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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM220, DARFUR UPDATE: REPORTS OF SAF BOMBING, GROUND ATTACKS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM220 2009-02-19 06:28 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6334
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0220/01 0500628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190628Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2999
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000220 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR UPDATE: REPORTS OF SAF BOMBING, GROUND ATTACKS IN 
EAST JEBEL MARRA; MORE VIOLENCE FEARED IN WADAA 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 194 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The SAF has been  bombing the SLA/Abdul Wahid-held 
area of Kutur in East Jebel Marra beginning at 07:00 on February 18, 
an SLA/AW commander told poloff. He stated that the bombing has 
resulted in six civilian deaths and the destruction of many homes 
and livestock. GOS paramilitary forces have moved into the area from 
their positions in Al Malam and at 15:00 were clashing with SLA/AW 
forces in the village of Saby, he said. Sources at UNAMID told 
poloff they also had unconfirmed reports of bombing the morning on 
February 18 in Faluga, east of Deribat, resulting in several 
civilian deaths. Meanwhile in North Darfur, the recent clashes in 
Wadaa between Mima tribesman indigenous to the area and the 
SLA/Minnawi forces trying to retake the town caused extensive damage 
that did not seem to have been caused by combat, but rather was 
deliberately inflicted, according to a UNAMID assessment team that 
visited Wadaa on February 13. Neither a precise casualty toll nor 
the number of possible wounded could be obtained or verified. On 
February 17 a UNDSS officer told poloff on that SLA/MM forces, 
backed by SLA/Unity, are preparing to launch another attack on Wadaa 
in the coming days. They have warned all Zaghawa and internationals 
to vacate the area, he said. End Summary. 
 
REPORTS OF SAF BOMBING IN EAST JEBEL MARRA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. On February 18, poloff received a call from SLA/AW Commander 
Ibrahim Al-Helou. Al-Helou stated that at approximately 07:00, the 
SAF began bombing heavily the area of Kutur (phonetic) in East Jebel 
Marra held by SLA/AW. The bombing continued up until 11:00 and 
resulted in the death of 3 women, 2 children and one elderly man, as 
well as the destruction of homes and livestock.  At approximately 
15:00, Al-Helou told poloff that GOS paramilitary forces  moved into 
the area from their positions in Al Malam and were fighting with 
SLA/AW forces in the village of Saby, approximately 30 kilometers 
northwest of Shangil Tobay. (Note: Al Malam was the site of clashes 
between JEM and GOS forces on February 11-12. Both JEM and the SAF 
made competing claims of victory following the clashes, but none of 
these was verified by independent sources. Jebel-Marra based 
SLA/Abdul Wahid commander Abdulgadir Abdurrahman Ibrahim (known as 
Gadura) told emboff on February 16 that while fighting did take 
place between JEM and the SAF, it was not significant and both sides 
overstated their claims to victory. End Note.) On February 18, a 
UNAMID official also told poloff there were unconfirmed reports of 
bombings that morning 1.5 kilometers outside of Faluga, east of 
Deribat. Four civilians were reportedly killed, including three 
children, and five injured. 
 
UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN WADAA 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On February 13, UNAMID sent a fact-finding and assessment 
team lead by Force Commander Agwai to Wadaa following several days 
of clashes involving SLA/Minni Minnawi, backed by SLA/Unity, and 
members of the Mima tribe who are the original inhabitants of the 
area (reftel). The team reported that it witnessed extensive damage 
to the town, which seemed deliberately inflicted. Numerous buildings 
and equipment--houses, shops, huts, generators--were burnt to the 
ground as was the market place, which was allegedly looted. 
Granaries set on fire were still smoldering during the time of the 
visit. According to the local population, medical supplies at a 
local dispensary, water pump equipment, goods and food, were 
allegedly stolen, as well as more than 2000 cattle herded out of the 
area. 
 
