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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM250, FIGHTING ERUPTS IN MALAKAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM250 2009-02-24 11:24 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
O 241124Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3065
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000250 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KPKO UNSC ASEC MARR MOPS SU
SUBJECT: FIGHTING ERUPTS IN MALAKAL 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Calm is slowly returning to Malakal following a 
multi-hour firefight in the center of the state capital provoked by 
Gabriel Tanginiya's return to the South. The SAF-aligned militia 
commander was directly responsible for the bloody 2006 confrontation 
between the SAF and SPLA in Malakal town.  Casualty reports remain 
unconfirmed, but UNMIS reports it has successfully safe-havened all 
INGOs into its Sector Three Headquarters. SPLA has taken control of 
the airport and is slowly restoring calm to the town.  Tanginiya 
remains in Malakal and UNMIS/Juba is facilitating the travel of JIU 
Deputy National Commander (SPLA) Thomas Cirillo and Ceasefire Joint 
Military Commission Head Mac Paul to Malakal today to convene an 
Area Joint Military Committee to mitigate against further violence. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Nuer militia leader General Gabriel Tanginiya defied the 
standing-order for his arrest in Southern Sudan, in place since 
2006, and returned to Malakal, Upper Nile State, on February 23. 
Less than twenty-four hours following his arrival, militia groups 
allegedly aligned with the Nuer commander, to include select SAF JIU 
officers, began indiscriminate shooting in the town and were quickly 
engaged by SPLA.  Initial, albeit still unconfirmed, reports place 
the death toll from the morning's violence at thirty-one. The SPLA 
has closed the airport in Malakal.  T-55 tanks and heavy weapons, 
thought to belong  to the JIU, have been deployed in the town 
center; UNMIS and SPLA confirm that the tanks fired their 
turret-mounted 100mm cannons from the deployed T-55s. While SPLA 
sources maintain that the multi-hour firefight had begun subsiding 
shortly before 11:00AM local, UNMIS/Malakal and select NGOs report 
that fighting continues. However, UNMIS security staff in Malakal 
believe  the SPLA has largely resumed control of the town and expect 
the situation will revert to normal by mid-afternoon. 
 
3. (SBU) UNMIS polchief Muin Shreim provided CDA Fernandez a similar 
version of events following a donors briefing with the SRSG on 
February 24.  He said that after the 2006 incident, Tanginiya was 
made a Major General in SAF and kept in Khartoum.  Tanginiya just 
received a 7 day pass (presumably from the SAF, but apparently not 
coordinated with the SPLA) to attend to "personal business" in 
Malakal, which had to do with his son's legal problems. SPLA got 
wind that he was going there yesterday, and a late night meeting of 
the CJMC decided that Tanginiya  must leave Malakal as soon as 
possible, today or tomorrow.  The CJMC decisions seem to have been 
poorly communicated to the field.  UNMIS offered to host Tanginiya 
last night, but he refused and stayed at the SAF JIU HQ. This 
morning the SAF JIU was transporting him from JIU HQ to UNMIS when 
they were confronted by SPLA - both JIU and regular SPLA.  Arguments 
ensued, and shots were fired triggering further violence. Tanginya 
returned to JIU HQ, which was then surrounded by SPLA.  Shreim said 
that there were four wounded as a result of the initial clash, the 
only casualties they could confirm as they had been  treated by 
UNMIS. He said (at 11:45 AM Khartoum time) that "the situation is 
now under control." CDA also alerted AEC Chair and P-3 Ambassadors 
on the situation earlier in the day. 
 
4. (SBU) UNMIS Sector Three Security Officer Ljuobmir Radovnikovic 
told ConGen PolOff that civilian casualties we2e believed to be 
light, and that while the situation was "messy," he expected it to 
be under-control "within a few hours."  UNMIS Force Protection was 
in the process of rescuing INGOs Solidarite and MedAir staff from 
the town center so  they could be safe-havened with other INGO staff 
at UNMIS Sector Three Headquarters.  Neither UNMIS nor other UN or 
QINGOS facilities in town have been a target of the violence. Reached 
at the height of the fighting on February 24, SPLA Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations James Hoth Mai noted to ConGen PolOff that a 
majority of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) JIU contingent was moved 
from the JIU headquarters by the SPLA to their barracks along the 
Nile's banks in order to distance themselves from Tanginiya and 
select JIU mutineers, as Hoth characterized it, "for their own 
safety." 
 
