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Viewing cable 09KABUL398, BUILDING AFGHAN CIVIL AVIATION CAPACITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL398 2009-02-24 03:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0468
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0398/01 0550331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240331Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7476
INFO RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC 0131
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RXFSNHQ/NATO HQ BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000398 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, EEB/TRA/OTP AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
DOT PASS FAA FOR RAY SMITH 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PREL EAID PGOV AF NATO
SUBJECT: BUILDING AFGHAN CIVIL AVIATION CAPACITY 
 
REF: A) 08 Kabul 223 
B) 08 KABUL 1661 
C) 08 Kabul 2977 
D) 08 Kabul 3019 
E) 09 Kabul 267 
 
1. (U) This is an action request message.  Please see para 14. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: International community efforts to support the 
Afghan civil aviation sector are poorly coordinated and lack 
coherence.  The Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) 
lacks capacity and leadership to manage effectively and safely 
Afghan civil aviation operations.  NATO Brussels has proposed 
imposing a Brussels-led steering committee to advise the Government 
of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in efforts to transition air 
space control to MoTCA.  However, after consultations with ISAF, 
ICAO, and MoTCA officials, Post strongly believes that such an 
approach would be misguided.  We believe a proposed Kabul-based 
Civil Aviation Working Group (CAWG) led by MoTCA that includes the 
U.S. military, ISAF, the USG, and major donors would be the most 
effective means of coordination and would better support the goals 
of the Afghan National Development Strategy.  The CAWG would also be 
an appropriate vehicle to organize support for the development of 
Afghan human capacity, infrastructure, and technical operations in 
the future.  These alternatives will be discussed at interagency 
meetings in Washington on February 23.  END SUMMARY. 
 
*************************************** 
A Snapshot of the Civil Aviation Sector 
*************************************** 
 
3. (SBU) The Afghan civil aviation sector is in disarray with many 
actors, both military and civilian, working disjointedly to advise, 
guide, and manage a marginally capable Afghan Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation (MoTCA).  Currently the U.S. Air Force (Central 
Command's Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC)) manages 
Afghan air traffic through the Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC).  Under U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the Combined 
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the U.S. military 
actively develops the capabilities of the Afghan National Army Air 
Corps (ANAAC) for military air transport operations.  GIRoA lacks 
capability to secure the airports and the Afghans are far from 
minimum International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance 
(reftel E).  NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
operates the major airports in Afghanistan.  The Afghans are 
currently negotiating a deal with the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates for the Emiratis to provide security at Kabul and Kandahar 
airports through a British-based contractor.  All other air 
operations are run, poorly, by the Afghan government. 
 
4. (SBU) Within the framework of the Afghan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS), MoTCA is responsible for the rehabilitation, 
organization, and management of the civil aviation sector in 
Afghanistan.  However, MoTCA's inability to manage day-to-day civil 
aviation operations and to develop long-term policy strategies 
places all civil aviation operations in jeopardy.  The draft Civil 
Aviation Law remains at a standstill in the Ministry and still 
requires Cabinet approval before the President can send it to 
Parliament for debate and passage.  Securing a modern civil aviation 
law that conforms to international standards is a critical component 
for developing civil air operations because it would authorize MoTCA 
to create a civil aviation authority (CAA).  Without a CAA, MoTCA 
does not have the legal and regulatory framework needed to develop 
standards for safety and security. 
 
5. (SBU) To further complicate matters, the Ministry has changed 
leadership twice in the last four months.  In November 2008, 
President Karzai abruptly sacked the ninth minister of transport and 
civil aviation since 2001 amid allegations of corruption and 
mishandling of Hajj flight operations (reftels C and D).  To date, 
MoTCA does not have an appointed minister.  Deputy Minister for 
Technical Affairs Raz Mohammed Alami, a 40-year veteran of the 
ministry and one of MoTCA's few aviation technical "experts," is the 
Acting Minister; however, Alami's limited leadership skills in 
policy making, lack of close ties to the President, and his dated 
technical knowledge make him an imperfect solution to MoTCA's 
leadership vacuum.  Below Alami, there are no officials in MoTCA 
with the technical knowledge, administrative skills, and policy 
acumen required to lead MoTCA from pre-Soviet era air operations and 
management into the 21st century. 
 
