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Viewing cable 09KABUL409, HELMAND SIX MONTH UPDATE - GOVERNANCE IMPROVES DESPITE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL409 2009-02-25 11:49 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1882
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0409/01 0561149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251149Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7493
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000409 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR AF
 
SUBJECT: HELMAND SIX MONTH UPDATE - GOVERNANCE IMPROVES DESPITE 
SECURITY AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Helmand remains one of the most violent provinces in 
Afghanistan but the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and Afghan security forces continue to expand security across the 
province.   The Governor Mangal overcame strong political challenges 
from Helmand powerbrokers and governance made steady progress under 
his direction.  The Provincial Council (PC) improved its work and 
supported efforts to build governance capacity.   Enemy Forces (EFs) 
were pushed away from Garmsir, Gereshk and Musa Qala district 
centers and the Nad Ali district was returned to government control. 
 Freedom of movement has improved for local residents but those 
working for the government or ISAF continue to face significant 
security challenges.  During this reporting period, numerous 
development projects progressed and several large government and 
security projects were completed.  The governor strongly supported 
counter narcotics efforts and his Food Zone program eventually 
enrolled over 33,000 farmers into wheat production and away from 
poppy. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
2. (SBU) Helmand province saw extensive fighting throughout the 
reporting period and EFs overcame local police elements to establish 
a strong presence in the Nad Ali District, located just west of 
Lashkar Gah.  EFs used this area as a staging area and launched 
several unsuccessful attacks against Lashkar Gah in October 2008. 
ISAF and Afghan security forces performed well together and 
inflicted a serious defeat on EFs.  In December 2008, ISAF and 
Afghan forces launched a large-scale operation, pushed EFs out of 
Nad Ali and began stabilization efforts immediately.  EFs continue 
to engage security forces in the area and appear determined to 
maintain a presence in the district. 
 
3. (SBU) In Garmsir, Gershk and Lashkar Gah there was a noticeable 
reduction in enemy activity, and security around these cities has 
improved.  Residents have more freedom of movement and the economies 
of these areas have improved.  The Musa Qala district remains 
kinetically active but the district center is stable and the Afghan 
police have assumed greater responsibility for city security. 
Sangin remains a large security challenge, and the removal of the 
U.S. Marines in October 2008 has hampered stabilization activities. 
EFs remain close to the district center and regularly engage the 
ISAF forces based there.  The provincial and district leadership 
continue to lobby for additional Afghan Army forces to help improve 
the situation but none have been deployed to the area.  Without 
sizeable Afghan Army reinforcements, the security situation in and 
around Sangin will remain stalemated. 
 
Political 
--------- 
 
4. (SBU) During the second half of 2008, Governor Mangal came under 
intense political pressure from former and current members of the 
Afghan Government.  Former governor Sher Mohammed Akunzada (SMA), 
who is now a senator, and former Helmand chief of police, Abdul 
Rhaman Jan (ARJ), joined forces to try to undermine Mangal's 
administration.  Each maintains a support base in Helmand and used 
these elements to lobby Kabul for Mangal's removal.  The collapse of 
local security forces in Nad Ali was directly attributed to the 
SMA/ARJ network and the organization tried to stir up public 
opposition to ongoing ISAF operations.  Following several incidents 
where civilian casualties resulted from clearance operations, the 
organization falsified casualty figures and used this information to 
try to unseat Mangal.  On other occasions, the group spread rumors 
Mangal had fled Helmand and had resigned his position. 
 
5.  (SBU) Throughout this political assault, Mangal waged an 
aggressive media campaign to defend his reform initiatives, and he 
initiated a sustained public outreach campaign.  From August 2008 
through January 2009, Mangal regularly visited district centers with 
members of the Provincial Council and various line directors.  He 
successfully used these events to speak to thousands of Helmand 
residents and often organized large media events to initiate new 
development projects and celebrate the completion of others.  These 
well-crafted visits built political momentum for his administration 
and won over Helmand residents.  These twin initiatives combined 
with excellent political support from the PRT allowed Mangal to 
overcome the political challenges, and he has now set himself as the 
dominant political force in Helmand province. 
 
