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Viewing cable 09KABUL392, HEZB-E-ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN PARTY CHAIR ON CARETAKER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL392 2009-02-23 05:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9400
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0392 0540517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230517Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7467
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS KABUL 000392 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: HEZB-E-ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN PARTY CHAIR ON CARETAKER 
GOVERNMENT 
 
1. (SBU) Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) Chairman Arghandewal 
on 2/22 told PolCouns his party would not make a "big deal" 
of the post-5/22 period following the constitutional 
expiration of President Karzai's term, even though most party 
members want Karzai to resign if he intends to run for 
re-election.  HIA's executive committee supported the 8/20 
election date, but had not yet decided on a favored 
candidate.  Arghandewal held out the option of supporting 
Karzai if the president offered HIA a vice president slot, 
but was generally downbeat on the government's performance 
over the past several years. 
 
2.    (SBU) Arghandewal recently joined talks led by Pir 
Gailani aimed at resolving disagreements among Afghan 
political leaders regarding post-5/22 executive authority. 
Based on his attendance at two meetings, Arghandewal felt 
some participants were not seriously committed to finding a 
consensus and were playing the Palace and the opposition for 
their own benefit.   HIA's preferred solution would be for 
Karzai not to seek re-election, in which case it would have 
no objection if he remained in office until the inauguration. 
 If Karzai wished to run, HIA would call for an interim 
government headed by Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi.  In such 
a scenario, HIA would call on Mojaddedi to replace some of 
Karzai's strongest supporters in the Cabinet, to prevent what 
HIA feared would be official efforts to influence the 
election outcome.  Arghandewal admitted these positions 
showed HIA was more concerned with Karzai's interference in 
the election than with following a literal  interpretation of 
the Constitution. 
 
3. (SBU) PolCouns outlined the U.S. position: resolution of 
the executive authority issue required Afghan political 
leaders (including Karzai and key opposition leaders) to work 
together to find an agreed-to political solution.  The United 
States would advocate no specific outcome, but would insist 
the eventual solution preserve the 8/20 election, maintain a 
strong government during the peak fighting season, and 
support the authority and goals of  the Constitution. 
 
4. (SBU) Arghandewal looked forward to closer cooperation 
with the new U.S. administration.  HIA and the U.S. shared 
common interests, such as promoting good governance and 
opposing negative Russian and Iranian influence in Afghan 
affairs.  However, Arghandewal's pro-U.S. stance and moderate 
positions on many issues may still be out of line with his 
party's grassroots membership, as he demurred when asked if 
HIA would publicly support increased U.S. troop deployments. 
HIA members were more interested in supporting U.S. positions 
on non-military solutions to Afghanistan's problems, he said. 
DELL