6. (SBU) MoTCA has four foreign technical advisors: one from ICAO 
 
KABUL 00000398  002 OF 003 
 
 
who advises Kabul International Airport (KIA) on airport operation 
standards and transition to Afghan control; one each from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA); and one from the U.S. Air Force to 
advise on air traffic operations.  Without their daily support to 
the Ministry, particularly to Alami, in planning and problem 
solving, MoTCA would barely function.  Recently Acting Minister 
Alami told FAA Rep that his priority is to shepherd the Civil 
Aviation Law through the cabinet so that it can finally be sent to 
Parliament; however, other more pressing day-to-day operational 
needs at MoTCA continually claim his time and divert his attention. 
 
7. (SBU) Weak donor coordination and inadequate training of MoTCA 
officials have undermined donors' well-intentioned efforts to 
support aviation-related infrastructure projects.  For example, the 
Japanese-funded USD 35 million state-of-the-art, international 
terminal at KIA remains empty and its jet-bridges unusable because 
MoTCA does not have the trained staff, money, or capability to 
manage such new technology.  The Japanese have promised another USD 
15 million to build a new air traffic control tower and fire station 
at KIA.  The Germans are building a new runway and terminal at the 
Mazar-i-Sharif airport to support German provincial reconstruction 
teams (PRTs) in the north.  The Asian Development Bank has an 
ongoing USD 32 million project for regional airport development. 
Meanwhile, the GIRoA struggles to find funding for an air traffic 
surveillance system to replace the current low-tech landline phone 
and GPS tracking system.  Such a surveillance system would allow 
MoTCA to easily track air traffic and ensure greater safety of 
aircraft flying in Afghanistan, a key component to Afghanistan 
meeting ICAO standards (reftel E). 
 
******************************************* 
Proposal for NATO Brussels-Led Intervention 
******************************************* 
 
8. (SBU) Post understands that NATO Brussels' International Staff 
(NATO I.S.) has a proposal to revive the Civil Aviation Steering 
Committee, which existed 2004-07 but accomplished little and was 
rolled up when the ANDS was launched.  This Steering Committee, 
using Brussels as a focal point, would bring together all elements 
of NATO concerned with Afghan air operations and advise MoTCA from 
Brussels on how to increase its technical and policy capacity to 
manage civil aviation operations.  An executive group would be 
advised by various advisory working groups including technical 
operations and air traffic control with the overarching goal of 
bringing Afghans to the point where they can safely and effectively 
manage their airspace and other civair operations.  While Post 
agrees with the end goal, we also believe this approach is 
misguided. 
 
9. (SBU) NATO IS also tried one year ago to revive the Civil 
Aviation Clearing House and Steering Committee in an attempt to 
sideline the GIRoA and allow the military effectively to manage 
civil aviation operations writ large (reftel A).  While the GIRoA 
lacks capacity to manage civil aviation functions, the ANDS process 
to which the USG and other major donors have committed calls on the 
international community to work in concert with the GIRoA to develop 
the Afghans' ability to control their own airspace.  As 
Afghanistan's main political forum for engaging the international 
community on economic development issues across all sectors, the 
Joint Coordinated Monitoring Board (JCMB) and the ANDS framework 
have superseded the NATO Clearing House/Steering Committee structure 
for civil aviation development.  Competing, donor-driven frameworks 
like the NATO-Brussels led Steering Committee would alienate Afghan 
leadership and limit the capacity of MoTCA develop technical and 
policy-making capabilities. 
 
