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DE RUEHJM #0266/01 0401330
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091330Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4076
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8547
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 5122
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4639

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 000266 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA, PRM FOR PRM/ANE; NSC FOR 
SHAPIRO/PASCUAL; L/FLA FOR PICKERING; 
TREASURY FOR PARODI/VINOGRAD/VELTRI; 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID FOR BORODIN/NANDY/LAUDATO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON PTER PGOV PHUM PREF KWBG IS
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION OF SIX USAID ASSISTANCE 
ACTIVITIES IN GAZA 
 
REF: A. JERUSALEM 196 
     ¶B. JERUSALEM 80 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Post recommends that the Department 
authorize six USAID assistance projects in Gaza, including 
water and sanitation projects and the provision of plastic 
sheeting to elementary schools.  The projects will meet 
urgent humanitarian needs for the population of Gaza. 
Authorization is required in view of the "material support" 
provisions of U.S. law.  Post notes that there are also 
practical and public diplomacy challenges in delivering aid 
in Gaza that may impact on our ability to implement these 
projects.  These include Hamas de facto control in Gaza, its 
attempts to control assistance, and strict GOI controls over 
goods allowed into Gaza.  Nevertheless, Post believes 
approval of these activities will demonstrate U.S. concern 
for the people of Gaza and support U.S. policy objectives. 
End summary. 
 
Legal Issues:  Material Support 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Hamas exercises control over all aspects of public 
life in Gaza, including public schools, utilities, and 
government hospitals.  U.S. criminal law generally makes it 
unlawful to knowingly provide "material support" to a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO), as Hamas is designated. 
Activities authorized at senior levels of the State 
Department and cleared by the Legal Advisor, however, can be 
conducted notwithstanding the "material support" statutes (18 
U.S.C. sections 2339A and 2339B). 
 
¶3. (SBU) In October 2007, the Secretary approved a general 
authorization for ongoing USG assistance for the West Bank 
and Gaza despite the fact that members of the general 
population may, in fact, include members of an FTO.  The 
memo, however, does not cover assistance provided through an 
FTO-controlled intermediary, and it explicitly prohibits 
rehabilitation and other infrastructure projects to the 
extent the infrastructure is owned or controlled by an FTO or 
FTO-controlled municipality.  For this reason, a specific 
authorization is required for such project activities. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Three specific activities have been approved 
previously.  In March 2006, the Secretary approved assistance 
related to avian influenza for, what was at the time, the 
Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministries of 
Health and Agriculture.  In May 2006, the Secretary approved 
dialysis assistance for the Hamas-controlled PA Ministry of 
Health.  In February 2008, the Deputy Secretary approved USD 
500,000 in emergency assistance to the North Gaza Wastewater 
Treatment Plant, which is owned and operated by the Coastal 
Municipal Water Utility (CMWU), to prevent raw sewage 
overflowing a treatment pond in Beit Lahiya. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Post recommends that the Department authorize the 
six additional USG assistance projects in Gaza described in 
paragraphs 10 and 11 below. 
 
The Gaza Water Utility as Beneficiary 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Repair of water and sanitation systems is a priority 
need in Gaza.  Water and sanitation services are provided by 
the CMWU, which owns and operates the water and wastewater 
systems in Gaza.  USAID has expertise in this area.  USAID's 
water and infrastructure office has two senior-level 
engineers who are Gazans, know the infrastructure problems in 
Gaza, and can make site visits.  USAID has an existing 
agreement with American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) to 
implement water and sanitation programs in Gaza.  ANERA 
employs two project engineers in Gaza and has already 
participated in numerous post-conflict damage assessments in 
Gaza. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The CMWU will be the recipient of the assistance. 
The CMWU is a semi-public entity established by the World 
Bank as the water and wastewater provider for Gaza.  It 
consists of a Director General, whose salary is paid by the 
World Bank; a Board of Directors representing eight Gaza 
municipalities (five permanent and three rotating); a 
representative of the Ministry of Local Government (appointed 
 
