VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0372/01 0510841
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD31C2CD MSI0222-695)
O 200841Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7436
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS KABUL 000372 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AGREES TO PUSH AFGHANS TO 
FIND SOLUTION TO EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY ISSUE 
 
REF: KABUL 354 
 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Ambassador briefed members of the 
diplomatic community on the U.S. position on the questions of 
the date for elections and executive authority in the 
May-August period: elections must stay on schedule for August 
20, and Afghan leaders themselves (i.e., not the 
internationals) must find a political solution with a legal 
underpinning to the problem.  The United States will 
prescribe no specific solution to the issue, but will work to 
keep Karzai and the opposition focused on arriving at a 
consensus.  The Ambassador urged the diplomatic community to 
speak in a unified voice to Karzai and the opposition along 
these two points.  Other heads of missions agreed, and many 
welcomed the strong U.S. lead on these issues.  End Summary. 
 
Way Forward Must Be Afghan-Led 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.    (SBU) On February 19, the Ambassador invited 
representatives of the international community (see para six 
for invitees) to his residence, to outline the U.S. position 
on the election date and the question of executive authority 
after May 22.  The Ambassador made clear the U.S. did not 
support or oppose any candidate, including Karzai.  The 
election outcome would be for Afghan voters to decide.  The 
international interest in the election was solely to preserve 
the stability, security, and constitutional government of 
Afghanistan.  The U.S. supported the decision last month by 
the Independent Election Commission to designate August 20 as 
the election date.  That date would allow sufficient time for 
the IEC and UN to make administrative arrangements and the 
ANA and ISAF to provide a secure environment for the vote to 
take place.  The firmness of our voice on August 20 was to 
preclude any discussion or action either to advance or delay 
the election date.  All foreign representatives endorsed the 
August 20 date. 
 
¶3.    (SBU) On the question of executive authority in the 
period after May 22 and until the presidential inauguration 
(most likely in September-October), the Ambassador made clear 
this was an issue requiring an Afghan-led solution, involving 
President Karzai and the opposition.  There are any number of 
solutions out there if the Afghans would be willing to find 
and agree to them.  The only role the international community 
should be to continue to urge Afghans to work together to 
find an agreeable political solution, preferably with some 
form of legal underpinning.  All sides would have to 
recognize that they will need to accept an outcome short of 
their respective optimal solution.  The Ambassador 
discouraged the internationals from devising or advocating 
for any of a range of possible solutions.  Those present 
agreed an Afghan-led process was crucial to any proposed 
solution's success. 
 
Internationals Agree to Push Message 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.    (SBU) The Ambassador encouraged the other heads of 
missions to use a "tough tone of voice" when communicating 
this message to both the Palace and opposition groups.  The 
international community should stay focused on the following 
primary interests: a solution that preserves August 20, 
strengthens the constitution, and avoids a crisis.  Embassies 
should promote this message individually without joint 
demarches or talking points, the Ambassador advised. 
 
¶5.    (SBU) UK Ambassador Cowper-Coles agreed personal 
opinions on the way forward were secondary and that the 
international community had to be united on the August 20 
election date.  British Foreign Minister Miliband told Karzai 
this week that Karzai needed to solve the issue directly with 
opposition groups.  Russian Ambassador Kabulov agreed with 
the Ambassador on both the election date and the role of the 
internationals, emphasizing that the diplomatic community had 
to stay patient at the same time it was vigilant in pressing 
the Afghans to reach a political consensus.  Turkish 
Ambassador Tokdemir was inquisitive and willing to be 
helpful.  As they were leaving, several of the 
representatives remarked that they welcomed the orientation 
of the U.S. thinking and were grateful for the strong lead 
from us. 
 
¶6. (U) Guest list: 
 
Attendees: 
Italian Ambassador Glaentzer 
Pakistan Ambassador Sadiq 
Russian Ambassador Kabulov 
Turkish Ambassador Tokdemir 
UK Ambassador Cowper-Coles 
Chinese CDA Li 
Dutch CDA van der Waals 
French CDA Fitou 
German CDA Buck 
Indian CDA Mishra 
NATO Acting Senior Civilian Rep Riggio 
Canadian Minister Knutson 
UNAMA Special Assistant to SRSG Smith 
 
Regretted: 
Japanese Ambassador Sato 
EU Special Representative Sequi 
WOOD