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SUBJECT: JUNBESH OFFICIAL EXPOUNDS ON PARTY REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OUTLOOK 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) Junbesh party central committee head Sayed Noorullah 
discussed his recent public spat with General Dostum, internal party 
reform efforts, and the party's outlook for the upcoming 
presidential elections with State PRT officer.  Anti-reform elements 
within Junbesh, especially former military commanders, will slowly 
come around to seeing the advantages of party reforms, Noorullah 
predicted.  He envisaged that the three main contenders for the 
presidency will be President Karzai, former Interior Minister Ali 
Jalali, and former U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilizad - all Pashtuns. 
 Junbesh's negotiations with the ethnic Hazara Wahdat party have hit 
a snag over which of their parties should nab the second 
vice-presidency should they reach a deal with one or more of the 
leading candidates.  Noorullah mentioned that he has rebuffed offers 
of support for Junbesh from Iranian government sources.  He believes 
Karzai should resign upon the expiration of his term in May but does 
not want a state of emergency declared in the country as a result. 
Noorullah also described the behind-the-scenes efforts by Labor and 
Social Affairs Minister Noor Qarqin to protect his own political 
future by manipulating the ethnic Turkmen vote. 
 
RELATIONS WITH DOSTUM STILL STRAINED 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) A confident, relaxed Sayed Noorullah acknowledged to State 
PRT officer on February 11 that his dust-up with Dostum was the 
result of tensions that had been mounting between the two men after 
the party congress last spring.  According to Noorullah, Dostum is 
"not well" psychologically, and believes Noorullah is the architect 
of the plan to send Dostum to Turkey for alcoholism treatment. 
Asked whether he will have to tread more carefully in pushing his 
reform agenda, Noorullah observed that the Junbesh steering 
committee has come to realize that Junbesh cannot revolve forever 
around Dostum.  The steering committee will consult with Dostum, but 
not allow him alone to shape the party's destiny.  Noorullah said 
the Junbesh steering committee has come to understand how 
debilitating alcoholism has been to Dostum's judgment.  "Dostum's 
thinking is static.  We need dynamic changes within the party," he 
said.  Noorullah did not speculate on when Dostum might return to 
Afghanistan, but said he would come back "tomorrow" if the doctors 
let him, and if that were to happen, it would bring trouble. 
 
NOORULLAH TRYING TO WIN OVER ANTAGONISTS WITHIN PARTY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶3. (SBU) Dostum has not been the only obstacle to reform; Junbesh's 
ex-commanders, particularly MPs from Faryab province like Fatiullah 
Khan and Ahmed Khan "Sarhowz," also have shown resistance to making 
the party more democratic.  "Junbesh is a party born of war, and 
many of the commanders still have that mentality," Noorullah 
explained.  He added that they feel "if Dostum's role is diminished, 
so will theirs be."  Calling the group of anti-reform elements in 
Junbesh who are opposed to his leadership "fanatics," Noorullah said 
that even some of its members, which he claims consists of 10-15 
young "hotheads" from Faryab, have softened their stance toward him 
lately.  As for the Junbesh MPs who refuse to buy in to the party's 
reform agenda, Junbesh will not support their parliamentary 
reelection bids next year.  Noorullah said he has been spending a 
lot of time meeting influential party members individually to 
explain the importance of the reform plans. "One way or another, 
they'll change eventually," he believes. 
 
JUNBESH'S OUTLOOK FOR THE ELECTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Junbesh is busy mobilizing its supporters but has not yet 
publicly settled on a candidate.  Noorullah described a few 
scenarios for his party in the upcoming presidential election.  In 
his opinion, the best course of action for Junbesh is to negotiate 
favorable terms independently with one or more candidates.  If that 
proves too difficult, Junbesh will try to conclude alliances with 
other parties and leverage its collective strength to cut deals with 
one or more candidates.  The third option for Junbesh is to run its 
own candidate, but Noorullah concedes that is unlikely to happen. 
Noorullah predicted the party will settle on a candidate within a 
month's time. 
 
SEEKING THE SECOND-VICE-PRESIDENCY 
---------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Junbesh's main condition for lending its support to a 
candidate is receiving the second vice-presidency should that person 
win.  (Note: Noorullah, clearly expecting the next president to be a 
Pashtun, believes the first vice-presidency will be given to an 
ethnic Tajik.)  That remains the sticking point in Junbesh's talks 
with the ethnic Hazara Wahdat party, which is also eyeing the second 
 
vice-presidency as a pre-condition for its support.  Discussions 
with other parties, like the Afghan Millat party (Pashtun majority) 
are taking place at a low level.  Junbesh membership in the United 
National Front (UF) is a dead issue, as far as Noorullah is 
concerned.  Before his recent trip to Turkey to meet Dostum, 
Noorullah said he met with UF chairman Rabbani and told him not to 
count Junbesh as a UF member anymore, even though Junbesh may 
continue to attend UF meetings.  Noorullah suggested that Junbesh 
may even hold discussions with influential Jamiat party figure 
Governor Atta of Balkh province, noting what he called Atta's 
dissatisfaction with Rabbani's UF.  (Note:  Atta is his own man and 
has previously remarked to State PRT officer that he does not feel 
bound by decisions of the UF.) 
 
