and the U.S. 
could   potentially overlap in Darfur's development, and Madibbo's 
work might provide a foundation for such cooperation.   However, the 
one caveat and major source of frustration remains that until the 
HAC and GOS stop their  harassment and obstruction of INGOs working 
in Darfur, such a partnership will be impossible. While development 
and painful tradeoffs about returns, land, and IDPs will eventually 
have to be addressed as part of a comprehensive solution to Darfur, 
this remains a regime that cannot be trusted on such sensitive 
issues. 
 
FERNANDEZ