4. (SBU) At two different locations nearby, the UNAMID team was 
shown fresh mounds of earth that, according to the locals, were the 
recently-dug mass graves where they buried 45 of their own people. 
The same sources indicated that a large number of people, many 
reported as having fled the fighting, were still unaccounted for. 
Neither a precise casualty toll nor the number of possible wounded 
could be obtained and verified. (Note: Adam Ahmed, TDRA Land 
Commissioner and a Mima SLM/MM member who hails from Wadaa, told 
poloff on February 17 that local leaders claim that 31 people died 
as a result of last week's clashes, with an unknown number of 
villagers still missing and unaccounted for. Ahmed reported that 
non-Zaghawa within SLM/MM are extremely unhappy about the attacks, 
accusing Minnawi's movement of refusing to permit humanitarian 
organizations to access the area.  End Note.) 
 
5. (SBU) UNDSS sources reported that the devastation was caused 
during clashes between the Mima tribesmen indigenous to the area and 
forces of SLA/Minni Minnawi, backed by SLA/Unity. (Note: SLA/MM has 
generally controlled the area since 2004, but is not welcomed by the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000220  002 OF 002 
 
 
Mima due to harassment, mistreatment and taxation. Fighting also 
erupted in 2007 between Mima backed by the GoS and Zaghawa supported 
by SLA/MM. End Note.) The local leader of Wadaa told UNDSS that on 
February 9, an attempt by the Mima to push SLA/MM out of the area 
resulted in the killing of a SLA/MM commander. The following day, 
SLA/MM forces with about 17 vehicles backed by SLA Unity attacked 
the village. The entire market was destroyed, as was 40% of the 
town, according to UNDSS. The SLA/MM forces were said have 
withdrawn from the area that evening. 
 
6. (SBU) On February 11, SAF forces with about 40 vehicles ambushed 
a convoy of SLA Unity fighters at a location 18 kilometers west of 
Wadaa, but Unity managed to repel the attack, according to UNDSS. 
(Note: on February 11, SLA/Unity's London-based spokesman Mahjoub 
Hussein issued a statement announcing that SLM/Unity had launched 
military attack on Wadaa, and requested UNAMID withdraw from the 
area. The statement affirmed that SLA/Unity had repelled a SAF 
ambush near Wadaa, and also strongly condemned the GOS-JEM talks in 
Doha, reiterating SLA/Unity's refusal to participate in these talks. 
End Note.) 
 
MORE ATTACKS FEARED? 
-------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) On February 17, a UNDSS officer told poloff that SLA/MM was 
preparing to launch another attack to retake the town of Wadaa in 
the coming days. "It's the same old story of a land grab," he said. 
SLA/MM commanders have warned all Zaghawa and internationals to 
vacate the area, he said. SAF forces are currently present around 
the town, but they claim they are only making security arrangements, 
and "they've made it clear they won't stay and fight." Chairman of 
the Darfur Land Commission Adam also told poloff that local leaders 
have communicated to him that Zaghawa living nearby have departed 
since the clashes, a sign that Ahmed said may indicate a coming 
counterattack by the Zaghawa-aligned forces of SLA/MM and SLA/Unity. 
 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: SLA/Abdul Wahid's positions in Darfur are largely 
defensive and pose little threat to the SAF, which is why reports of 
bombing of his areas of control are puzzling. It is possible the 
alleged bombings were carried out in reaction to Abdul Wahid's 
Israel trip and his public statements characterizing the Doha talks 
as reconciliation between Sudan's Islamists. However, regardless of 
the GOS's motivation, its alleged bombings do little to ease doubts 
about GOS sincerity in finding a solution to the conflict. 
Meanwhile, the situation in Wadaa shows that despite Minnawi's loss 
of territory and influence over the past month, his commanders are 
still capable of destabilizing the security situation in Darfur. 
This is also true of SLA/Unity, which continues to move with 
impunity from the foothills of Jebel Marra all along the border 
between North and South Darfur. Without the participation of either 
group, any potential ceasefire arrangement reached between the GOS 
and JEM in Doha will do little to bring peace to Darfur. The 
participation of SLA/Abdul Wahid in some fashion is also crucial, 
because although his forces maintain a largely defensive posture, he 
remains the only rebel leader with significant popular support and 
legitimacy. 
 
FERNANDEZ