VZCZCXRO9940
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0245/01 0541415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231415Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3055
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000245 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR ROUNDUP: JEM CLASHES WITH SLA/MM AND SAF; SKEPTICISM 
ABOUNDS ON DOHA 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 236 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq told CDA Fernandez on 
February 22 that despite its public statements, the NCP recognizes 
that little was achieved at the recent talks in Doha, and that no 
agreement to which JEM is the only party will bring peace to Darfur. 
 Siddiq also accused JEM of destabilizing the situation in Darfur by 
engaging SLA/MM and later the SAF in fighting on February 21-22. 
Sources at UNDSS confirmed clashes between JEM and SLA/MM on 
February 21 near Shangil Tobay, and confirmed reports of GOS bombing 
in the Dobo Madrassa-Faluga region where JEM was said to be present. 
On February 23, a UNDSS officer told poloff that the latest reports 
indicate JEM has fled North to an area west of Mellit, where it is 
aggressively being pursued by the SAF. The Egyptian Embassy 
expressed concern that the Doha meeting excluded several major rebel 
movements and will do little to change the situation on the ground 
in Darfur, a concern also voiced by several prominent civil society 
leaders. End Summary. 
 
JEM CLASHES WITH SLA/MM, SAF 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 22, MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq told CDA Fernandez 
that "nothing was achieved in Doha," and the NCP, even though it is 
publicly trumpeting the agreement, realizes that it really is not an 
agreement at all. "The outcome was far behind our ambitions," he 
said.  According to Siddiq, no agreement will work if JEM is the 
only party, because JEM will just become like Minnawi's SLA/MM after 
the DPA was signed.  He did note, however, that the GOS achieved 
something by insisting on the principle that the process should be 
inclusive and other groups should be invited in (something which JEM 
initially resisted), which was included in the final document. 
Meanwhile, Siddiq said that JEM is actually escalating the conflict 
in Darfur, and that the GOS has information that Chad sent a 
re-supply convoy to assist JEM in East Jebel Mara. He said JEM first 
engaged SLM/MM in fighting over the weekend and then engaged the SAF 
in fighting, in the course of the re-supply effort. (Note: news of 
the JEM re-supply convoy and clashes with SLM/MM were also brought 
to the attention of CDA by SLM/MM MP Ali Traio on February 21. End 
Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNDSS sources confirmed that fighting between SLA/MM and 
JEM took place on February 21 at around 16:00 in the area of Wadi 
Mora (near Tabit) about 20 kilometers North of Shangil Tobay. SLA/MM 
was reportedly supported by GOS aerial bombing. The SLA/MM Field 
Commander confirmed the clashes to UNDSS, as well as the aerial 
attacks in the village of Tamarara, located in the Wadi Mora area. 
UNDSS also reported that on the morning of February 21, GOS Antonov 
bombers conducted aerial bombardments in the vicinity of Dobo 
Madrassa, though there were no casualties reported. During the 
afternoon of that same day, a GOS Antonov bombed Faluga village, 
where about thirty civilians were injured. (Note: At the time, JEM 
forces were said to be present in the greater Dobo Madrassa-Faluga 
region. End Note.) Nine of the injured received medical treatment at 
an INGO (MDM) clinic at Deribat, while the others were treated at an 
MDM clinic at Faluga. MDM told UNDSS that its staff based at Deribat 
had spent the last two nights in bunkers out of fear of possible 
aerial bombardments, following a constant presence of GOS airplanes 
hovering around the town throughout the night. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Several other rebel factions reported clashing with JEM 
forces in East Jebel Marra. On February 22, the little-known, 
Arab-led movement United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF) issued a 
statement decrying an attempted assassination of its 
Commander-in-Chief Yassein Yousif Abdelrahman by JEM forces in 
"south Ttabet (sic) area near Jabel Marra" (Yousif is a Baggara 
Rizeigat who once fought for the SPLA) On February 22, United 
Resistance Front (URF) Political Secretary Tajeldin Niam told poloff 
that JEM had attacked URF forces led by Bahar Abu Garda in East 
Jebel Marra on February 21, and accused the GOS of having a "*secret* 
agreement" with the JEM for the latter to destroy all other rebel 
movements in Darfur. On February 23, a UNDSS officer told poloff 
that over the past several days  there have been continuous 
unconfirmed reports of clashes along the border of North and South 
Darfur, and that the situation remains chaotic. However, he believes 
that the bulk of the fighting is between JEM and the SAF. He stated 
the latest information he had received indicated that JEM is being 
actively pursued by SAF and has now fled North to the area of Daba 
Tuga, west of Mellit. "It appears the SAF is chasing JEM around the 
hills," he said. (Note: On February 23, SLA/Unity commander Abdalla 
Yahia told emboff there was fighting between the SAF and JEM in Daba 
Tuga and Turra. End Note.) 
 
