O 190547Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2998
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000219 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: TOUGH ECONOMIC TIMES POSE CHALLENGE TO DISARMAMENT, 
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION 
 
¶1. Summary: On February 16, Sudan's National DDR Coordinating 
Council hosted a donor conference in Juba to discuss the latest 
developments in their efforts to reduce SAF and SPLA forces, and to 
encourage donors to provide additional funds to support the 
reintegration of former soldiers into civilian society.  Initial DDR 
is to focus on the Three Areas in an attempt to draw down forces and 
reduce tensions on the North-South border.  Donors pledged a total 
of approximately US$90 million over two years.  However, given the 
serious economic downturn expected due to the falling price of oil 
and its effect in reducing GNU and GOSS revenues, it will become 
increasingly difficult to find a way to gainfully employ demobilized 
soldiers who may thus further destabilize an already troubled 
region. End summary. 
 
¶2. In a speech to the conference, GOSS President Salva Kiir reported 
that the size of the SAF and SPLA has now stabilized, with the 
absorption by both sides of a large number of Other Armed Groups 
(OAGs), which had been necessary to control OAGs  and contain 
fighting that would otherwise have erupted between these militias 
and the SAF and SPLA.  Kiir noted that absorbing the OAGs had been a 
difficult process that had placed a large financial burden on both 
sides, given the expense of paying these additional soldiers.  Now 
the time had come, Kiir said, to reduce the regular forces in order 
to both downsize the army to a more realistic and manageable level 
and to reduce the economic burden it poses.  (Note:  Observers 
estimate that at 150,000 soldiers, the SPLA is approximately three 
times its optimal size.  End note.)  It made sense to start this 
effort in the Three Areas on the North-South border, he said, which 
would help to reduce tensions in these sensitive regions. 
 
¶3. The problem with the DDR process, Kiir continued, was with the R 
(reintegration) part of it.  Demobilized former fighters have to 
find viable employment opportunities to support themselves and their 
families, or they will be tempted to simply pick up their weapons 
again to rejoin the militias they had left, or form criminal gangs. 
To help with this, Kiir pledged that the GOSS would contribute $250 
to each demobilized fighter to help fund the transition to civilian 
life, and provide to each a package of needed household goods and 
farming tools as well as a parcel of land in order to encourage them 
to become farmers. 
 
¶4. At the meeting, donors committed US$88.30 million to the DDR 
process (with the UK leading the way with a pledge of US$30 million) 
mostly geared toward helping with the reintegration process. 
 
¶5. Comment: The recent steep fall in international oil prices has 
dramatically cut the amount of money available to the GNU and to the 
GOSS.  This reduction impacts the GOSS particularly, as it depends 
almost exclusively on oil revenue to fund its operations.  The 
effect of this and the severe austerity measures the GOSS will be 
forced to adopt to cope with its steep budget shortfall are  certain 
to cause an economic contraction in Southern Sudan, reducing the 
economic opportunities available to the local population and making 
the job of demobilizing thousands of ex-fighters that much tougher. 
The threat of social unrest caused by this economic downturn, 
combined with the possible destabilization that is likely to result 
from demobilizing former combatants unable to find work, will pose a 
major challenge to the GOSS in the coming months. It may also 
undermine attempts to proceed with the DDR plan, either saddling the 
GOSS with the financial burden of an unsustainably large and 
wasteful military, or forcing it to cope with disgruntled 
ex-combatants unable to make a living through legitimate means. 
Either way, the SPLA has tough decisions ahead and will have to 
manage this process very carefully to avoid exacerbating tribal 
tensions. 
 
FERNANDEZ