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Viewing cable 09KABUL391, ASHRAF GHANI EXPLORES SOLUTIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL391 2009-02-23 05:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9383
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0391 0540507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230507Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7466
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS KABUL 000391 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: ASHRAF GHANI EXPLORES SOLUTIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY QUESTION 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani 
Ahmadzai recommended using the Constitution and other 
government institutions to resolve the question of President 
Karzai's authority after the May 22 expiration of his term. 
Ghani, who expects to declare his own candidacy for the 
presidency within a few weeks, has been studying the Afghan 
Constitution and considering similar historical situations in 
other countries to find an acceptable solution.  Like many of 
Karzai's potential rivals, Ghani contended that Karzai would 
manipulate government resources to aid his presidential 
campaign.  Because of those suspicions, Ghani argued that 
Karzai should step down in favor of a caretaker government 
after May 22 if he intended to run for re-election. 
 
Constitutional Rationale 
---------- 
 
2.    (SBU) Ghani told PolCouns that the Supreme Court and 
Parliament, the two branches of government whose authority 
would continue through the period in question, should play a 
constructive role in resolving the dispute over post-May 22 
presidential continuity.  He pointed out the Court's 
authority under Article 130 to "rule in a way that attains 
justice in the best manner" in situations where there is no 
guidance in the Constitution or law.  He suggested the Court, 
in conjunction with Parliament, had authority to establish 
guidelines for a caretaker government. 
 
3. (SBU) Under Ghani's plan, Karzai would step down in favor 
of a caretaker government, perhaps modeled on Pakistan's 
transitional authority in 1993, when Moeen Qureshi, a former 
World Bank official, served as caretaker prime minister. 
Ghani proposed that this interim government should then 
replace more than 2,000 appointees at the national, 
provincial, and district level, again because they could 
bring undue influence on the election process.  Despite 
PolOffs' questions over whether such a realignment of 
government responsibilities could be handled in just a few 
months, Ghani remained confident that hundreds of technocrats 
could move into positions of authority without damaging the 
government's performance or jeopardizing ongoing security 
campaigns. 
 
Karzai's Role Unclear 
---------- 
 
4. (SBU) Ghani acknowledged that his plan included no role 
for Karzai in devising the transition authority mechanism. 
He agreed it would be difficult to imagine Karzai abdicating 
all involvement in such a process.  At that point, PolCouns 
reiterated the U.S. position that resolution of the 
presidential continuity issue required Afghan political 
leaders (including Karzai) to work together to find an 
agreed-to political solution.  The United States would 
advocate no specific outcome, but insists the eventual 
solution preserve the 8/20 election, maintain a strong 
government during the peak fighting season, and support the 
authority and goals of the Constitution. 
 
5. (SBU) Ghani agreed that any solution would require 
Karzai's concurrence.  He pledged to continue his 
negotiations with other political leaders while keeping 
security in mind.  He promised to separate the August 20 
election date, which he supported, from the question of 
presidential continuity.  He called First Vice President 
Massoud's public criticisms of the government's legitimacy 
"counterproductive" given the imperative of establishing an 
environment in which political leaders could work together to 
reach a consensus.  He would discourage opposition leaders 
from organizing public protests of the government, as such 
protests would attract insurgents looking to create chaos. 
Despite the failure of opposition groups to unite around a 
single leader or sway Karzai to consider giving up his 
incumbency, Ghani felt Afghan leaders could find an 
acceptable consensus by the third week of March. 
DELL