5. (SBU) Hoth told ConGen PolOff February 24 that Tanginiya's 
arrival in Upper Nile State had caught the SPLA, SAF JIU contingent, 
and government of Upper Nile State by surprise.  (NOTE: GOSS 
Minister for Internal Affairs Paul Mayom told Consul General 
February 24 that Upper Nile Governor Gatluak 
Deng Garang is not even in the state. END NOTE.)  According to Hoth, 
the only actors who t knew of Tanginiya's plans were SAF Military 
Intelligence officers who had arrived at the airport in Malakal in 
an attempt to escort the Nuer commander into town. For this reason, 
the SPLA believes that SAF military intelligence had a role in 
chartering the flight that brought him, and possibly induced 
Tanginiya's return outright. 
 
6. (SBU) UNMIS/Malakal and SPLA sources confirm that SPLA MPs 
assigned to Malakal airport detained Tanginiya and the SAF military 
intelligence officers on February 23 until representatives from the 
state's Security Committee could arrive at the airport.  Hours of 
negotiations ensued between the Committee and Tanginiya, with the 
latter refusing on three separate occasions to re-board the aircraft 
and return to Khartoum.  Hoth maintains that the Committee 
emphasized that they did not want trouble from Tanginiya, and they 
were willing to forego his arrest if he were to return peacefully to 
Khartoum. 
 
7. (SBU) By mid-afternoon, SPLA D/COS (Administration) MG Salva 
Mathok ordered the SPLA JIU contingent to forcibly place Tanginiya 
onto the aircraft, an order over-ruled by state-level 
representatives fearing a backlash.  By night-fall, Security 
Committee representatives had secured permission to place Tanginiya 
at UNMIS Sector Three Headquarters overnight.  This suggestion was 
also rebuffed by Tanginiya , and he instead moved into the JIU 
Headquarters mere blocks from the Governor's Office. (NOTE: Other 
sources within the SPLA state Tanginiya was moved to the SAF 
barracks, on the northwest side of the town. The JIU in Malakal, as 
elsewhere in Sudan, is neither joint nor integrated: the SPLA 
contingent resides ten minutes across town by car from its SAF 
counterparts. END NOTE.) 
 
8. (SBU) Hoth asserted that Tanginiya remained at the JIU 
Headquarters as of this morning, although rumors concerning his 
whereabouts continue to fly in both Juba and Upper Nile State, with 
wild rumors of fighting in Renk in addition to reports that allied 
militias are moving out of Upper Nile toward Old Fangak. UNDSS is 
attempting to facilitate the travel of JIU Deputy National Commander 
(SPLA) Thomas Cirillo to Malakal today for an Area Joint Military 
Commission meeting.  UNMIS is also reportedly attempting to move its 
Force Commander to Upper Nile State to further reduce tension.  As 
of mid-day on February 24, (SAF) JIU Commander Abdul Majhid did not 
have plans to travel outside of Juba. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: The Government of Southern Sudan, and the SPLM in 
particular, have increasingly believed that the NCP would attempt to 
stir up trouble in the South as a means of diverting attention from 
any ICC fallout and have long seen Khartoum's hand in tribal unrest 
throughout the South. With an ICC announcement now set for March 4, 
and the GNU Presidency meeting today in Juba, the timing of 
Tanginiya's arrival in Malakal is certainly suspect from the SPLM's 
point of view, and ill-considered on the part of the SAF.  The 
Minister for Presidential Affairs reported to ConGen staff in late 
January that the SPLM received reports of NISS training factions 
aligned with erstwhile Foreign Minister (and SPLM turncoat) Lam 
Akoh, and that Akol met with NISS Chief Salah Ghosh as recently as 
January 26.  Tanginiya's presence in Malakal could signal the tip of 
an extremely problematic iceberg that threatens to sink the CPA if 
the NCP doesn't move quickly to rein in its more subversive elements 
and tendencies at a time when Sudan and the CPA are already under 
extreme pressure. END COMMENT. 
 
FERNANDEZ