VZCZCXRO0726
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0403/01 0551009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241009Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7484
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0739
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000403 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DELANEY AND DEANGELIS 
DEPT PASS OPIC 
DEPT PASS TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR MHIRSON, ABAUKOL, BDAHL, AND MNUGENT 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
COMMERCE FOR HAMROCK AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: ECIN ECPS ETRD EFIN AF
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF WFP'S AFGHAN FOOD AID REVEALS PROBLEMS 
 
REF: 08 Kabul 3222 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (SBU) In 2008, the USG responded to both the United Nations (UN) 
World Food Program's (WFP) on-going Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operation (PRRO) in Afghanistan and two separate food appeals in 
January and July.  Both efforts were successful.  USG provided 
157,520 metric tons of food commodities with a value of $162 
million, which accounted for 66 percent of the overall total. There 
are no reports of widespread food shortages or incidents of 
starvation. 
 
¶2. (SBU) A USAID contractor assessment of the (WFP) distribution in 
three Afghan provinces has revealed WFP aid distributed in Ghazni, 
Badghis, and Ghor reached only 40, 52 and 90 percent respectively of 
the target recipients.  USAID and ECON have presented the findings 
to Kabul-based WFP Country Director Stefano Porretti, who 
acknowledged that WFP had concerns about the transparency and 
distribution within the program.  USG will continue to monitor and 
evaluate the situation.  End Summary 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
¶3. (SBU) After a three-week, rapid survey (including visits to seven 
villages and interviews with recipients) the USAID contractor, 
FEWSNET, reported that: 
 
- Not all recipients have received their full food allotment. 
 
- The Food for Schools program seems to be doing better than Food 
for Work program in getting food to recipients, presumably because 
parents and students have a better understanding of the amounts they 
are supposed to receive. 
 
- Record keeping between WFP and its Afghan Government implementing 
partners is poor, making it impossible for a limited survey to 
determine the extent of the problem. 
 
- Security makes it difficult to deliver food and monitor food 
deliveries in many parts of the country. 
 
- WFP is getting and tracking food to the provincial level where it 
is turned over to its local implementing partners. The major 
problems begin with these secondary deliveries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As a result of these issues, USAID is commissioning FEWSNET 
to do a fuller, nationwide survey to give the Mission a clearer 
understanding of the WFP food delivery program, the extent of 
leakage in the program, and what can be done to fix it. 
 
DETAILS OF ASSESSMENT: FOOD FOR WORK 
 
¶5. (SBU) FEWSNET presented its findings to USAID Deputy Director, 
USAID FFP Officer, and Deputy Economic Counselor, outlining WFP 
distribution activities in the three provinces, broken down by Food 
For Work (FFW), Food For Schools (FFS), and Food For Training (FFT). 
 According to the data, the FFW program had the largest delta 
between allocation and actual distribution of aid.  FEWSNET 
presenter suggested that the reason for this was a lack of community 
awareness among FFW recipients.  The work undertaken by FFW 
recipients is often maintenance of canals, roads, etc. that takes 
place regardless of WFP aid.  In addition, the projects do not 
originate from the communities themselves; rather, they are directed 
by the District Development Assembly or provincial governors.  FFW 
recipients allege that the food aid is misappropriated at those 
decision making levels. 
 
FOOD FOR SCHOOLS 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to FEWSNET, FFS distributions are more reliable. 
There are fewer chances for misuse because recipients know how much 
food they should be receiving.  Nonetheless, there are aspects of 
the program that can be exploited by misuse.  WFP transports FFS 
only to district centers.  As most schools themselves are located 
some distance from the delivery points, there is no oversight of 
 
KABUL 00000403  002 OF 002 
 
 
distribution at the schools. 
 
WFP RESPONSE 
 
¶7. (SBU) USAID and ECON brought these points to WFP's Porretti, who 
acknowledged that the current WFP distribution paradigm is far from 
perfect.  Porretti agreed to develop data on how FFW and FFS aid is 
allocated between the Afghan government and NGOs.  Interestingly, he 
said that current WFP data suggest that the FFW program is more 
effective than FFS, precisely the opposite of the FEWSNET finding. 
USAID Deputy Mission Director underscored that regardless of which 
program was "better," WFP tracking and monitoring was weak and 
unacceptable and eventually would lead of a re-evaluation of the 
WFP.  Porretti agreed and promised to work on a mechanism that would 
reduce the delta between allocated aid and that received by 
beneficiaries. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
¶8. (SBU) WFP distribution issues described above need to be further 
evaluated.  USAID will continue to engage with WFP to improve record 
keeping and the distribution system.  USAID will augment the food 
security staff at the Mission. 
 
DELL