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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM140, BOMBING CONTINUES AND GOS BLOCKS UNAMID SENIOR LEADERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM140 2009-02-03 16:16 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5242
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0140/01 0341616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031616Z FEB 09 ZDK PER MCO OFFICE
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2857
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000140 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  BOMBING CONTINUES AND GOS BLOCKS UNAMID SENIOR LEADERS 
FROM TRAVELING TO MUHAJARRIYA 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 134 
B) KHARTOUM 125 
 
KHARTOUM 00000140  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 3, the Government of Sudan blocked 
senior UNAMID leaders from traveling to Muhajarriya - a move that 
several UNAMID leaders have already interpreted as a violation of 
UNAMID's Status of Forces Agreement with the GOS.  UNAMID sources 
also reported that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) dropped over 25 
bombs dropped near Muhajarriya on February 3, one of which was only 
200 meters from UNAMID's team site (TS).  This contact also stated 
that the number of IDPs seeking protection around the team site 
continues to rise. END SUMMARY. 
 
BOMBING CONTINUES 
- - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU)  On February 3 at 17:00 local time, a contact from 
UNAMID's Joint Mission Analysis told poloff that the Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) continued "heavy bombing" in Muhajarriya with over 25 
recorded incidents of aerial bombing on February 3.  This contact 
reported that one of the bombs landed 200 meters from UNAMID's Team 
site.  As a result of the extensive bombing, this source stated thatQ 
the number of IDPs seeking refuge around the team site perimeter 
continues to rise. 
 
UNAMID LEADERSHIP BLOCKED FROM TRAVEL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)  Also on February 3, three senior UNAMID leaders (from 
JMAC, UNDSS, and Public Affairs) and one UNAMID political officer 
all confirmed that Sudanese National Intelligence and Security 
Services blocked senior UNAMID leaders from traveling to Muhajarriya 
on February 3.  (As reported in Ref A, a UNAMID delegation led by 
Deputy Force Commander Emmanuel Karenzi and including Human Rights, 
Public Affairs, UNDSS, NGOs, and humanitarian agencies planned on 
traveling to Muhajarriya for fact-finding and assessment mission on 
February 3.)  The delegation planned to depart El-Fasher at 9:30 by 
helicopter, stop in Nyala for additional passengers, and then 
continue on to Muhajarriya. 
 
4.  (SBU)  According to UNDSS'S Chief Aminata Thiaw, NISS in Nyala 
refused flight clearance for UNAMID for the UNAMID aircraft.  "The 
cancellation of this trip had nothing to do with UNAMID.  NISS would 
not grant clearance and so that was the end of it," stated Thiaw. 
One participant in the trip from UNAMID Public Affairs separately 
told poloff that UNAMID's senior staff was comfortable with the trip 
and that the UNAMID Team Site (TS) and pilots had both taken 
necessary safety precautions.  According to this source, the TS had 
secured the landing area in Muhajarriya and the UNAMID pilots had 
planned for a direct and quick descent to the landing area.  The 
Public Affairs official reported that as UNAMID waited for the 
necessary clearances, senior UNAMID representatives were made to 
wait for over two hours. "There was the usual 'blame-game' and 
'ping-pong' from the Sudanese security as they tried to blame 
another region or office for the decision," said this source.  After 
two hours of waiting, the decision was finally made that the 
clearance would not be granted, and the UNAMID leaders decided to 
return to headquarters. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE 
- - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Several of these UNAMID contacts within JMAC, Public 
Affairs, and Political Affairs told poloff that these GOS actions 
are "very significant" and could be a violation of the UNAMID's 
Status of Forces Agreement (see text in para 7 for portion of SOFA) 
with the GOS.  "We are not being allowed to do our jobs and assess 
the situation for ourselves," stated one UNAMID contact. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
6.  (SBU)  The ongoing violence in Muhajarriya, the displacement 
caused by it, and the GOS's interference with UNAMID's freedom of 
movement are all causes for serious concern.  The GOS often prevents 
UNAMID from visiting areas where there is fighting or bombing (or 
where there was fighting and bombing) due to security concerns - 
which in some cases are legitimate but often serve as an excuse to 
deny UNAMID access to areas and populatioNs that would provide 
damning information.  CDA Fernandez conveyed our grave concerns 
about this latest example of GOS obstruction to State Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Al Samani Al Wasila the afternoon of February 3 and 
will follow up with additional NCP officials tomorrow.  We are also 
passing the same message to contacts at NISS.  Post recommends an 
additional statement from the Department expressing concern about 
the ongoing fighting and SAF bombing, calling on JEM to withdraw 
from positions in South Darfur and a return to the status quo ante 
of January 14, and calling on the GOS to allow UNAMID full access to 
Muhajarriya.  The meetings of Chief Mediator Bassole in Doha with 
 
KHARTOUM 00000140  002.8 OF 002 
 
 
the Government and JEM take on added importance to negotiate a 
ceasefire and safe passage for JEM back to North Darfur. 
 
 
7.  Begin text on Status of Forces Agreement: 
 
"12. ... UNAMID shall enjoy full and unrestricted freedom of 
movement without delay throughout Darfur and other areas of Sudan 
where UNAMID is operating in accordance with its mandate by the most 
direct route possible, without the need for travel permits or prior 
authorization or notification, except in the case of movements by 
air, which will comply with ICAO safety regulations and the 
customary procedural requirements for flight planning and operations 
within the airspace of Sudan as promulgated and specifically 
notified to UNAMID by the Civil Aviation Authority of Sudan..." 
 
FERNANDEZ