VZCZCXRO3752
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0210/01 0480509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170509Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2984
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000210 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, DCHA/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: USAID PARTNER STAFF EXPELLED FROM SUDAN 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 100 
B) KHARTOUM 106 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Last week the Country Director for USAID implementing 
partner PADCO-AECOM was given 48 hours to leave Sudan by the 
Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC).  The 
order was in direct response to a discussion between the Charg 
d'Affaires and the HAC Commissioner at the High Level Committee 
Meeting of the Joint Communiqu on Humanitarian Access in Darfur. 
At the meeting, the Charg raised the ongoing dispute between the 
GoS an USG over disposition of property utilized under USAID-funded 
grants and contracts in Sudan and requested a meeting (in a 
diplomatic note) to solve the impasse.  In retaliation, the HAC 
Commissioner ordered the PADCO-AECOM Country Director expelled from 
the country.  This action takes place in the context of continuous 
harassment of international actors in Sudan, restriction of space by 
the GoS for humanitarian and development activities, and increasing 
tension and uncertainty regarding domestic response to the 
anticipated issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Discussions with senior 
Sudanese officials from February 12-16 raised a perhaps false hope 
that the steps taken by Sudan can be reversed.   END SUMMARY. 
 
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USAID PROGRAMS CAN CONTINUE IF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS STOP ATTACKING 
SUDANESE SOVEREIGNTY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 10, the PADCO-AECOM Country Director Marv Koop, 
who has lived and worked in Sudan for more than 15 years, was called 
in for a meeting with HAC General Manager Ahmed Adam.  Adam informed 
Koop that his residence visa, issued for his position with 
PADCO-AECOM, was revoked and Koop had 48 hours to leave the country. 
 Adam explicitly linked the order to leave to the interventions of 
the USG in issues of Sudanese sovereignty.  Adam told Koop that if 
he left quietly, the PADCO-AECOM program would be allowed to 
continue, but "if the American diplomats continue to attack Sudanese 
sovereignty," then the PADCO-AECOM program would be shut down.  Adam 
also told Koop that if there is a response to this action from the 
USG, HAC will be more than happy to shut down other American 
organizations in Sudan.  Adam told Koop that he could return to 
Sudan, just not with a USAID-funded organization. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
DISPUTE OVER ASSET DISPOSITION REMAINS UNRESOLVED 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GoS perception of USG attacks on Sudanese sovereignty 
stems from an ongoing dispute over the disposition of property 
utilized in USAID-funded grants and contracts in Sudan.  HAC 
consistently maintains that the disposition of assets used by 
international NGOs (INGOs) registered through HAC and operating in 
Sudan under the International Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act 
("NGO law") of 2006 should be decided by HAC without any discussion 
with donors.  Many existing technical agreements negotiated between 
INGOs and state-level ministries and HAC offices include language 
allowing donors to be involved in asset disposition.  HAC is 
currently attempting to force INGOs to accept a new version of the 
technical agreement that has no language allowing donor involvement 
in asset disposition.  The issue of asset disposition is 
particularly important for USG-funded partners, due to the 
restrictions of US law on providing direct support to the central 
Government of Sudan, and prohibitions on transfer of licensed 
dual-use equipment. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The current dispute between HAC and USG dates back almost 
exactly one year to the closeout of USAID implementing partner 
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI).  In January 2008, when DAI 
closed its program in Sudan, HAC seized assets funded by USAID from 
DAI, including items classified as dual-use by the Department of 
Commerce (DOC).  Such equipment must be licensed for export to Sudan 
and is prohibited from transfer or use by anyone in Sudan, under 
U.S. Export Administration Regulations, without express consent from 
DOC.  Many of these seized assets, including restricted items as 
well as vehicles, are still in HAC's possession, despite diplomatic 
notes sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and repeated 
discussions held between the CDA, USAID Mission Director, Minister 
of Humanitarian Affairs and HAC Commissioner.  The issue was also 
specifically raised in high-level discussions between US Special 
Envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson and senior GoS officials, although 
the agreement reached on it was left uncompleted when the talks fell 
apart during the Abyei crisis last May. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000210  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Some of the DAI assets, valued at approximately $360,000, 
were transferred in January 2008 from DAI to PADCO-AECOM, which has 
been using them for activities that support the implementation of 
Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Khartoum, Abyei, South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile states.  Over the past year, HAC has 
repeatedly threatened to take the DAI assets from PADCO-AECOM, and 
used the threat of their seizure to intimidate PADCO-AECOM staff. 
In July 2008, the HAC Director of NGO Procedures Mutasim Abualghasim 
took a licensed DAI laptop from PADCO-AECOM premises.  In September 
2008, USAID removed 19 DAI computers from the PADCOM-AECOM Khartoum 
office to prevent their seizure by the GoS.  Some DAI assets, 
including vehicles, computers and communications equipment, were in 
use by PADCO-AECOM staff and therefore were not removed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
GOS PUNISHES USAID PARTNERS FOR DISPUTE WITH USG, PUTTING 
PEACE-BUILDING PROGRAMS AT RISK 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The latest round of confrontation began on January 25, 
2009, when HAC again demanded the DAI assets from PADCO-AECOM, and 
learned that USAID had removed the DAI computers.  During the DAI 
closeout, Koop was required to sign a memo stating that PADCO-AECOM 
would keep the DAI assets until HAC determined what would be done 
with them.  Abualghasim told Koop that PADCO-AECOM had violated 
their agreement with HAC, thereby proving that they were 
untrustworthy, and immediately issued a letter demanding the 
handover of all DAI assets by PADCO-AECOM to HAC.  PADCO-AECOM took 
no action and on January 28, Post sent a diplomatic note to MFA 
stating that the property in question belongs to the USG and 
disposition should be done in consultation with the US Embassy and 
USAID. 
 
