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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM217, WHILE ABYEI TEETERS ON THE EDGE, COMPLEX BUDGETIING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM217 2009-02-18 12:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5353
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0217/01 0491214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181214Z FEB 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2995
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000217 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WHILE ABYEI TEETERS ON THE EDGE, COMPLEX BUDGETIING 
PROCEDURES FRIUSTRATE ADMINISTRATOR 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 91 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Over eight months after the June 8 Roadmap 
Agreement was signed, the Abyei Interim Administration remains 
stymied by a critical lack of funding.  GoS officials described 
complex and confusing financing procedures, and blame the AIA for 
failing to take the steps necessary for money to be disbursed. 
Frustrated and mistrustful of the NCP, Administrator Arop Mayok has 
withdrawn to Juba for the last few weeks, but will return to Abyei 
today.  The AEC has encouraged Mayok to meet again with the Finance 
Ministry, while CDA Fernandez has put the NCP on notice that it 
needs to ensure that the money is allocated soon.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GoS Describes Complex Funding Procedures 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU) On February 17, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission 
(AEC) hosted an informal briefing by GoS officials for the SPLM, AEC 
coordinators, and the UN. Among the GOS officials present were Unity 
Fund chair Yahya Babiker (NCP), the NCP's Minister of State for 
Presidential Affairs, Idris Abdelgadir, and Minister of Cabinet 
Affairs Kosti Manibe (SPLM).  AEC Chairman Derek Plumbly noted that 
there is a "serious vacuum" in Abyei, due to the lack of funding for 
the Abyei Interim Administration (AIA).  He added that the AIA was 
to have been in place two weeks after the Roadmap was signed in 
June, and the IDPs were to have returned home by the end of that 
month, but seven months later neither has occurred.  He mentioned 
that only the previous day, an enraged IDP had shot and killed three 
Dinka police officers and wounded one other.  UN Head of Office for 
Abyei Chris Johnson added that the situation in Abyei never is 
stable, and "now it is beginning to get worse."  She noted that if 
"yesterday's clash had been between Dinka and Misseriyya Arabs, the 
situation could have exploded." She added that both Administrator 
Arop Mayok and his deputy have been absent from Abyei for some time. 
 CDA Fernandez commented that many of the actions that need to be 
taken were being discussed in September and are still pending. This 
is inexcusable and dangerous. In the meantime, tensions in Abyei are 
building. 
 
3.  (SBU) Note:  Separately, the UN Head of Office told econoff that 
the situation in Abyei is "quite fragile."  She said that public 
trust in the security forces had collapsed following the December 
gun battle between the JIU and JIPU.  This, combined with the lack 
of a functioning administration and nervousness that the decision of 
the Abyei boundary arbitration panel could result in renewed 
north-south conflict, have led most of the thousands of IDPs to 
delay returning home until at least after the arbitration decision 
is announced.  End note. 
 
4.  (SBU) GoS officials present blamed the AIA for having failed to 
take what they claimed are the necessary steps to permit the 
disbursal of funds.  The ambitious (appox. US$89 million) 2009 
budget presented by the AIA had incorrectly assumed all AIA funding 
would come from oil revenues and treated administrative and 
development spending the same, they said.  As explained by the GoS 
Finance Ministry, AIA's own costs (salaries and operating expenses) 
must be funded by the GNU under "normal budget procedures."  (They 
estimated that these costs "are not huge," less than US$10 million.) 
 US$1 million in "seed money" already has been disbursed but not 
spent.  The oil revenues are reserved for development (capital) 
programs.  According to the Finance Ministry, to receive the 
promised oil revenues, the AIA must establish a separate Abyei 
Relief and Development Fund (ARDF) in which the Finance Ministry can 
deposit funds, and take steps to authorize the transfer. 
 
5.  (SBU) Separately, AIA also will administer the two percent of 
revenues set aside for use by the Ngok Dinka.  For this, the AIA 
must establish an additional account and then consult with Ngok 
Dinka leaders on how the tribe desires the money to be used before 
any of it is spent.  The additional two percent set aside for the 
Misseriya is to be administered separately, possibly by the governor 
of Southern Kordofan state.  (Note:  Recently, Misseriya elder Sadiq 
Babu Nimr told CDA Fernandez that the Misseriya mistrust Southern 
Kordofan's governor and would prefer other arrangements to disburse 
the money.  End note.)  In addition, the Unity Fund, established by 
the Roadmap agreement to finance development along the north-south 
border, has been ordered to give priority to projects in Abyei, 
include a major road linking Muglad in Kordofan to Wau in Western 
Bahr al-Ghazal. 
 
