VZCZCXRO8491
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0315/01 0421254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111254Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7331
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000315 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR KDEM AF
 
SUBJECT: PAKTYA PROVINCE SIX-MONTH ASSESSMENT: JULY-DECEMBER 2008 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Paktya's security situation remained stable in the second 
half of 2008, with Zormat and the Zadran Arc the main focuses of 
coalition security efforts.  Increased insurgent infiltration in the 
northern half of the province may require additional Afghan or 
Coalition Forces (CF) in 2009, particularly in the remote Jani Khel 
district bordering Khost province and along the Pakistan border. 
Governor Hamdard remains a relatively effective administrator, but 
the real challenges lie at the district level.  The lack of official 
status for three of the provinces' 14 districts particularly 
hindered governance in these areas.  The groundbreaking for the 
long-awaited Gardez-Khost road project through the Zadran Arc took 
place in August, with 15 kilometers completed prior to the winter 
construction halt.  Combined with the impending launch of both the 
Gardez-Ghazni road and approval won for the provincial "spine road" 
from Gardez to the Pakistan border, the province will have all of 
its major routes paved for the first time in its history. 
 
TRIBES DECISIVE FOR SECURITY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The security situation in Paktya was largely stable 
throughout the second half of 2008.  Two areas in particular 
remained problematic: the southern district of Zormat, which has a 
relatively weaker tribal structure than the rest of the province, 
and the Zadran Arc, which in Paktya comprises the districts of 
Shwak, Waze Zadran, and Gerda Serai.  Zormat, at the northern edge 
of an area of relative instability that extends to Paktika and 
Ghazni provinces, has long been susceptible to Taliban and Haqqani 
influence.  The Zadran Arc also includes districts in Khost and 
Paktika provinces and has historically been relatively isolated from 
the rest of the country.  These two areas were the principal focus 
of coalition operations in Paktya during late 2008. In Zormat, CF 
established a new Joint Combat Outpost (JCOP) near the village of 
Sahak along the route from Gardez to Ghazni, and have plans to 
establish at least one more, further along the route toward the 
Paktika border.  Long-delayed plans to transfer authority for 
security from the coalition to a steadily improving Afghan National 
Army (ANA) may be realized in the first half of 2009.  In the Zadran 
Arc, the coalition established a second Combat Outpost (COP) along 
the Gardez-Khost road route in late 2008. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Isolated areas in the northern part of Paktya have also 
seen insurgent influence, principally directed by Hizb-e Islami 
Gulbuddin (HIG) and also by incursions of various forces across the 
border between Paktya's Jani Khel district and Sabari district in 
Khost.  There are currently limited coalition or Afghan forces in 
this isolated area, though the first half of 2009 may see an 
increase to coincide with renewed development and outreach to tribal 
leaders in Jani Khel.  The lessening of Sunni-Shia conflict in 
Pakistan's Kurram Agency in fall 2008 also impacted the security 
situation in the north, especially in the Pakistan border districts 
of Jaji Aryoub and Dande Patan, by making cross-border freedom of 
movement easier for insurgents -- as well as for the tribes that 
straddle the border and for commerce.  Coalition training of and 
partnership with the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) began in 
earnest only in late 2008. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Paktya's government officials and tribal leaders almost 
universally extol the efficacy that traditional tribal forces (known 
as arbakai) would have in opposing insurgent organizations that are 
not tribally rooted, which none of the insurgent groups are. 
Although Paktya enjoys a relatively better security situation than 
its neighboring provinces, Paktya's leaders are not satisfied, and 
view "Loya Paktya" (which comprises Paktya, Paktika, Khost, and 
parts of Ghazni and Logar) as uniquely suited among all of 
Afghanistan's regions for a significant tribal role in ensuring 
security.  In fact, during Paktya's voter registration campaign in 
November-December, Afghan security forces and civilian officials 
alike appealed to tribal elders to provide protection.  Voter 
registration proceeded largely without incident -- with the 
exception of Zormat, where insurgents were actively intimidating 
citizens from registering.  Paktya province has strong and cohesive 
tribes -- notably the Mangal in the northeast, the Ahmadzai and Tuta 
Khel in the center, and the Zadran in the south -- whose ultimate 
commitment to the Afghan government is dependent upon stability and 
progress.  The government will have to devise an effective means for 
enlisting their continuous support to ensure security. 
 
GOVERNANCE GAPS IN UNOFFICIAL DISTRICTS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Juma Khan Hamdard's last six months as Paktya governor have 
 
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been reasonably successful, though the province has suffered from 
his frequent absences from the province.  The Governor is a veteran 
Pashtun leader, albeit originally from Balkh, and broadly 
acknowledged as skilled at bringing tribal leaders together. 
However, he complains that he does not have sufficient funding from 
Kabul to convene tribal shuras on a regular basis, and continues to 
use his own funding for that purpose.  (Note: The Embassy provided 
the Governor a small grant that enabled him to convene two large 
shuras in late 2008.)  In the last months of 2008, the PRT took a 
more active role in connecting Governor Hamdard with districts and 
officials in the province.  The PRT facilitated the first-ever visit 
of the Governor to the northern district of Chamkani, provided 
transport for a visit to Jaji Aryoub, and plans to move him more 
regularly around the province. 
 
