VZCZCXRO7245
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0187/01 0410805
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100805Z FEB 09 ZDK CTG NUMEROUR REQUESTS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2948
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000187 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFURI CIVIL SOCIETY AND FORMER REGIME OFFICIALS PUSH FOR 
USG ENGAGEMENT WITH SUDAN, RECONCILIATION IN DARFUR 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 153 
 
KHARTOUM 00000187  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In meetings with Senior Representative for Sudan 
Tim Shortley and CDA Fernandez, Darfuri civil society leaders and 
retired government officials pressed for greater U.S. diplomatic 
involvement in engaging directly with the GOS to solve the Darfur 
crisis.  With Darfuris fed up that "the war in Darfur has become 
wars for Darfur," as one participant put it, a broad range of 
participants in the meetings expressed hope that the upcoming Qatari 
initiative will succeed.  But while peace talks may reconcile the 
mostly Zaghawa factions still at war with Khartoum, civil society 
participants bemoaned the GOS's attempt to stifle the work of 
Darfuri organizations, further exacerbating tribal differences and 
reducing the chances for true grass-roots reconciliation. End 
summary. 
 
The Arab Perspective 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a meeting with SPG Shortley and CDA Fernandez on 
February 3, Southern Rizeigat Arab leader El Waleed Madibo explained 
that ethnic polarization in Darfur can be ameliorated with 
international support for a dialogue in Darfur free of NCP meddling. 
 Madibo described Arabs in Darfur as "trapped," aware that the GOS 
"misused and betrayed" them, and angry that the GOS has not shared 
its wealth with the Darfuri Arab populace.  The said that by 
coercing the NCP regime to accept the legitimacy of the 
Darfur-Darfur dialogue, the U.S. can encourage Darfuris to tackle 
the "militarization of identity" plaguing their region.  As director 
of the independent Sudanese NGO Governance Bureau, Madibo suggested 
that the US should support a trip of Darfuri civil society leaders, 
including key non-Janjaweed Darfuri Arabs, to the United States to 
meet with policy makers and subsequently return to Darfur as a 
positive public diplomacy initiative. 
 
Former Regime Officials Urge U.S. Engagement 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Assembled at the home of former North Darfur governor Ret. 
Gen. Ibrahim Suleiman (fired by President Bashir in 2002 for 
objecting to arming Arab tribesmen) on February 4, a group of 
retired GOS officials and Sudanese intellectuals told Shortley and 
CDA that U.S. diplomatic engagement with the GOS and Darfuri rebels, 
on the level of dialogue conducted to conclude the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), can bring about positive change in Darfur. 
Al-Shafie Ahmed Mohamed, a retired ambassador and former Secretary 
General of the NCP, said that it is unlikely the CPA itself would go 
forward without a satisfactory resolution of the Darfur problem, but 
U.S. involvement is necessary to achieve a breakthrough similar to 
the CPA.  Retired General Siddiq Mohamed Ismail echoed sentiments in 
the room supporting the Doha negotiations, calling the Qatari 
initiative a true opportunity to bring peace and security to Darfur. 
Mohamed Mahmoud Haroon, an NCP member and professor of social 
sciences at the University of Khartoum, said that the situation in 
Darfur at this moment is conducive to ending fighting, as all 
parties are "fed up" that "the war in Darfur has become wars for 
Darfur."  According to Haroon, the paradigm shift that U.S.-Sudanese 
relations underwent during CPA negotiations brought about a complete 
political shift in Sudan, as the NCP agreed to form the Government 
of National Unity with the SPLM.  Haroon envisions a similar shift 
taking place in Sudan should the U.S. be inclined to engage the GOS 
on Darfur and CPA implementation. 
 
Civil Society Perspective 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Meeting with CDA and Shortley on February 4, a 
Khartoum-based group of civil society activists insisted that peace 
in Darfur is possible if the GOS begins permitting Darfuris to 
negotiate among themselves.  Dr. Mousa Adam, a well-known Darfuri 
civil society leader with the Darfur Civil Society Forum (DACIF), 
said, "The ways of solving our own problems exist, but things get 
out of hand with the interference of a third party."  With Darfuri 
Arabs marginalized to the point of having no representative, Adam 
and DACIF are currently reaching out to give Arab tribes the 
opportunity to "come out of the enclosure the government has put 
them in."  Outreach to Arab tribes will reassure Arab tribes they 
will not be punished for the crimes of the janjaweed, while also 
rejuvenating the now-defunct idea of unity among Darfur's many Arab 
and African tribes. Eltaishi Mohamed, a Darfuri leader from the Arab 
Ta-ashir tribe, likewise supported outreach to Arabs to revive the 
concept of peace through unity.  "The rule of the gun has failed to 
deliver peace and solutions for unity.  The only way to create the 
old idea of unity in Darfur is through the path of civil society," 
Eltaishi said. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000187  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although DACIF would like to begin outreach to non-warring 
tribes in Darfur, activists told Shortley and the CDA that the space 
for Darfur civil society organizations is restricted in the same way 
that the GOS restricts humanitarian operations in Darfur.  With true 
Sudanese NGOs not permitted to operate, Waleed Madibo asked CDA if 
the U.S. could coerce the GOS to permit independent civil society 
organizations to operate in Darfur.  Concerned that this restriction 
will prevent the voice of the "silent majority" of Darfuris from 
being heard at the upcoming talks at Doha, Mousa Adam warned, "Any 
peace agreement not bought by the silent majority will be a failure, 
and will not filter down to the villages.  There were more IDPs 
after Abuja than before.  Partial peace is no peace." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: One of the underlying themes of these meetings was 
the desire of the Sudanese to see grater diplomatic engagement from 
the United States.  Participants were hopeful that American 
diplomacy could contribute to an end to the violence in Darfur, 
recognizing that significant pressure/incentives must be 
applied/offered to the regime to encourage the kind of political 
shift that occurred following the signing of the CPA. Unfortunately, 
much of the level of suggestions revolves around talking, rather 
than doing (or changing policies) by the regime. Although 
intellectually and morally well-positioned to promote peace and 
reconciliation, independent civil society organizations in Darfur 
mostly suffer in silence, with no real mechanisms to protest the 
GOS's restrictions on their operations.  Post recommends increasing 
support for Darfuri civil society organizations such as DACIF, who 
can contribute to the dialogue about Darfur's future in a way that 
armed movements cannot, and will become increasingly important once 
peace is achieved.  Unfortunately, the bloodletting by both cynical 
rebel movements and a ruthless regime continues. End comment. 
 
¶7. (U) Senior Representative Shortley did not clear this cable prior 
to his departure from Sudan. 
 
FERNANDEZ