6.  (SBU) AEC Chairman Plumbly noted that interim administrator 
Mayok is frustrated by the complicated procedures described, which 
he does not clearly understand.  He said that Mayok also has been 
misinformed, for example, having been told that he would be 
responsible for administering the Misseriya, as well as the Ngok 
 
KHARTOUM 00000217  002 OF 002 
 
 
Dinka funds. Any inclusion of the Misseriya in Abyei discussions is 
seen by the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka as an NCP "Trojan horse" seeking 
to establish improper Misseriya claims to Abyei. 
 
Next Steps 
- - - - - - 
7.  (SBU) The coordinators and the SPLM agreed that they would 
strongly encourage Abyei Administrator Mayok to come to Khartoum as 
soon as possible to sit down with GoS Finance Ministry officials to 
be clearly briefed on the necessary steps.  The coordinators agreed 
that they would meet Mayok beforehand to prep him for his briefings 
from the GoS, and afterwards encourage him to return to Abyei to 
take direct charge of the AIA. CDA Fernandez warned the NCP 
officials again that it would be extremely regrettable if Abyei 
blows up again as happened in May 2008 because of the inability of 
GOS officials to get the money flowing. Plumbly noted that a related 
problem is the difficulty of Western NGOs seeking to work in the 
Three Areas getting visas and travel permits. There are about $30 
million set aside which cannot be spent because of GOS obstacles and 
a lack of a local administration. He said he would follow up with 
the usually obstreperous HAC to try to improve NGO access and hold a 
meeting on this specific concern. 
 
8. (SBU) While attending a DDR conference in Juba on February 16, 
CDA had asked for a meeting with Mayok, accompanied by the Dutch 
Ambassador (who heads AEC's Three Areas Working Group) and Plumbly. 
Mayok, accompanied by AIA Financial Secretary Deng Air Deng, was 
both confused and defiant, blaming the NCP for constant delay and 
obfuscation.  He said that different NCP officials say different 
things at different times about funding, and are often not 
available. "Only (Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs) Ahmed 
Haroun makes himself available and tries to help," he noted. 
 
9. (SBU) Mayok said that the AIA has not hired technical staff yet 
because it only has assurances of that $1 million dollars ($2 
million Sudanese Pounds) available. It has no vehicles despite a 
promise of 10 landcruisers in September 2008. He added that the NCP 
constantly seeks to involve the Misseriya into discussions about 
funding. Mayok was pressed to agree to come to Khartoum as soon as 
possible to iron out these financial roadblocks and to spend more 
time in a simmering Abyei rather than sulking in Juba and attending 
to private business interests. At the end of two hours, he seemed to 
reluctantly agree to do so noting that "I agree that someone needs 
to break this cycle". 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
10.  (SBU) The Byzantine procedures described by the GoS at the AEC 
informal meeting are complicated and confusing, and it is no wonder 
that the suspicious and, perhaps, overwhelmed and unprepared Mayok 
is frustrated.  This is compounded by his legitimate mistrust of the 
NCP and suspicion that he has been given the runaround in his 
previous efforts to free-up funding for his Administration.  AEC 
coordinators, including the U.S., will work with him to try to make 
sure he understands fully the necessary steps.  He will need to be 
proactive and aggressive in carrying them out and quickly putting to 
use the funds that become available. Abyei remains an extremely 
volatile place and urgently needs that money.  Even though NCP 
officials are not entirely wrong in shifting some of the blame to a 
passive Mayok, CDA Fernandez has told several NCP officials that we 
hold the GNU accountable for the lack of transfer of money to the 
AIA, regardless of the challenges inherent in making the appropriate 
financial arrangements and AIA's obvious weaknesses. Much of the NCP 
rhetoric about the AIA was eerily similar to NCP excuses we have 
heard in the past about not funding the TDRA or not fulfilling the 
NCP's commitment to the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. They use 
legitimate bureaucratic and fiscal questions as a cloak to delay and 
evade funding past and possibly future opponents of the NCP. 
 
FERNANDEZ