¶7. (SBU) After not receiving any response to this diplomatic note 
for two weeks, on February 9 the CDA raised the issue with HAC 
Commissioner Hassabo Abdurahman in the meeting of the High Level 
Committee (HLC) on the Joint Communiqu between the Government of 
Sudan and the United Nations.  [Note: the HLC includes a donor 
observer - a rotating position shared between the US, UK, and EU. 
US currently holds the position.  End note.]  During the discussion, 
Hassabo insisted that DAI signed a technical agreement with HAC and 
therefore HAC has the right to determine what happens to their 
assets.  He accused the USG of funding unregistered "Mickey Mouse" 
organizations, and questioned why "political" types were getting 
involved in issues between the HAC and non-governmental 
organizations.  The tense encounter ended when Minister of 
Humanitarian Affairs Haroun Ron recommended that HAC and CDA hold a 
follow-up meeting to discuss the issue further. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Hassabo reportedly left that meeting in a fury, returned to 
his office, and gave the directive to expel the PADCO-AECOM Country 
Director Koop from Sudan.  Just hours before the confrontation took 
place at the HLC, a delegation of HAC and Ministry of Humanitarian 
Affairs staff visited the PADCO-AECOM Khartoum office.  They 
informed Koop that they would return the next day with a truck to 
pick up the DAI assets, and would also begin an "evaluation" of the 
PADCO-AECOM program.  On February 10, the group returned, and 
although they took no assets with them on that visit, they informed 
Koop that they would return in seven days with a decision on asset 
disposition, a decision that would rest in part on the findings of 
the evaluation.  The delegation also interviewed expatriate and 
local PADCO-AECOM staff, and took with them files on grant 
activities. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Koop departed Sudan safely on February 13.  Post has 
already taken the step of asking Consular Affairs to rescind the 
multiple-entry US visa that HAC Commissioner Hassabo holds, and put 
HAC staff Adam and Abualghasim on the visa ineligibility list.  CDA 
Fernandez raised the issue with NCP senior official Qutbi al-Mahdi 
on February 12, and Presidential Advisor Ali Abdallah Masar on 
February 14. Masar called CDA on February 15 to report that a 
"compromise" was in the works that would allow Koop to return in 
another position and allow PADCO-AECOM to work "in a coordinated 
fashion" with the Sudanese. CDA had noted to both officials that it 
was strange that Sudan would such a step the same day that the first 
official letter from President Bashir to President Obama, seeking an 
improvement in relations, was delivered to the Embassy. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10. (SBU) The events of the past week are the latest confrontation 
in an ongoing battle by the GoS to assert its exclusive control over 
organizations implementing humanitarian and development programs in 
 
KHARTOUM 00000210  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Sudan, and to deny donor organizations involvement in important 
aspects of project implementation.  HAC cares little about the 
actual DAI property in question, and much of what they have in hand 
remains locked up gathering dust.  The GoS may simply want to make 
clear to INGOs and donors that it is in charge in Darfur and that 
INGOs must suffer in silence if they want to remain in Sudan.  The 
regime can be counted on to continue this dispute with its typical 
tactics - yesterday the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Ron and HAC 
Commissioner Hassabo made statements to the press warning NGOs to 
'stay out of politics,' and stating that some NGOs have a 
'governmental' agenda and 'are not doing what they are supposed to 
do.'  The accusation is ironic, given the number of local NGOs that 
are controlled by the GoS.  As has happened in the past, the 
rhetoric and threats may subside without dramatic impact on USG 
assistance programs in Sudan.  Hassabo may be acting on his own in 
this case, or if his move was approved by more senior officials it 
is possible that the regime is hoping to provoke greater engagement 
from the US since the regime knows that humanitarian access is one 
of our highest priorities in Sudan.  CDA will follow up with 
additional interventions at the MFA and the Humanitarian Affairs 
Ministry this week, warning that the regime is sending still another 
bad signal to Washington with this latest action.  However, we here 
at post recognize that enhanced humanitarian access in Darfur (and 
progress on many of our other goals such as CPA implementation) is 
contingent on a working relationship with the government. The regime 
has one strong card in this fight - they know that the NGO and 
international community care more about at risk populations in 
Darfur than they do, so that Darfur's vulnerable people become pawns 
or hostages in their calculations. 
 
FERNANDEZ