Governance 
 
KABUL 00000409  002 OF 003 
 
 
---------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Helmand provincial government continues to be largely 
ineffective, but the Helmand directors of Health and Education 
improved their operations and increased delivery of services.  The 
PC celebrated the opening of their new office/shura hall in October 
2008 and this facility has improved the group's operations.  They 
are now holding regular meetings with their constituents and the 
shura hall is the preferred venue for the large outreach shuras 
organized by the governor and the PC.  Over the past several months, 
the PC leadership has become more assertive and is beginning to 
organize additional outreach events.  They now ask for detailed 
briefings from the PRT on security and development issues and their 
regular attendance at shuras in the districts has raised the group's 
profile. 
 
7. (SBU) Mangal has tried unsuccessfully to remove multiple Helmand 
line directors, but told PRTOFF that many of these officials have 
strong political protection in Kabul and their removal is not 
possible.  On several occasions, he has tried to fire the directors 
of Agriculture and Rural Rehabilitation and Development but said he 
cannot generate the political support from Kabul to replace them. 
At the district level, the governor has replaced the district 
administrators of Gereshk, Kajaki and Sangin with positive results. 
The new district administrators were selected with support from the 
local communities and all have worked well to improve security in 
their areas.  They also played key roles in the voter registration 
process, ensuring the effort was initiated and well protected for 
the duration. 
 
Development 
----------- 
 
8. (SBU) During the reporting period development efforts continued 
across central Helmand, and several important projects were 
completed and other ventures initiated.  Construction of the Bost 
Airfield facility is advancing well - and when completed this spring 
- will significantly improve civil aviation and support expanded 
agricultural exports.  The completion of the provincial council 
building and the provincial police headquarters has significantly 
increased the capacity of both the local government and law 
enforcement community.  Both opening events were major political 
opportunities for the governor and left a clear impression on local 
residents that large-scale development will progress in Helmand. 
All development initiatives in Helmand received significant support 
from Mangal and district leadership.  The PRT found itself under 
regular pressure from Helmand officials to push forward road and 
power projects.  Even in the less secure areas, there is a sense of 
urgency to move development projects along as quickly as possible. 
 
 
Counter Narcotics 
----------------- 
 
9. (SBU) In the last six months, Helmand residents witnessed 
Governor Mangal wage a daily assault against the Helmand narcotics 
industry.  At every public and private venue, Mangal and his staff 
hammered away at the drug trade and on numerous occasions publicly 
shamed leading narcotic industry figures.  His consistent message 
that drug production is the root of corruption and poor security in 
the province found a receptive audience within a large portion of 
the Helmand population.  Governor Mangal organized large media 
events to announce the start of Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) and 
Governor-led Eradication (GLE) operations in the province, and 
staged several large drug burns with media representatives on hand 
to ensure his message of zero tolerance for poppy reached well 
beyond Helmand province. 
 
10. (SBU) Mangal combined his zero tolerance for drug production 
with strong support for alternative livelihood programs.  He 
received excellent support from USAID and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) to help launch the Food Zone 
program that provided high quality wheat seed and fertilizer to 
almost 33,000 Helmand farmers.  This unprecedented effort was 
intended to encourage farmers to return to traditional agriculture 
and was a direct shot at the narco-barons who use their drug revenue 
to destabilize Helmand.  The Food Zone program was a strong example 
of provincial authorities listening to their residents and 
developing a plan with the support of the development agencies at 
the PRT.  If the Food Zone program helps reduce poppy cultivation, 
there will be requests to continue this effort. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
KABUL 00000409  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) Security, development and governance improved in Helmand 
province despite the severe political and military challenges. 
Governor Mangal dominated Helmand political events and he astutely 
outmaneuvered his political opposition, leaving them in much weaker 
positions.  Mangal has tremendous ambitions for his administration 
and he is already pushing the U.S., UK and Danish missions to 
deliver more military and development support.  He is determined to 
bring the rest of the Helmand districts under government control and 
he wants to deliver large-scale development projects that he can use 
to strengthen his political position. 
 
DELL