¶6. (SBU) USAID's Local Governance and Community Development program 
(LGCD) started a series of district administrator conferences and 
trainings to bring them collectively to Kabul in January 2009. 
District administrators have few resources with which to establish 
authority in their districts, a deficiency LGCD is addressing. 
Several new district centers were constructed and/or existing 
facilities rehabilitated in the province in recent years.  Sayed 
Karam and Ahmad Abad are nearing completion, Jani Khel somewhat 
further behind, and the PRT is set to start new such projects in 
Zormat, and possibly in Chamkani, Dande Patan, and Mirzaka.  There 
have been several changes in the line-up of district administrators 
in the latter half of 2008, with those from Zormat and Dande Patan 
switching places; a new district administrator also came to Jani 
Khel, the most inaccessible district in the province; and a new 
district administrator was brought to Gerda Serai after an 
ineffective stint in Jani Khel and three other districts before 
that. The prior Gerda Serai district administrator quit in protest 
of his lack of pay in the fall and provincial officials told the PRT 
that it is difficult to find qualified personnel to serve there. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Lack of funds, personnel, and facilities for Gerda Serai 
and Paktya's two other unofficial districts hindered governance in a 
variety of ways.  The lack of status was less consequential, 
however, for Mirzaka and Lija Mangal, as these two unofficial 
districts have more unified tribal structures anchored by the 
predominantly pro-government Mangal tribe.  But Gerda Serai is the 
home district of Jalaludin Haqqani, a significant base of support 
for the Haqqani network, and contains much of the most difficult 
terrain in the province.  In all districts, district administrators 
rely on the active support and cooperation of district tribal 
shuras, convened on a regular basis and generally representing the 
most legitimate authority in the districts. 
 
A SURGE IN DEVELOPMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Governor Hamdard has been fortunate in that his tenure has 
coincided with a sharp increase in development funding for the 
province, led by U.S. military funding and the launch of a major 
USAID project.  The total figure in Commander's Emergency Response 
Funds (CERP) funding for FY 2008 was approximately $37 million, more 
than four times the amount from FY 2007.  Provincial leaders are 
well aware that the number for FY 2009 is likely to be significantly 
higher.  Most of Paktya's leaders and elders have long complained 
about the disparity in funding between Paktya and surrounding 
provinces.  Because the increase roughly coincided with Hamdard's 
assumption of the governorship, he has been able to take credit for 
the increase and thus increase his own support; at the same time, he 
has taken an active role in lobbying Kabul and international donors 
for more support. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The centerpiece of development efforts in Paktya was the 
groundbreaking of the Gardez-Khost road, a $98 million USAID-funded 
project eagerly awaited for years.  The PRT has been coordinating 
complementary projects along the road's route, such as bazaar 
turnouts in the three Zadran Arc districts the road traverses and 
schools in Gerda Serai.  The PRT has also won approval for other 
significant road projects in the province, including a key piece of 
the "spine road" from Gardez which runs through most of the 
province's districts to Ahmad Khel, where both forks lead to the 
Pakistan border, in Jaji and Dande Patan districts.  The PRT 
portion, awarded to a contractor in December, runs from Gardez to 
Alamgay in Sayed Karam district.  The Army Corps of Engineers 
portion is Alamgay to Dande Patan and the portion from Ahmad Khel to 
Jaji will likely be a combined effort of IRD and the PRT.  The 
Gardez-Khost road, due to be complete in late 2009, and the spine 
road, which will see significant progress in 2009, will both be 
vital trade and transport links, connecting Paktya to Pakistan in 
two directions, and to the one already-paved road in the province, 
from Gardez to Kabul through the Tera Pass.  When the long-planned 
 
KABUL 00000315  003 OF 003 
 
 
USAID-funded Gardez-Ghazni road breaks ground in the first half of 
2009, the last vital link the province requires -- to Highway One -- 
will have gotten underway.  CF will be augmented in March 2009 by an 
Agribusiness Development Team to help the people of Paktya develop 
their predominant economic activity and prepare for the commercial 
opportunities these roads will provide. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Provincial Development Council (PDC) meets monthly and 
made strides prioritizing development projects that it approves 
throughout the province and ensuring donors are attuned to those 
priorities.  Line directorates at the provincial level, however, 
remain weak and ill-funded, and translating community needs into 
provincial priorities remains problematic.   Generally donors, 
including the PRT, must engage communities directly to learn their 
needs, despite the existence throughout the province of Community 
Development Councils (CDCs).  Some donors made efforts in late 2008 
to engage with CDCs directly -- including UNAMA and GTZ in the 
Zadran Arc, USAID/LGCD in Zormat, and CARE International in Sayed 
Karam -- but these efforts remain ad hoc.  In general, district and 
village leaders still have little confidence in the Afghan 
government addressing their development needs and seek to engage 
with international donors, the PRT and CF in particular, as a more 
reliable source of development. 
 
WOOD