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Viewing cable 09KABUL399, PHASE 4 VOTER REGISTRATION IS A STRONG FINISH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL399 2009-02-24 04:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0603
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0399 0550404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240404Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7479
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS KABUL 000399 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PHASE 4 VOTER REGISTRATION IS A STRONG FINISH 
 
REF: A. KABUL 000154 
     B. KABUL 000237 
     C. KABUL 000313 
 
1.  (SBU)  The fourth and final phase of the voter 
registration update for the 2009 presidential and provincial 
council elections ended February 20.  A few districts that 
opened late will operate additional days to complete the full 
thirty-day registration period (REF A.)  As of February 19, 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) figures show 495,484 
new voters joined the rolls in the four southern provinces: 
275,020 in Kandahar; 133,313 in Helmand; 66,687 in Uruzgan; 
and 20,464 in Nimroz.  This total is 39 per cent of the 
number of voters registered by 2005, putting Phase 4 near the 
rest of the country, where the comparable figure is 42 
percent.  Some 32 percent of new Phase 4 voters were women, 
almost equal to the 39 percent for the other three phases. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
VIOLENCE - THE DOG DID NOTHING IN THE NIGHTTIME 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Contrary to the expectations of Afghan and 
international security forces, the Taliban fighters that 
drove violence in the south up to new levels in 2008 did not 
target the Phase 4 voter registration process. Public 
statements by Taliban leaders in Pakistan threatening voters 
and condemning elections did not translate into a campaign of 
killings or bombings.  This curious fact meant that in thirty 
days of voter registration, no election workers were killed, 
no electoral offices or voter registration sites were 
attacked, and intimidation and harassment of voters was 
ineffective.  Frequent targets of Taliban operations -- such 
as police and moderate religious figures -- continued to come 
under attack, so that some violent incidents overlapped with 
the voter registration process.  As reported REF B, police 
arrested suspects after two men shot and killed a police 
officer outside a Kandahar city voter registration site.  On 
February 22 Kandahar provincial security chiefs told the 
media that police discovered and defused more than 100 bombs 
in the past two months, but that voter registration had 
finished without major security incidents. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The established presence of Taliban in five 
Helmand districts and two Kandahar districts, and the 
consequent inability of government representatives and 
security forces to operate there, curtailed opportunities for 
these citizens to register.  Electoral officials cite 
numerous anecdotes indicating residents of these areas 
traveled to other registration sites.  Demand in Helmand's 
capital city of Lashkar Gah exceeded expectations, most 
likely as a result of such displacements (REF C.)  The IEC 
also opened substitute sites near the two closed districts in 
Kandahar (REF A.) 
 
---------------- 
LOCAL LEADERSHIP 
---------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  Zekria Barakzai, Deputy Chief Technical Officer of 
the IEC, on February 22 said the support of grassroots 
religious leaders and certain provincial governors was key to 
the success of Phase 4 operations.  The IEC hired as many 
local mullahs as possible to work as civic educators and 
election workers.  Among local officials, Helmand's Governor 
Mangal was especially active in voter outreach, holding a 
variety of meetings and rallies in outlying areas despite 
substantial threat to his personal security. Mangal, as noted 
septel, is not part of President Karzai's circle of political 
favorites, a fact that rebuts suspicions the governor 
misallocated state resources to favor the incumbent. 
Uruzgan's Governor Hamdan, in contrast, remained distant from 
the voter registration process, and refused even to work in 
his office in the wake of the February 2 suicide attack on 
the nearby police station in Tarin Kowt. 
 
----------------- 
NATIONAL POLITICS 
----------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Helmand and Kandahar, seen as the Pashtun 
homelands and the key battlefront with the Taliban, loom 
disproportionately large in national politics.  The success 
of voter registration there does much to push aside earlier 
speculation that insecurity would disenfranchise Pashtuns and 
discredit the elections.  Karzai and his rivals increasingly 
appear ready to acknowledge that the race is on. 
DELL