by the Hamas-controlled government in Gaza); and a General 
Assembly made up of twenty five municipalities.  All members 
of the Board of Directors are either appointed by Hamas or 
from Hamas-controlled municipalities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The chairman of the CMWU Board of Directors is Dr. 
Munjed Abu Ramadan, the de jure mayor of Gaza City (de facto 
control of Gaza City rests with Hamas).  Abu Ramadan is a 
Fatah member.  (Note: Despite removal of Ramadan from his 
position as Gaza City Mayor by the Hamas-controlled 
government in Gaza in late 2007, he remains the CMWU Chairman 
and signs all documents on behalf of the Board of Directors. 
End note.)  The CMWU,s Director General and chief executive 
officer, Monther Shublak, is under contract to the World 
Bank.  Abu Ramadan has successfully separated politics from 
the CMWU's operations, and the utility's core functions, 
including planning, finances, and operations and maintenance 
are handled by the management team established by the World 
Bank and led by Shublak.  As Chairman of the CMWU Board of 
Directors, Abu Ramadan effectively controls decisions by the 
Board and shields the CMWU from political interference.  Abu 
Ramadan and Shublak would serve as the points of contact for 
USAID. 
 
¶9. (SBU) USAID would also coordinate activities with the 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA).  The PWA acts as the 
government regulator for water and wastewater in the West 
Bank and Gaza.  The PWA,s Deputy Chairman, Rebhi al-Sheikh, 
is based in Gaza.  He was appointed prior to the 2006 
elections and was never replaced by Hamas.  He is a Fatah 
member and reports to the PWA Chairman, Shaddad Atilli, who 
is based in the West Bank.  The Hamas-controlled PA in Gaza 
has avoided taking control of the PWA, and the USG maintains 
contacts with the Deputy Chairman, Mr. Al-Sheikh. 
 
Water and Sanitation Projects with the CMWU 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The five proposed USG projects with the CMWU are: 
 
¶A. Repair up to 12 Water Wells 
 
Twelve deep water wells in Gaza City and Beit Hanoun, Beit 
Lahiya and Jabaliya, which supply drinking water to over 
800,000 residents, were damaged during the recent conflict. 
Electrical and mechanical equipment and pump repairs are 
needed to maintain a safe and regular supply of water.  All 
twelve wells are owned and operated by the CMWU.  Project 
planning and implementation would be done in close 
coordination with the PWA and Monther Shublak of the CMWU. 
USAID would manage the project(s) through its Emergency Water 
and Sanitization Program run by ANERA.  ANERA would 
subcontract to vetted local companies. 
 
¶B. Repairs to Water Distribution Network 
 
The main water pipeline system that transmits water from the 
north to central and south Gaza was damaged in the conflict. 
This damage adversely affects water supply to about 700,000 
residents in north, central and south Gaza.  The project 
would supply parts and make repairs to this water 
transmission system.  The water transmission system is owned 
and operated by CMWU.  Project planning and implementation 
would be done in close coordination with the PWA and Monther 
Shublak of the CMWU.  USAID would manage the project through 
its emergency water and sanitization program run by ANERA. 
ANERA would subcontract to vetted local companies. 
 
¶C. Waste Water Collection Network Repairs 
 
There was extensive damage to Gaza City and Jabaliya,s waste 
water distribution networks during the recent conflict. 
Damage to waste water lines was exacerbated by years of 
neglect and make-shift repairs.  An initial assessment 
revealed that up to 3 kilometers of waste water lines need 
repair or need to be replaced, affecting waste water 
collection service to hundreds of thousands of Gaza 
residents.  The entire Gaza waste water network is owned and 
operated by the CMWU.  Project planning and implementation 
would be done in close coordination with the PWA and Monther 
Shublak of the CMWU.  USAID would manage the project through 
its emergency water and sanitization program run by ANERA. 
 
ANERA would subcontract to vetted local companies. 
 
¶D. Waste Water Facilities Repairs 
 
There was extensive damage to waste water treatment 
facilities in Gaza City and Beit Lahiya.  Waste water backed 
up into many neighborhood streets and poses a health risk to 
hundreds of thousands of residents.  The CMWU carried out 
some makeshift repairs following the cease-fire, but a 
comprehensive repair the facilities is needed to avert waste 
water flooding.  USAID would repair and renovate up to four 
waste water treatment facilities and related pumping stations 
in Gaza City and northern Gaza cities of Beit Lahiya and Beit 
Hanoun.  All Gaza waste water treatment facilities are owned 
and operated by the CMWU.  Project planning and 
implementation would be done in close coordination with the 
PWA and Monther Shublak of the CMWU.  USAID would manage the 
project through its emergency water and sanitization program 
run by ANERA.  ANERA would subcontract to vetted local 
companies. 
 