EGYPTIANS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION OF PEACE PROCESS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Also on February 22, Egyptian first secretary Tamer Azzam 
told poloff that Egypt continues to be concerned by the direction of 
the peace process. Qatar and Bassole have "undermined regional 
efforts and excluded major rebel movements," and if this continues, 
it will lead to another useless agreement between the Zaghawa and 
the GOS, stated Azzam.  Given his courtship of JEM, it may be 
impossible for Chief Mediator Bassole to change the negative opinion 
of rival rebel movements such as SLA/AW, SLA/Unity, and the URF. 
Although not optimistic about his chances of success, Azzam said 
that the Chief Mediator should now focus on bringing SLM/Unity into 
the process and working towards a Cessation of Hostilities. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Azzam also stated that Minnawi's February 17-19 visit to 
Egypt was the GOE's attempt to play a supportive role in the process 
to "give some attention to an important movement, and neutralize the 
negative role that SLM/MM could play at this stage."  In addition to 
discussing the peace process in Cairo, Minnawi requested more 
development aid for Darfur be channeled through the TDRA.   Azzam 
also noted that the GOE's efforts to mediate between SLM/MM and the 
GOS on returning Muhajarriya to Minnawi's control have not been 
successful.  "The GOS has not given us a straight answer on 
returning Minnawi's land, and they want his forces to be integrated 
into SAF before the land is returned," stated Azzam. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Azzam stated that the February 22 visit by President Bashir 
to Egypt focused on the impending ICC arrest warrant, and not the 
peace process.  The February 14 visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Aboul-Gheit and intelligence director Omer Suleiman also focused on 
this issue and showed Egypt's support for both Sudan and an Article 
16 resolution.  "The GOS is very stressed right now, and you need to 
realize that if more pressure is put on Sudan, very bad things could 
happen," said Azzam.  He stated that he takes GOS Intelligence Chief 
Salah Al-Gosh's February 20 remarks "very seriously - he was issuing 
a real warning, not just speaking to the masses."  (Note:  As 
reported in reftel, Gosh stated at a military promotion ceremony 
that "We [the government] were Islamic extremists, but then became 
moderate and civilized believing in peace and life for everyone. 
However we will revert back to how we were if necessary. There is 
nothing any easier than that." End Note.) 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS ALSO DISAPPOINTED IN DOHA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Darfuri civil society activists expressed disappointment at 
the GOS-JEM talks in Doha. On February 22, noted human rights 
advocate and Fur leader Salih Mahmoud Osman told poloff that 
"bilateral agreements have proven to be of little help in Darfur. 
We cannot expect that this will settle the whole conflict in 
Darfur."  After attending the talks as a parliamentary observer for 
the Sudanese Communist Party, Osman described the Qataris as 
"genuinely interested in peace and development in Darfur," but 
lacking a realistic perspective on the conflict.  El Tigani Sesei, 
Fur leader and former governor of North Darfur, told poloff by 
telephone from Addis on February 19 that he predicts the Doha 
agreement to have a destabilizing effect on Darfur.  Sesei sees the 
agreement as crowding out other rebel movements in favor of JEM, 
which will in turn de-legitimize Bassole, and keep other prominent 
rebel actors from buying into future agreements.  Ahmed Adam Yousif, 
a Darfuri peace activist and founder of the El Fasher-based Ajaweed 
Organization for Peace and Development, was likewise critical of the 
Doha agreement, questioning Bassole's strategy of legitimizing JEM 
at the cost of undermining what remains of the DPA. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: Less than a week after the conclusion of the Doha 
talks, the chaotic violence in Darfur has shown little sign of 
abating. Indeed, it could be argued that the situation has worsened, 
with JEM as a destabilizing factor: not only does it remain a target 
of GOS bombers (for lack of a ceasefire agreement), but also has now 
attracted the ire of other rebel groups.  They have condemned JEM's 
unilateralism and disregard for their territorial holdings, as it 
tries to escape through Jebel Mara back into Chad. The other rebel 
movements are even less likely now to sign on to the Doha talks.  To 
overcome their mistrust, JMC Bassole ought to explore a series of 
parallel talks (in Doha or another venue) to bring about either 
parallel security agreements linked to a common political framework, 
or a broad-based ceasefire (if possible) to improve security on the 
ground in Darfur. JEM seems to be strong enough to create additional 
havoc and suffering in Darfur but not strong enough to impose order 
or remove any of its increasingly angry rivals from the field. 
 
FERNANDEZ