VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0380/01 0530609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220609Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7448
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KABUL 000380 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR AF
 
SUBJECT: UK Foreign Secretary Miliband Discusses Best Practices with 
Kunar Governor Wahidi 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) In a February 18 meeting, Kunar Province Governor Wahidi 
reviewed for visiting UK Foreign Secretary Miliband the reasons for 
his success in the most "kinetic" province in Afghanistan.  Wahidi 
cited extremely close cooperation with and support from the PRT in 
security, governance, and development as the most critical factor, 
followed up by an increase in U.S. military presence, and a creative 
use of informal tribal shuras to keep insurgent activities contained 
to a few valleys and districts.  Wahidi also predicted that, based 
on the high voter registration turnout, most Kunari residents would 
participate in the August 20 presidential elections.  The governor 
identified Kunar's porous border with Pakistan, the current 
deficiencies in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and a 
sluggish Kabul bureaucracy as his most formidable obstacles to 
further reform.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) During his fourth official trip to Afghanistan, UK Foreign 
Secretary (FS) Miliband included a stop in U.S.-led Regional Command 
(RC)-East to compare the UK and U.S. approaches to 
counter-insurgency and support for the Afghan government at the 
sub-national level.  Following his February 17 visit to the UK-led 
PRT in Helmand Province, RC-East Division Commander MG Schlosser and 
the DCM escorted FS Miliband to PRT Asadabad in the northeastern 
province of Kunar on February 18 to receive a briefing by Schlosser, 
the DCM, the brigade commander, and the PRT integrated team.  The 
delegation then traveled to Kunar Governor Wahidi's compound for a 
meeting and working lunch.  FS Miliband's final stop in RC-E was a 
trip to the Torkham Gate Border Control Center in Nangarhar 
Province. 
 
Wahidi's Best Practices for Provincial Development 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) FS Miliband praised Governor Wahidi for his successful 
tenure of 14 months as governor and posed a number of questions to 
distill Wahidi's best practices for significantly advancing 
security, governance and development in the province with the 
highest number of violent clashes between insurgents and Coalition 
Forces (CF) in the country.  Wahidi listed three key factors: 
 
-- Unwavering Support from the PRT.  Wahidi repeatedly said that the 
robust cooperation with and backing from the PRT was the foundation 
of his effective governorship.  It may have been the governor's 
initiatives to revive the Provincial Coordination Committee (on 
security matters) and to funnel all development projects through the 
Provincial Development Committee, but the PRT's financial and 
technical support and excellent "customer service" turned these 
initiatives into a reality.  The governor was proud to inform FS 
Miliband that as a result of the PRT and USG's willingness to 
support -- and not parallel or dictate -- his reform agenda, 
corruption at the provincial and district level has been reduced, 
civilian casualty incidents have been minimized, and popular 
perception of the local government's authority is growing on his 
watch.  The success lies not in the PRT's record spending of $84 
million in development projects, but in the application of the $84 
million to Afghan government priorities. 
 
-- Increased U.S. troop presence.  Wahidi claimed the majority of 
Kunaris welcomed the January deployment of an additional U.S. 
maneuver battalion to Kunar, mainly because of his efforts to cast 
in a positive light the presence of foreign troops in a province 
historically known for its strong resistance to outsiders.  The 
governor takes every opportunity, including in shuras and on the 
local radio and television stations, to explain that the U.S. 
soldiers bring with them "lots of money" for economic development. 
Wahidi also stresses to his constituents that CF are in Kunar mainly 
to provide the necessary security for badly needed development 
projects, and will withdraw from the area when the projects are 
completed.  He provided as an example the U.S. military withdrawal 
from a village when a road project was completed. 
 
-- Isolation and marginalization of insurgents.  When asked about 
the composition and intensity of the insurgency in Kunar, Wahidi 
estimated that the insurgents were loosely associated with one of 
"eight groups" (without offering further details).  However, he 
posited that the vast majority of the terrorist groups' foot 
soldiers were in fact economically-driven youth or timber and 
gemstone smugglers seeking to protect their illicit activities from 
foreign troops.  Moreover, the clashes with CF mainly occurred in a 
few valleys, including the Korengal and Pech valleys, and Chapa Dara 
and Gaziabad districts.  In addition to the relatively high-paying 
PRT-backed economic development projects to attract fighting-age 
 
youth away from insurgent groups, Wahidi has also established a 
network of unofficial shuras at the village, district, and 
provincial level to facilitate dialogue between official local 
authorities and tribal leaders. 
 
Elections Turnout Likely to be Another Success Story 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Wahidi was optimistic about the voter turnout in Kunar on 
August 20, the date of the presidential election.  Kunar ranked 
first in RC-E provinces (14 in total) for posting the highest number 
of new voters following the Voter Registration campaign.  Wahidi 
predicted a similar turnout on election day.  He added that the 
tribal decision-making process is democratic in nature, since the 
majority decision usually prevails in shuras, and Kunari residents 
look forward to the opportunity to participate in a process that 
leads to the election of their president. 
 
Obstacles to Further Reform 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While clearly proud of his accomplishments and outstanding 
relationship with the PRT, Wahidi was equally candid about the 
challenges that lie ahead: 
 
-- Unregulated border with Pakistan.  Wahidi underscored the 
critical role that the porous, lawless 240 km border with Pakistan 
played in Kunar's future development and security.  Kunar has been 
"victimized by the seven gates" (or passages) that lead from 
Pakistan to Kunar, and until these passages are controlled, 
Pakistan-based insurgents will continue to undermine the fragile 
political stability in the province and destabilize other parts of 
the country.  Wahidi also noted that the unregulated border allowed 
the timber and gemstone smuggling to continue unabated; conversely, 
the establishment of border posts could generate significant tax and 
customs revenues for the provincial and national budgets. 
 
-- More improvements in ANSF. Wahidi told FS Miliband that the 
professionalism of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) and Afghan Border 
Police (ABP) had improved over the year, thanks to CF efforts, but a 
further increase in quality and quantity of the local Afghan police 
was still needed. 
 
-- Kunar's entanglement in Nuristan's security challenges. Wahidi 
repeated his request to re-locate to Nuristan the bases of the ABP, 
Afghan National Army, and CF units used to conduct operations in 
Nuristan.  He maintained that the bases adversely affected Kunar's 
security because they drew more insurgents from Nuristan to Kunar, 
when the fight for control over Nuristan should be carried out in 
Nuristan. 
 
-- Lack of higher education opportunities in Kunar.  Wahidi lamented 
that many students leave Kunar to go to Peshawar for higher 
education.  He noted that women in particular lose opportunities 
because they have no higher education options in the province and 
their families are reluctant to send them beyond the province for 
education. 
 
--- Sluggish Kabul bureaucracy.  Wahidi was careful not to criticize 
the capacity of the line ministers in Kabul, and emphasized his 
support for a strong central government, but complained that Kabul 
ministries often took six months or longer to respond to his 
requests for financial or technical support.  Moreover, the 
resources he does receive from Kabul are negligible (in comparison 
to PRT and U.S. Embassy resources); in recognition of the brigade's 
approval of CERP funds, Wahidi said "Jalalabad is the most important 
(city) to me." 
 
¶6. (U) This cable has been reviewed by the PRT Commander. 
 
DELL