¶E.  Jabaliya Water Tank Repair 
 
The main water tank for the Jabaliya area was damaged during 
the recent conflict.  The damage to the water tank has left 
as many as 90,000 residents in the area without water or with 
only intermittent supplies.  The Jabaliya water tank is owned 
and operated by the CMWU.  Project planning and 
implementation would be done in close coordination with the 
PWA and Monther Shublak of the CMWU.  USAID would manage the 
project through its emergency water and sanitization program 
run by ANERA.  ANERA would subcontract to vetted local 
companies. 
 
Other Assistance:  Plastic Sheeting for Schools 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Public elementary schools in Gaza need plastic 
sheeting to cover broken or missing windows.  Plate glass is 
not currently allowed into Gaza, and it may be months before 
glass windows can be imported and installed.  In the 
meantime, school children are exposed to the elements.  Only 
USAID-financed U.S. NGOs have sufficient quantities of 
plastic sheeting in Gaza to meet emergency needs.  Other 
donors have insignificant amounts of plastic sheeting 
available and have left this sector largely to USAID.  Since 
January 1, USAID has procured USD 250,000 worth of plastic 
sheeting and ordered an additional USD 250,000.  Headmasters 
of public schools have been calling NGOs begging for plastic 
sheeting.  USAID-financed U.S. NGOs, however, are prohibited 
from providing plastic to public schools in Gaza due to the 
material support statutes.  If such assistance is authorized, 
rolls of plastic sheeting and tape would be provided to needy 
elementary schools.  USD 50-100 worth of plastic sheeting and 
tape is sufficient for one school.  Given its temporary 
nature, the plastic sheeting would add no permanent value to 
a school building.  The principal USAID subgrantee for the 
project would be CHF, but other subgrantees may also be asked 
to assist.  No contact would take place with government 
officials above the level of each school's headmaster. 
 
Challenges of Providing Assistance and Reconstruction in 
Gaza: 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The USG will face practical and public diplomacy 
challenges in delivering aid in Gaza, including Hamas de 
facto control, its attempts to control assistance, and GOI 
restrictions over goods allowed into Gaza. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Coordination with Hamas:  Hamas is pressuring 
international organizations and NGOs to "coordinate" their 
activities with Hamas "ministries."  Local NGOs, upon which 
U.S. NGOs depend to varying degrees to distribute 
commodities, perceive grave risks in this situation.  The PA 
is competing to oversee Gaza assistance but does not exercise 
control on the ground.  USAID partners will continue to 
comply with the USG "contact" policy, and avoid all contact 
with Hamas authorities in Gaza except for minimal 
administrative contact at the lowest possible level needed to 
implement USG approved activities, as provided for in the 
contact policy.  If Hamas presses U.S. partners for more 
 
contact, they may not be able to implement these projects. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Public Diplomacy:  There is a real risk that Hamas, 
as the de facto power, will seek credit for rebuilding 
efforts, including for these specific projects.  Post will 
work with our implementing partners to avoid this, but it may 
be impossible to avoid all efforts by Hamas to take advantage 
of the situation.  Post believes this is a risk worth taking, 
as the humanitarian needs are compelling and the USG will 
benefit from any credit it receives.  Post believes that 
USAID's work on the ground in its areas of expertise will 
provide both short- and long-term benefits to the people of 
Gaza, and will lay the groundwork for increased public 
diplomacy efforts at a later time. 
 
¶15. (SBU) GOI Access Controls:  Strict GOI controls on 
imports into Gaza, if unchanged, will hinder implementation 
of these assistance projects.  The USG has witnessed 
cumbersome bureaucratic approval processes and time-consuming 
negotiations over entry for materials -- cement, pipes, steel 
reinforcement bar, water pumps, electrical materials, valves, 
etc. -- all of which are currently prohibited.  Materials 
such as these will be required to implement the proposed 
water projects. 
 
¶16. (SBU) USAID has cleared this message. 
WALLES