VZCZCXRO7702
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0225/01 0510913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200913Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3006
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000225 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, DCHA/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: USAID PARTNER ASSETS SEIZED IN SUDAN 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 210 
B) KHARTOUM 106 
C) KHARTOUM 100 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) The Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
proceeded on February 18 with a summary seizure of assets used by 
USAID implementing partners PADCO-AECOM and International Rescue 
Committee (IRC).  These seizures are the latest in a continuing 
pattern of intimidation and disruption by the regime of humanitarian 
and development activities in northern Sudan.  The government likely 
hopes to demonstrate that when the bilateral relationship is good or 
headed in a positive direction, problems such as this can be quickly 
solved (as they were briefly following SE Williamson's April 2008 
meetings with the NCP in Rome,) but in the absence of engagement 
there will be little cooperation. End summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOS SEIZES ITEMS RESTRICTED BY US LAW 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) After expelling the PADCO-AECOM Country Director from Sudan 
with 48 hours notice on February 10 (Ref A), HAC staff returned to 
the PADCO-AECOM office in Khartoum on February 17 and gave 24 hours 
notice that they intended to take possession of all property 
previously purchased under USAID contract by Development 
Alternatives Inc. (DAI) and used by PADCO-AECOM in implementing the 
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives' (OTI) program in Sudan.  HAC 
arrived at the PADO-AECOM office on February 18 and removed DAI 
assets from the premises, including computer and communications 
equipment. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Unfazed by explanations from PADCO-AECOM staff that 
transfer of restricted items such as computers and communications 
equipment violates their obligations under US federal law, HAC 
removed laptops, satellite phones, and other items with dual-use 
technology from the PADCO-AECOM premises.  HAC has ordered 
PADCO-AECOM to bring all DAI assets utilized in field offices in the 
Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains) to Khartoum by 
Saturday.  The total estimated value of DAI assets remaining in 
Sudan is $360,000, of which HAC already had approximately $150,000 
worth of vehicles and one laptop in their possession.  Thus far HAC 
has only focused on the property from the DAI contract funded 
previously by USAID/OTI, and not property purchased under the 
PADCO-AECOM contract; a change in that focus would mark even more 
significant escalation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the same day in Nyala, South Darfur, HAC seized assets 
from USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) partner IRC, 
which is providing humanitarian and life-saving assistance in 
Darfur.  IRC has been continuously targeted and harassed by HAC and 
National Security due to its provision of assistance to women 
victimized by rape and for the organization's outspoken advocacy on 
issues of violence against women.  After a long period of pressure 
from HAC, both in South Darfur and at the federal level, IRC was 
forced to turn over a number of assets to HAC.  Repeated Embassy 
interventions with senior MFA and Intelligence officials over the 
past months have produced empty promises but no improvement in the 
situation. HAC told IRC that if it did not authorize the transfer of 
assets, HAC would not grant stay visas, work permits, and travel 
documents to IRC staff.  [Note: similar threats were made to 
PADCO-AECOM staff.]  HAC removed USAID-funded equipment from the IRC 
offices, including vehicles, computers and other office equipment. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The first seizure of USG assets took place in January 2008 
upon the closeout of the DAI program in Sudan (Ref B and C). 
Subsequently HAC has seized assets belonging to other USAID 
partners, but these assets were not specifically funded by USAID. 
These latest seizures may reflect targeting of two USAID-funded 
organizations with fairly high political profiles, or the beginning 
of a broader trend of GoS targeting of US organizations to create 
additional regime "bargaining chips" for high-level bilateral 
discussions with the Americans. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
ASSET SEIZURE COMPROMISES PROGRAMMING IN THREE AREAS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Field office staff in Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile 
states rely on the vehicles, Codan and VHF radios, and satellite 
phones transferred to PADCO-AECOM from DAI for operational life 
 
KHARTOUM 00000225  002 OF 003 
 
 
support.  When these assets are taken away, PADCO-AECOM will seek to 
rent replacement vehicles as quickly as possible and purchase 
satellite phones on the local market where possible.  USAID/OTI may 
also authorize additional funds under the PADCO-AECOM contract to 
purchase replacement vehicles and communications equipment. 
However, the GoS strictly controls the import and licensing of 
vehicles and radios, and there will likely be delays in getting 
these assets to field offices. This will hinder urgently needed 
programming in some of the most volatile areas in Sudan. 
 
