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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM134, UNAMID PROPOSES SAFE ZONE IN MUHAJARRIYA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM134 2009-02-03 06:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1382
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0134/01 0340600
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030600Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2843
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000134 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID PROPOSES SAFE ZONE IN MUHAJARRIYA 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 125 
B) KHARTOUM 116 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 2, UNAMID's Joint Special 
Representative Rodolphe Adada told CDA Fernandez that the Justice 
and Equality Movement has taken four defensive positions outside of 
Muhajarriya, while the GoS vows a large-scale attack on JEM in South 
Darfur. UNAMID will stay in the area, and has proposed establishing 
a de-militarized "safe zone" in Muhajarriya to both the GOS and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  The GOS wanted more details 
regarding the safe zone proposal but were now reconciled to UNAMID 
remaining on the ground, said the JSR.  Adada will travel to 
Ndjamena on February 3 to meet with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and 
discuss the proposed safe zone, while troop reinforcements and 
senior UNAMID leadership will visit Muhajarriya in the coming days. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Adada opened the meeting stating (as reported reftel) 
that Secretary General Ban Ki-moon overturned UNAMID's initial 
inclination to evacuate Muhajarriya.  CDA Fernandez stated that it 
was a good decision for the protection of civilians and IDPs, for 
UNAMID's reputation, and for its own safety, as JEM (reportedly in 
need of supplies and fuel) may have attacked UNAMID units retreating 
to Nyala.  Adada reported that following the SYG's decision, he 
immediately traveled to Khartoum on February 1 to explain UNAMID's 
position to the GOS. 
 
UNAMID'S "SAFE ZONE" PROPOSAL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU) Adada reported that he and senior UNAMID staff met 
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Mutriff Saddiq, Intelligence Chief 
Salah Ghosh, and Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Hussein in a series 
of meetings on February 1 and 2.  According to Adada, these GoS 
officials repeated the list of concerns already presented to CDA 
Fernandez by U/S Saddiq (reftel) including: JEM's need for 
provisions and fuel and the possibility that they could attack 
UNAMID for this supply; the GOS's belief that all civilians have 
fled Muhajarriya; and the GOS's intention to stage a large attack 
against JEM in the near future.  Adada reported that he proposed 
creating a de-militarized safe zone near the UNAMID Muhajarriya base 
camp free of weapons and fighters to these GOS officials. UNAMID 
would be responsible for disarming all individuals in this zone, and 
ensuring that only civilians are allowed in the area.  According to 
Adada the GOS officials appeared overall lukewarm but mildly 
accepting of the idea.  Salah Ghosh appeared most open to the idea, 
stated Adada, while Defense Minister Hussein wants to attack and 
completely destroy JEM.  Compared to several weeks ago, the GOS 
appears to have slightly backed away from a ceasefire and is now 
more interested in military options, stated Adada.  Adada added that 
the GOS will probably agree to UNAMID's proposal as long as it does 
not strengthen JEM, but that their final response will depend on a 
number of factors including: whether JEM will stay in the area; if 
JEM leaves how they will be escorted; and how any deal now will 
impact ongoing discussions between the Chief Mediator, JEM, and the 
GOS. 
 
JEM TAKES A DEFENSIVE POSTURE OUTSIDE OF MUHAJARRIYA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  According to Adada, JEM has now left Muhajarriya, removed 
its heavy weapons from inside the village and the market, and 
established four defensive positions outside of Muhajarriya. 
Although UNAMID can not verify whether JEM lacks adequate 
provisions, JEM's defensive posture signals that JEM may be short of 
fuel and left with no choice but to bunker down and fight.  Adada 
also said that the GOS appears intent on attacking JEM in 
Muhajarriya, saying "We need to take the GoS's words that they are 
going to attack very seriously, and it appears as though JEM is 
going to fight for its life."  He noted that both Ghosh and the MOD 
saw this as a golden opportunity to "punish" JEM. 
 
