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Viewing cable 09HELSINKI62, FINLAND AND THE MAY 2009 NPT PREPCOM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HELSINKI62 2009-02-19 13:56 2011-04-24 00:00 SECRET Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0062/01 0501356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191356Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4823
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0007
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0388
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0965
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0105
S E C R E T HELSINKI 000062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS); GENEVA (CD); UNVIE 
(IAEA); USUN (POL); USNATO (POL); USEU (POL) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019 
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG FI KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL
UNGA 
SUBJECT: FINLAND AND THE MAY 2009 NPT PREPCOM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 06970 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael Butler for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) PolChief met on February 10 with Outi Holopainen, the 
MFA's Director for Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation, to discuss the Finnish government's (GOF) 
views on upcoming non-proliferation meetings (REF). 
Holopainen said that, regarding the NPT review cycle, the GOF 
had not formed concrete positions regarding its own 
objectives - that would happen later in February into March; 
she had not seen any documents coming out of EU working 
groups.  Holopainen appreciated early engagement on the 
matter by the U.S., and added that Finland is not alone in 
looking to the new Administration with high expectations, 
hoping for positive signals about the tone to be set for the 
Prepcom (calling early signs "constructive and "very 
promising").  Holopainen attributed the relative slowness of 
Finland (and the EU) to a "wait and see" attitude, i.e., 
waiting for "signals" to indicate whether the "overall 
atmosphere will be conducive for progress" at the May 2009 
PrepCom. 
 
2. (C) Holopainen shared current thinking within the GOF on 
the NPT.  She stressed the importance of the "credibility" 
and "universality" of the NPT, adding that a key issue for 
the GOF is a balance of the treaty's "three pillars" of 
non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear cooperation.  She 
noted an "eternal tension" regarding the pillars, in 
particular between the nuclear "haves" and "have nots." 
Holopainen said that as a small have-not Finland would 
benefit from a strong, fully implemented NPT.  For Finland, 
one area seemingly forgotten in NPT discussions is that of 
tactical nuclear weapons. Sharing such a long border with 
Russia, tactical nuclear weapons remain an important topic 
that the Finns feel has been neglected. 
 
3. (C) Regarding what the GOF looks for from the new 
Administration, Holopainen said they would like to see the 
U.S. ratify the CTBT.  The GOF realizes the Administration 
faces difficulties domestically, but feels that ratification 
would provide a valuable example for others to follow. 
 
4. (C) Holopainen touched on a few other matters.  EU member 
states are discussing the proliferation of technology and a 
multilateral arrangement regarding a nuclear fuel supply. 
Holopainen, pointing to the concern of some countries that 
such and arrangement constitutes an attempt by the West to 
monopolize the nuclear fuel market, said that such an 
arrangement is "easier said than done."  Nevertheless, 
Finland is willing to work constructively on the matter, in 
particular within the EU. 
 
5. (S) COMMENT: On non-proliferation activities the Finns 
have been very cooperative.  They have assured us that the 
GOF vigorously implements dual use provisions of UNSCR 1803 
on Iran's nuclear program and all previous resolutions 
related to Iran.  The government has established a working 
group that includes the Foreign Ministry, Customs and the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy in order to provide 
additional safeguards. Officials state that the GOF welcomes 
the EU's process aimed at ensuring implementation among all 
Member States. On sanctions, the GOF has been supportive of 
possible sanctions against Iran within an EU framework. Last 
summer the GOF prevented a pending transaction that would 
have put dual-use weather-related technology in the hands of 
an Iranian shell company.  END COMMENT. 
 
6. (U) Contact information: 
 
MFA Unit for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation 
 
Outi Holopainen, Director 
 358 9 160 56185 
outi.holopainen@formin.fi 
 
Outi Hyvarinen, Counsellor 
(Nuclear Non-proliferation and disarmament, missile 
non-proliferation, NSG, MTCR, HCOC, CTBT) 
 358 9 160 5582 
outi.hyvarinen@formin.fi 
 
Nina Nordstrom, First Secretary 
(Chemical (OPCW) and biological (BWC) disarmament, Australia 
Group, Verifin, CD) 
 358 9 160 56030 
nina.nordstrom@formin.fi 
 
Sandra Hatzidakis, First Secretary 
(Conventional weapons, (CCW), small arms and light weapons) 
 358 9 160 55110 
sandra.hatzidakis@formin.fi 
BUTLER