¶7. (SBU) USAID/OTI will continue its activities to support 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by making 
unity attractive through tangible peace dividends along the 
North-South border and increased integration of NCP and SPLM local 
governance structures.  The seizure of assets from PADCO-AECOM field 
offices in the Three Areas will slow down program implementation, 
and make it more difficult for staff to reach remote and insecure 
areas -- the very locations where OTI activities seek to stabilize 
volatile community dynamics and mitigate potential conflict.  If 
staff security cannot be ensured with adequate, makeshift measures, 
expatriate staff will be pulled back to Khartoum to manage remotely 
and the program will rely more heavily on local staff for activity 
development and implementation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) USAID/OTI activities in the Three Areas are warmly welcomed 
by the local populations, including local government officials, as 
some of the very few high-profile post-CPA peace dividends and 
development activities in the region.  Delays and disruptions in 
implementation of these activities will be quickly noticed by 
well-connected supporters like Governor Malik Agar in Blue Nile 
State.  Indeed, when PADCO-AECOM requested permits to move vehicles 
from Damazin to Khartoum for handover, the local HAC/SSRRC staff 
refused and took the issue up with federal HAC.  Federal HAC agreed 
to HAC/SSRRC's request to keep the DAI assets at the local HAC 
office in Damazin.  Previous interference by HAC in the PADCO-AECOM 
program has resulted in governors and state ministers traveling to 
Khartoum to protest restriction of access to the Three Areas; 
similar protests to address the current situation would be easy to 
mobilize - and indeed may occur without any encouragement.  Federal 
HAC deeply resents this pressure and may retaliate against 
PADCO-AECOM even more dramatically in response. 
 
¶9. (SBU) USAID/OTI's activities in Khartoum supporting civil society 
and civic engagement in CPA-mandated political processes, including 
the upcoming elections, are largely unaffected by seizure of DAI 
assets.  However, these activities, implemented by PADCO-AECOM, will 
be impacted by the increased suspicion and scrutiny that has 
accompanied HAC's actions in the past two weeks.  In each 
multiple-hour visit by HAC staff to PADCO-AECOM offices, they have 
asked specific questions about activities in Khartoum, local 
grantees, and operational practices of OTI and PADCO-AECOM.  They 
have removed files and other documentation detailing grantee names, 
contact information, and activities.  They have made it clear to 
PADCO-AECOM staff that they have intimate knowledge of internal 
communications and operations (likely passed on by the HAC "interns" 
who sit in PADCO-AECOM as in many INGO offices, or other local staff 
who have been pressured to provide information.)  These 
interrogations have a chilling effect on support to civil society 
organizations for civic education around elections, support the 
local groups say is desperately needed in the short-term, and not 
immediately forthcoming from any other donor. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In meetings this week with high-level NCP officials, the 
CDA pointed out the disconnect between the stated GoS goal of 
improved cooperation with the Obama Administration and its 
harassment and disruption of USG-funded humanitarian and development 
assistance activities in Sudan.  CDA was assured by at least one 
interlocutor that a "compromise" would be found to the PADCO-AECOM 
situation.  Further meetings are scheduled on February 22 (with MFA 
U/S Siddiq) but we expect more obfuscation from the regime. As the 
HAC continues threatening and expelling USAID partner staff, seizing 
USAID partner assets with impunity, forcing INGOs to sign technical 
agreements with language that INGOs and their donors do not accept, 
the regime appears to be challenging us to engage.  In another 
example of calculated non-cooperation, having previously agreed to 
allow up to eight U.S. military officers join UNAMID, the regime 
appears to be reneging on that deal, just as two of the officers are 
set to arrive next week (this issue has also been raised repeatedly 
and will be raised again on February 22).  Our sense is that these 
actions are likely deliberate, connected and calculated; the regime 
 
KHARTOUM 00000225  003 OF 003 
 
 
has chosen several items that it knows (or is hoping) are important 
to us but not important enough for us to seriously retaliate.  The 
objective is to demonstrate that when the relationship between the 
U.S. and Sudan is improving, and there are signs of engagement from 
the U.S., relatively minor issues such as these can be easily 
resolved (as several issues were resolved when former SE Williamson 
briefly engaged but ultimately backed away.)  Improved humanitarian 
access and the approval of the U.S. military officer visas were 
promised at that time, but the U.S. did not deliver anything in 
return, and now the NCP would like to encourage deeper engagement by 
a new American Administration by demonstrating how seemingly small 
things can become difficult in the absence of meaningful engagement. 
 The Sudanese regime is betting that the U.S. administration is not 
ready to escalate these two issues into something more serious.  In 
this context, these two incidents appear to be shots across our bow 
to see how we will react, in the hope that our reaction will be to 
engage in the regime's favorite pastime: negotiation. 
 
FERNANDEZ