UNAMID TRAVEL SCHEDULE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Deputy Force Commander Emmanuel Karenzi, UNAMID Civil 
Affairs South Sector Chief Ali Hassan, Humanitarian Coordinator Toby 
Lanzer, and representatives from NGOS such as MSF, Solidarite, and 
CHR will travel to Muhajarriya on February 3 and 4 to assess the 
military, logistical, and humanitarian needs in the area.  About 
3,000 IDPs are now huddled near the UNAMID base which is also going 
to be beefed up by additional heavy equipment and two additional 
platoons. Meanwhile, JSR Adada, Chief Mediator Bassole, and other 
senior UNAMID staff plan on traveling to Ndjamena to meet JEM leader 
Khalil Ibrahim to attempt to secure Ibrahim's approval for the 
safe-zone concept.  Adada stated that he will directly tell Khalil 
Ibrahim that he and his movements are starting to lose the 
credibility that they gained from their Washington visit and talks 
with Bassole, and that it was a bad idea for "JEM to travel straight 
 
KHARTOUM 00000134  002 OF 002 
 
 
from Washington to Muhajarriya."  Adada also stated, "I will tell 
Khalil directly - if you do not cooperate on this issue, you will 
lose." Adada noted that by giving media coverage to this meeting in 
Ndjamena, UNAMID can put additional pressure on JEM, even if "Khalil 
does not accept our safe-zone proposal." 
 
EFFECT ON OTHER REBEL MOVEMENTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU) JSR Adada and UNAMID polchief Mohammad both stated that 
other rebel movements are beginning to coalesce around a common 
hatred of JEM.  JEM's attacks on SLM/MM and their leaders' continued 
assertion that "JEM is the only movement in Darfur," has fostered 
renewed relationships between former allies of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement.  Adada reported that he met the United Resistance Front's 
Tajadine Niam in Addis Ababa on January 31.  Niam reported that a 
federation of movements including SLM/Unity, URF, and SLM/MM has 
started to form.  Niam bitterly blamed the Americans and Bassole for 
JEM's bloody incursion. According to Niam, Minni Minnawi has become 
the "center piece" of this federation, and "only Minnawi may be able 
to unite SLM."  Adada stated that this federation does not include 
all elements of SLA/AW, as the prominent SLA/AW Commander Muhammad 
Terrada appears to be coordinating with JEM in East Jebel Marra, the 
only prominent rebel leader doing so.  Adada agreed that JEM's 
attack on Muhajarriya has been a "disaster for the Zaghawa tribes 
and the rebel movements."  He also agreed that even if JEM leaves 
the area, the GOS will never allow Minnawi to regain full authority 
over his former areas of control so Khartoum will benefit from JEM's 
misadventure.  Adada also reported that Chief Mediator Bassole's 
courtship of JEM has enraged many rebel movements and that his 
credibility is beginning to suffer.  Meanwhile, Abdul Muhammad 
speculated that a decisive GOS victory over JEM in Muhajarriya could 
severely weaken, if not disable, JEM altogether.  "In Darfur rebel 
strength is only measured by mobility and the number of landcruisers 
that a movement has.  If JEM cannot flee and its vehicles are 
destroyed, JEM could lose respect and be disabled," stated Abdul 
Muhammad. 
 
7.  (SBU)  On February 2, SLM Chairman Minni Minnawi told CDA 
Fernandez that JEM's actions have drawn all the other rebel factions 
together. He said that he is coordinating with prominent field 
commanders Ali Karbino, Bahar Abu Gharda, and Abdallah Banda and 
others who have been tricked and threatened by Khalil. He said that 
they are in frequent contact with, but will not participate in a 
Sudanese Armed Forces assault on Muhajarriya. Minnawi noted that he 
does not trust the SAF and is afraid that if they intervene SAF 
could turn on them and attack SLM/MM at any point.  According to 
Minnawi, the outcome in Muhajarriya will be decided by who is the 
cleverest at maneuvering a political or military solution favorable 
to their side. 
 
8. (SBU)  Comment: If it is true that JEM is out of fuel (this is a 
frequent assertion which is not yet proved), JEM may accept the safe 
zone proposal while using the time gained to seek resupply.  Khalil 
Ibrahim is unlikely to accept the "status quo ante" as he would lose 
face under such a scenario.  And while JEM's incursion has weakened 
Minnawi and strengthened the GOS, it seems that the news of Minni's 
political demise were premature. Meanwhile the government is 
debating whether to try and destroy JEM's vehicles outside 
Muhajarriya (Defense Minister Abdel Rahim's preference) or whether 
to allow JEM to remain in the area but without supply routes to 
slowly squeeze them in place (NISS Chief's Ghosh's reported 
preference).  Either way, JEM's foolish attack into South Darfur 
seems to have weakened it and turned other rebels against it, and 
played right into the hands of the GOS. It is still possible that 
JEM will seek to break out from the area and try to reach the safety 
of the Chadian border - if it can. 
 
FERNANDEZ