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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM166, WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM166 2009-02-05 15:39 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3933
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0166/01 0361539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051539Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2916
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000166 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE? 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1754 
B) KHARTOUM 1549 
C) KHARTOUM 1504 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The Sudan People's Initiative (SPI) has been given 
a headquarters and some funding, but no mandate or support from GOS 
officials to implement its recommendations, Chairman of the SPI 
Drafting Committee Professor Atayeb Hajj Attia told CDA Fernandez in 
a meeting on February 5. While several leading, squabbling NCP 
figures continue to exert their influence on the Darfur portfolio, 
there is no clear leader among them and thus no clear Darfur policy, 
he said. He also stated that the impending ICC announcement has 
triggered a wave of internal machinations within the regime and 
essentially paralyzed any and all decision-making. Attia feared that 
the ICC would lead to the eventual downfall of President Bashir, and 
that with no clear successor this could easily lead to a total 
breakdown of the state apparatus and trigger regional conflict, a 
"somalization" of Sudan. He also warned of impending political and 
economic collapse in South Sudan, triggered by plunging oil 
revenues.  Attia is a respected elder statesman of the academic 
community in Sudan and his observations deserve close attention. End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On February 5 CDA Fernandez met with Professor Atayeb Hajj 
Attia, the Director of the Peace Research Center of the University 
of Khartoum who served as Chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 
Sudan People's Initiative (SPI) in Kenana (ref A). Attia expressed 
frustration that he was been unable to make real progress on 
implementing the SPI recommendations. "They gave me a nice building 
to serve as a headquarters, and a check to fund activities," he 
said. "But there is no process, and no point of contact. There's no 
one person [in the government] that you can talk to get anything 
done," he said, adding that (with the sole exception of VP Ali Osman 
Taha) it is impossible to consistently get any of the Ministers or 
Presidential Advisors on the phone. "They all shut off their mobiles 
and work in isolation," he remarked. Senior regime leaders seemed to 
be more concerned about NCP internal power struggles than progress 
in Darfur, he complained. 
 
3. (SBU) Attia believes that the SPI process has stalled because of 
resistance from within the GOS. He noted that the various actors 
exerting influence on the Darfur portfolio (including Presidential 
Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha, 
NISS Chief Salah Ghosh, Defense Minister Abdelrahim Hussein, Financ 
Minister Awad al-Jaz) each have their reasons to withhold 
implementing the SPI recommendations. "Some feel they need to leave 
some cards on the table before talks in Doha," while others are 
still advocating for a military solution, he said. This lack of a 
clear policy is as much about internal NCP machinations as it is 
about lack of cnsensus, he said. The impending ICC announcement has 
put tremendous pressure on the regime and essentially paralyzed 
decision-making. "No one wants to take ay initiative or propose 
concrete steps," because they are afraid of how it will affect their 
position in the current balance of power, he said. 
 
4. (SBU) Though he has had doubts about continuing the uphill battle 
to implement the SPI recommendations, Attia told CDA that he remains 
committed to trying, hoping that he can leverage the Doha Peace 
talks to push forward the process. He is focused on grassroots 
issues--voluntary returns, tribal reconciliations, compensation and 
blood money--which can have tangible effects on the ground. "The big 
macro issues, we can leave to Doha," he said. Unfortunately, he 
added, the situation in Darfur is deteriorating rapidly, with an 
increasing polarization between (and inside) different tribes and 
rebel movements. 
 
5. (SBU) Attia also told CDA that in his capacity at the Peace 
Research Center of the University of Khartoum, he is bringing 
together representatives of different political parties for 
closed-door discussions on how to ensure a "soft landing" in the 
wake of the ICC announcement. He hopes that a candid discussion of 
views will help avert a disaster, but he himself is not optimistic. 
"At some point, this country will be so weakened that Bashir will 
need to step down," he said, arguing that with no clear successor 
this could easily lead to a total breakdown of the state apparatus. 
"There are many actors who think that if the regime collapses, they 
can take over," he said. "But in reality, it's a huge hkle that will 
cause the entire boat to sink." He noted that as the only African 
country bordering all three "conflict belts"--the Horn of Africa, 
the Great Lakes, and the Sahel--Sudan had the potential to set off a 
chain reaction of violence that could propel much of Africa into 
chaos. Attia had just returned from Cairo where he described 
Egyptian officials as deeply concerned about the possible 
"somalization" of Sudan. 
 
6. (SBU) To fend off this potential disaster, Attia urged CDA that 
the USG take strong, early steps and "widen its mandate" in Sudan. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000166  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
"You need a new comprehensive model, rather that just replacing the 
people at the top," he said. He advocated that the USG pursue strong 
and direct engagement with the GOS and exert "heavy pressure outside 
and inside, in cooperation other international stakeholders," to 
further goals of peace and security. Without such action, the 
situation will likely deteriorate quickly, he said. 
 
7. (SBU) Attia also sounded alarm bells about the political and 
economic crisis in South Sudan. The plunging oil revenues will 
reveal the weakness of the South's economy and political system 
within months, he said, warning that "a storm is coming." He noted 
that SPLM has in many ways adopted the worst practices of the NCP 
and equally paralyzed in its decision-making. "The SPLM has learned 
more quickly than my brightest students," he joked. "Even their 
corruption practices are analogous to those of the NCP." He added 
that the former rebels of Sudan's Eastern Front, feeling betrayed by 
both the NCP and their former allies in the SPLM, are also deeply 
unhappy and talking about going back to fighting. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Attia is one of the most respected political 
scientists in Sudan and we give some credibility to the gloomy views 
he expressed. The SPI represents the latest in empty promises and 
hollow spectacles put forth by the NCP regime. It also serves as an 
unwelcome reminder that the regime remains mostly unwilling--and 
perhaps more worryingly, unable--to take substantive and positive 
steps towards resolving the conflict in Darfur. If true, the 
paralysis of decision-making amongst the NCP leadership is likely to 
be exacerbated by the ICC indictment. And though Attia's fears of a 
total meltdown might be premature, strong engagement with the regime 
on the part of the USG and international community are the best hope 
for preventing further violence and chaos, not just in Darfur but in 
the rest of Sudan as well, especially the South. 
 
FERNANDEZ