VZCZCXYZ0001 
OO RUEHWEB 

DE RUEHJM #0269/01 0401425 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
O 091425Z FEB 09 
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4082 
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4645 
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY 
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 000269 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC; NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, IPA; 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/PASCUAL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KWBG IS PTER ASEC EFIN
SUBJECT: WEST BANK AND GAZA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON 
TERRORISM 
 
REF: 08 STATE 120019 
 
 
Overview 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Palestinian Authority's (PA) counterterrorism 
(CT) efforts improved in the 2008 reporting period. PM Salam 
Fayyad's government engaged in efforts to control terrorist 
groups, particularly Hamas. Nevertheless, additional efforts 
will be required to dismantle terrorist groups in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA was unable to undertake CT 
efforts in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Hamas and other 
armed groups in Gaza were responsible for hundreds of rocket, 
mortar and small arms attacks into Israel in 2008. Hamas 
also engaged in tunneling activity, and smuggled weapons, 
cash and other contraband into the Gaza Strip. Hamas has 
created its own security forces in Gaza, built around Hamas 
military wing cadres, which now number at least 15,000. In 
the West Bank, PA security forces (PASF) followed up on 
efforts to establish law and order and fight terror cells 
with security deployments to Jenin, Bethlehem and Hebron, and 
closures of Hamas-linked charities and other NGOs. All 
observers, including Israeli security officials, credit PASF 
with significant security improvements across the West Bank. 
Terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB) remain active, but 
their ability to carry out attacks from the West Bank has 
been degraded. Extremist settler groups are also a threat in 
the West Bank, and have engaged in attacks against 
Palestinians and incitement against Palestinians and Israeli 
security forces. 
 
Palestinian Security Forces 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The primary PA security forces (PASF) are the 
National Security Forces (NSF), police, Preventive Security 
Organization (PSO), Presidential Guard (PG), General 
Intelligence (GI, or Mukhabarat) and Civil Defense. All 
forces are under the Interior Minister's operational control 
and follow the Prime Minister's guidance. In the Gaza Strip, 
Hamas has established separate internal intelligence, police, 
coastal patrol, border guard and "Executive Force" 
organizations. Hamas military-wing members are often 
integrated into their ranks. Militias in Gaza such as the 
Hamas and PIJ military wings, the AAMB and an assortment of 
and clan-based armed groups also carry out attacks against 
Israel. 
 
Terror Infrastructure and Attacks 
in the West Bank and Gaza 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Palestinian terrorist groups, particularly PIJ and 
Hamas, receive substantial foreign funding and support from 
foreign terrorist organizations, mainly those based in Syria 
and Lebanon. The PA has aggressively pursued Hamas-linked 
groups and institutions in the West Bank, but has not fully 
dismantled Hamas or other terrorist organizations and their 
infrastructure in territory under its control. In March, a 
Hamas cell from the southern West Bank carried out a suicide 
bombing in Dimona, Israel, killing an Israeli woman. In 
April, PIJ gunmen infiltrated the Tulkarm industrial area and 
killed two Israeli security guards. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The situation in and around the Gaza Strip is much 
worse. As noted above, the PA has no control in Gaza. In 
April, Hamas gunmen killed two Israeli civilians at the Nahal 
Oz fuel terminal after infiltrating into Israel. At least 
1856 rockets and mortars were fired from Gaza into Israel in 
2008, killing five Israelis in February, May, June and 
December attacks, and causing several injuries. Hamas also 
engaged in tunneling activity and smuggled weapons, cash and 
other contraband into the Gaza Strip. 
 
Attacks Against American Citizens 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) There were no terror attacks against American 
citizens in the West Bank or Gaza during the reporting 
period. No progress was made in apprehending, prosecuting, 
or bringing to justice the perpetrators of the October 2003 
attack on a U.S. Embassy convoy in Gaza that killed three USG 
contractors and critically injured a fourth. 
 
Cooperation in Fighting Terror 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Cooperation between the PA and Government of Israel 
(GOI) security services improved in 2008. Nevertheless, PASF 
commanders have complained that the IDF does not coordinate 
anti-terror efforts with them and conducts unilateral raids 
in towns in Palestinian areas. The PA protected and returned 
several Israelis, including IDF soldiers, who had entered 
Palestinian cities, including Jenin, Jericho, and Bethlehem. 
 
USG Support of Palestinian CT Efforts 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) and the State 
Department's Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) administered security 
assistance to the NSF and PG in 2008. The USSC also worked 
with PA security commanders to assist their CT efforts, 
including in its deployments to Jenin, Bethlehem, and Hebron. 
U.S. Consulate General Jerusalem administered Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance training for over 200 PA security personnel, 
primarily members of the PG. 
 
Obstacles to More Effective CT Actions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the West Bank, the PASF were hindered by a lack 
of resources, unclear chain-of-command, and IDF-imposed 
restrictions on their movement, equipment and operations. 
PASF officials frequently raised concerns about operational 
difficulties imposed by the GOI on PASF movements. Efforts 
to arrest and prosecute terrorists were also impeded by a 
disorganized legal system and inadequate prison 
infrastructure. PA courts were inefficient and failed to 
ensure fair and expeditious trials, while most Palestinian 
prisons were destroyed in Israeli military operations during 
the second Intifada and have not been rebuilt. 
 
Political Efforts to Counter Terror 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) President Abbas and PM Salam Fayyad have publicly 
and consistently supported a security program that includes 
disarming fugitive militants, aggressively arresting members 
of terrorist organizations, and gradually dismantling armed 
groups. PM Fayyad has condemned violence against Israelis in 
harsh terms and taken rapid action against those involved in 
attacks. Since becoming Prime Minister, Fayyad has condemned 
every attack against Israelis as contrary to Palestinian 
interests and commitments, and has ordered immediate action, 
including arrests and prosecutions. 
 
Anti-Incitement Efforts 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The PA government reversed Hamas, official 
justification of terror and incitement against Israel and 
instituted stricter controls on media outlets and religious 
figures to counter incitement. The PA government established 
in June 2007 with Fayyad as PM omitted language from its 
platform concerning &the right of resistance8. The 
President, the PM, and the government actively criticized 
violence and terror as contrary to Palestinian interests. 
 
Counter-Terror Finance Operations 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) continued 
building a Financial Follow-Up Unit (FFU) and developing 
capacity to track and deter financial transactions used to 
fund terrorist activity. The PA Cabinet has improved efforts 
to counter terrorist financing, and the Finance Ministry 
works with the Justice Ministry, Attorney-General, Supreme 
Judicial Council and (as appropriate) Interior and Waqf 
Ministries to shut down illegal NGOs and charities. USAID 
supports the PA,s financial sector reform efforts through 
its Modernizing Financial Institutions project. The PA 
enacted Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation in late 2007 
and has used its provisions to freeze suspect bank accounts, 
although the law does not criminalize all terrorist financing 
activities. The PA continues to experience substantial 
shortcomings in investigating and prosecuting financial 
crimes due to personnel shortages and limited technical 
expertise in law enforcement and the judiciary. The PA is 
also lagging in its implementation of the AML law due to 
limited regulatory guidance for the private sector. 
 
¶12. (U) POC for this report is Political Officer Kyler 
Kronmiller. 
 
 
WALLES