****************************** 
A Civil Aviation Working Group 
For Coordinated Action 
****************************** 
 
10. (SBU) Acting Minister Alami has told FAA rep on numerous 
occasions that the Afghan government prefers a Kabul-centered 
advisory group, led by the Minister of Transport, that supports the 
ANDS.  He strongly disagrees with a NATO Brussels-led group that 
relegates the Afghan government's participation to merely receiving 
instructions from Brussels.  Moreover, Post is increasingly 
concerned that there are no efforts to prioritize infrastructure 
projects and no mechanism for coordinating donor engagement in the 
civil aviation sector.  The NATO-Brussels proposal lacks any such 
mechanism.  Therefore, in consultation with ISAF, MoTCA, and ICAO 
 
KABUL 00000398  003 OF 003 
 
 
and with the aim of achieving shared objectives, Post has been 
working to organize a Kabul-based Civil Aviation Working Group 
(CAWG) to be chaired by the Minister or Acting Minister and with 
membership consisting of ISAF, ICAO, FAA, the U.S. Air Force, the 
U.S. Embassy, and, importantly, the major donors (Germany, Japan, 
Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank).  ISAF, MoTCA, and the 
Embassy have tentatively agreed to aim for an early April launch of 
the CAWG. 
 
11. (SBU) In a February 21 meeting with FAA rep and Econoff, Major 
General Charles Sullivan, the Director of ISAF's Air Coordination 
Element, strongly supported Post's efforts to develop a Kabul-based 
CAWG.  Sullivan agreed that the working group is a critical 
component of coordination efforts that will gradually enable the 
Afghans to take over their airspace and allow NATO to cede control 
of Afghan airspace to the GIRoA. 
 
12. (SBU) Post believes the CAWG presents the following merits over 
the NATO proposal as a mechanism for organizing international 
support for Afghan civil aviation.  The CAWG: 
-- Involves Afghan leadership and thus ownership; 
-- Is better linked to the ANDS; 
-- Includes donor countries and is thus better placed to prioritize 
assistance projects; 
-- Is Kabul-based, not Brussels-based; and 
-- Offers greater potential to bring a strategic approach to 
strengthening civil aviation and transitioning to Afghan control. 
 
13. (SBU) Post believes that improving coordination among donors, 
multilateral and bilateral, for the fledgling MoTCA will require 
close cooperation between civilian and military partners in Kabul 
and a strategic approach as a way forward.  This approach would 
offer a framework, currently lacking, that would enable Afghans over 
time to replace international partners as managers of the civil 
aviation sector.  Such a proposal might usefully consist of four 
pillars: institution building, technical training, civil aviation 
operations and on-the-job training (OJT), and, lastly, 
infrastructure. 
 
14. (SBU) For longer term consideration, Post notes that this 
four-pillar structure would require numerous civilian technical 
advisors to develop human capacity of MoTCA and could entail 
significant USG resources that have not yet been identified, if we 
decide to take on a leading role.  FAA is developing a proposal for 
inter-agency consideration in the near future.  An immediate 
decision to support the establishment of a CAWG in Kabul does no 
more than leave the door open to such a decision and protects the 
developing trust on the ground between civilian and military actors 
and the GIRoA and the international partners with respect to civil 
air operations. 
 
15. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post recognizes the shared goals of NATO, 
ISAF, MoTCA, U.S. Air Force, and various Washington agencies in 
improving Afghan civil aviation capability to minimum compliance 
with ICAO standards and shifting responsibility of air operations 
over time to a capable MoTCA.  To that end, Post strongly supports a 
Kabul-based, Afghan-led, civilian and military jointly coordinated 
effort to support the Afghan civil aviation sector.  Post asks that 
the Department urge the Department of Defense to support the 
Kabul-based Civil Aviation Working Group that will work in concert 
with Afghan authorities in support of the ANDS.  Post also 
recommends the Department advise USNATO of efforts to coordinate 
civil aviation development in Kabul and instruct USNATO to build 
support for this strategy with relevant NATO officials while 
opposing efforts by the NATO I.S. to revive ideas of enduring NATO 
control over Afghan airspace. 
 
DELL