SIZING UP POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS 
------------------------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) Looking at the potential field of presidential candidates, 
Noorullah expects the strongest contenders to be Pashtun.  He 
believes that Karzai, despite his loss of standing with the 
international community, could still be a formidable contender, 
especially if he remains as president until the August elections. 
District and provincial government appointees, hoping to keep their 
jobs, may feel compelled to conduct campaign outreach on Karzai's 
behalf.  Noorullah is clearly keen about the prospects of former 
U.S. Ambassador Khalilizad should he enter the race - Noorullah 
claims Khalilizad already has people laying the groundwork for his 
campaign.  But he is less keen about the chances of former Interior 
Minister Ali Jalali, unless Khalilizad decides to back him. 
Noorullah dismissed the prospects of First Vice-President Ahmad Zia 
Massoud, who he claimed will be UF's candidate, and scoffed at the 
UF's "Obama-like vision" in thinking that an ethnic Tajik could be 
elected president in majority Pashtun Afghanistan. 
 
REBUFFING IRAN'S OFFER OF SUPPORT 
--------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Noorullah mentioned that during the internal party turmoil 
last December and January, Iranian government sources contacted him 
about lending their support to Junbesh.  Noorullah said he refused 
to entertain the offer and sent a clear signal to them that Junbesh 
does not want Iranian support. 
 
JUNBESH: KARZAI SHOULD STEP DOWN WHEN TERM ENDS IN MAY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶8. (SBU) Noorullah noted that Junbesh would air a statement on 
party-owned Aina TV, to inform supporters about the party's election 
preparations and to call on the government to take appropriate 
measures to fill the "legal vacuum" created if President Karzai 
refuses to step down when his term ends in May.  In Noorullah's 
view, Karzai should resign and Upper House Speaker Mojadeddi should 
be named interim leader.  But the August elections should not be 
preceded by a state of emergency - a measure proposed by some MPs. 
Noorullah warned that conducting a campaign against such a backdrop 
would be a setback for the country and could result in undemocratic 
elections. 
 
MINISTER QARQIN'S TURKMEN "GAME" 
-------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) Asked what he made of reports circulating among ethnic 
Turkmen communities that Engineer Rosi Guildi Khojayhen, an MP from 
Shortepa district in Balkh province, would be their candidate for 
president, Noorullah grinned and said that was all a "game" being 
rigged by Labor and Social Affairs Minister Noor Qarqin - an ethnic 
Turkmen - to ensure Qarqin's political future.  Many Turkmens say 
they feel betrayed by Qarqin because he has not brought any 
development to their communities, most of which are situated along 
the Amu Darya river.  (Note: The head of the education department in 
the ethnic Turkmen district of Kaldar in Balkh province told State 
PRT officer a few days earlier that even he - an ethnic Turkmen 
whose father is Qarqin's cousin - will support Khojayhen.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) As Noorullah explained it, Qarqin, realizing he has lost 
support, is using Khojayhen as a tool by propping him up as the face 
of the Turkmen bloc.  The plan is the old bait-and-switch: Khojayhen 
runs for president, bows out of the race, cuts a deal with a leading 
candidate, encourages Turkmen voters to support that candidate, and 
later, along with Qarqin, reaps the political spoils.  The Council 
of Turkmens in Kabul has reportedly blessed Khojayhen's presidential 
bid, and according to Noorullah, Khojayhen and Qarqin have already 
discussed this plan with Karzai.  (Note:  Qarqin is believed to have 
carried about half the Turkmen vote for Karzai in the last 
election.)  Yet Qarqin's opportunism will push him to correct course 
if needed and to throw his weight behind whichever candidate appears 
to be the front runner, opined Noorullah, who added that "there will 
 
 
be at least one ethnic Turkmen minister in the cabinet no matter who 
becomes president and Qarqin wants to be that minister."  Noorullah 
believes Khojayhen, an ex-Junbesh commander, lacks sufficient 
capacity to hold a ministerial portfolio much less serve as 
president.  Despite these political machinations, Noorullah remains 
confident Junbesh will attract the majority of the Turkmen vote, and 
points to well-attended party shuras in Turkmen communities in 
Badghis and Faryab provinces as an indication of their support.  By 
its own estimates, Junbesh claims it captured half the Turkmen vote 
in the last presidential election, and it believes itcan pick up 
another quarter of the vote next ime. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Noorullah did not drop any clues as to whom Junbesh would 
support for president.  But his criticism of Karzai was much sharper 
during this exchange than it was two months ago, making it seem 
unlikely that Junbesh will cut a deal to support Karzai.  Nor did 
Noorullah sound optimistic that a deal would be struck with the 
Wahdat party.  Noorullah's deputy in Faryab province, when asked by 
State PRT officer in early February if he and other Junbesh party 
officials couldrally supporters to vote for Karzai if a deal wee 
to be struck with the president, admitted tat they could not and 
said such a move would undermine their credibility. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Noorullah realizes he will have to put on a charm 
offensive to build trust among Dostum's stalwart supporters given 
the party's recent internal spat.  As a Turkish diplomat remarked to 
State PRT officer, charisma is one quality the dour Noorullah - a 
former intelligence operative - lacks.  One card that is his to play 
for the foreseeable future is Turkey's support for Junbesh party 
reforms.  For Dostum, coming to terms with the realization that his 
is not the only voice shaping the party's future may be even more 
bitter a pill to swallow than having to follow a 12-step program. 
It is fair to say that Noorullah achieved a minor victory by being 
reinstated as the party's central committee chairman despite 
Dostum's having stripped him of that title.  Officially, Dostum 
remains the party's leader, one who is still held in very high 
esteem by many.  As the Junbesh party chairman in Faryab province 
remarked, insulting Dostum in Faryab is an offense more serious thaninsulting a 
 religious leader.  An uneasy truce btween their 
respective camps prevails, but byNoorullah's account, the Junbesh 
steering committee is behind him more now than it was two months ago 
when the rift emerged. 
 
DELL