Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09DUSHANBE241, TAJIKISTAN'S ECONOMY IN DIRE CONDITION, INTERNATIONAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DUSHANBE241.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DUSHANBE241 2009-02-27 13:00 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dushanbe
VZCZCXRO4826
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0241/01 0581300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271300Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0095
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0010
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0025
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0020
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0010
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0128
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000241 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PGOV ELAB TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S ECONOMY IN DIRE CONDITION, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SAY 
 
REF: A: 08 DUSHANBE 1502, B: 08 DUSHANBE 1548 
 
DUSHANBE 00000241  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) Summary: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are 
predicting a very difficult year ahead for Tajikistan as a 
result of the global financial crisis.  Economists at both 
institutions say the situation is far worse than they had 
predicted even a month ago.  It is expected that the major 
impact on the Tajik economy will come from a steep drop in 
remittances from Tajiks working abroad, especially in Russia. 
Remittances, which equaled over half of Tajikistan's GDP last 
year, are a lifeline for this poor economy.  But January figures 
were 22% lower than the previous year, the first such drop in 
six years of recordkeeping.  The IMF predicts GDP growth of 3% 
this year, but cautions that this is "optimistic."  The EBRD 
initially predicted 5%, but said the figure will be revised 
downward.  Economists at both organizations said the economy 
will likely get much worse before it gets better, and Tajikistan 
may require significant support to avoid serious hardship.  The 
IMF mission here said the results of the IMF-mandated audit of 
the Central Bank will be made public soon, and following this 
they will recommend renewed a Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) for Tajikistan at the April meeting of the IMF's 
board.  End summary. 
 
IMF, EBRD Urge Support for Fragile Tajik Economy 
 
2. (U) The IMF briefed the international donor community on the 
health of Tajikistan's economy on February 18.  Over the course 
of the previous two weeks, an IMF team lead by Mission Chief for 
Tajikistan Axel Schimmelpfennig had been in Dushanbe to assess 
the country's macroeconomic conditions, meet with government 
officials, and make recommendations about the future. 
Schimmelpfennig announced that, based on the team's findings, 
they are recommending a resumption of assistance to Tajikistan 
under the IMF's low-interest lending program for low-income 
countries, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
(IMF assistance to Tajikistan was suspended last year as a 
result of National Bank misreporting about loans it had 
underwritten to cotton sector financers.  IMF officials report 
that the Bank has been meeting the loan repayments required for 
resumption of assistance, and they are satisfied with 
Tajikistan's macroeconomic policy.)  Schimmelpfennig said his 
team will recommend a PRGF in the amount of $120 million, with 
much of the assistance front-loaded in order to help Tajikistan 
cope with the financial crisis.  The proposal will be taken up 
by the IMF's board in Washington at the beginning of April. 
 
3. (U) In a separate presentation two days later, the EBRD 
unveiled its transition report for 2008, detailing economic 
conditions and country performance in the Eurasian region.  EBRD 
Principal Economist Rika Ishii, based in London, was similarly 
pessimistic about the state of the Tajik economy, saying that 
the situation here is considerably worse than she had predicted 
just a month ago.  EBRD country director Mathieu Le Blan said 
that the Bank intends to make some 50 million Euros available to 
Tajikistan this year in assistance. 
 
What a Difference Two Months Make 
 
4. (U) The majority of Axel Schimmelpfennig's presentation was 
devoted to a dour appraisal of Tajikistan's economic climate 
over the coming year.  His tone was markedly gloomier than it 
was during his last visit two months ago (ref A).  During that 
visit he said Tajikistan was likely to be insulated from the 
full brunt of the economic crisis due to the isolation of its 
banking sector and the presumed resilience of remittance flows. 
This time, however, he acknowledged that the crisis was already 
having a very negative effect on the country, and there were few 
domestic resources available to respond to it.  He noted that 
44% of domestic industries are not running at all right now due 
to insufficient power. 
 
5. (U) Schimmelpfennig said the IMF was now predicting GDP 
growth of 3% for Tajikistan in 2009 -- compared to its earlier 
projection of 5-6% -- "if all goes well."  But, he said, all was 
not likely to go well, particularly given new projections that 
Russia's economy will contract by 1% over the coming year. 
Given Tajikistan's dependence on Russia as its primary source of 
imports and remittances, negative growth in the Russian economy 
will almost certainly have a significant impact here.  EBRD's 
 
DUSHANBE 00000241  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ishii said that the Russian Ministry of Finance had recently 
released its own projection of a 2.2% contraction in the Russian 
economy.  In light of this, the projection she had made at the 
end of January that Tajikistan's economy would grow by 5% this 
year -- based chiefly on the relatively mild winter -- would 
have to be significantly downwardly revised.  She added 
anecdotally that even over the course of the two days she had 
spent in Tajikistan on this visit, it was clear that the 
situation is much worse than she had imagined from London. 
 
The Rose-Colored Glasses are Off on Remittances 
 
6. (U) The major impact of the global financial crisis on the 
Tajik economy will be felt through a decline in remittances. 
Since 2003, when the IMF began collecting data, remittances 
through the banking system have grown substantially year after 
year, reaching $2.67 billion in 2008 -- equivalent to 52% of 
Tajikistan's GDP, the highest percentage of any country in the 
world.  In January of this year, however, for the first time in 
six years remittances declined year-on-year, dropping 22% from 
January 2008.  The IMF forecasts that remittances over the 
course of 2009 will be 30% lower than 2008, but Schimmelpfennig 
once again cautioned that even this figure may be optimistic, 
given credible projections he has seen of a 50% drop.  The EBRD 
also predicts that remittances will decline steeply, but they 
did not make a specific prediction. 
 
7. (U) The IMF appears to have adopted a different paradigm 
since its earlier briefing in December.  Even as the financial 
crisis was gathering steam, IMF and World Bank officials were 
predicting that remittances would prove resilient to economic 
shocks.  Some of their confidence was based on economic 
research, including work done by World Bank remittance expert 
Dilip Ratha, arguing that remittances are very "supply 
dependent" -- i.e., that overseas guestworkers will do 
everything possible to continue sending money back home, 
including moving to a new location or country, accepting 
lower-status or lower-paying work, or even cutting back on their 
own expenditures on food and housing.  The new IMF and EBRD 
projections appear to eschew this earlier logic, however. 
 
8. (U) Ishii cautioned, however, that we should avoid drawing 
conclusions from one month in isolation.  She noted that January 
2008 remittance figures were particularly high as a result of 
last winter's food crisis, when overseas workers made efforts to 
send home as much money as possible to help their families.  She 
said she has also heard reports that more people may be 
hand-carrying remittances home rather than sending them through 
banks, out of concern about the stability of the Tajik banking 
sector.  Both factors would result in deflated January 2009 
figures.  A clearer picture would emerge, she said, when data 
from February and March are known.  Schimmelpfennig said that a 
side effect of continued decline in remittances would be the 
return of a significant amount of overseas workers.  If this 
happened, the country would have less money with which to feed 
more mouths -- a situation that had the potential to spiral 
downward. 
 
Somoni Expected to Slide South 
 
9. (U) Both the EBRD and IMF experts said they expected the 
Tajik somoni to continue to decline against the dollar.  (Note: 
In the last few months the somoni has dropped from 3.4 to as 
much as 3.9 to the dollar.  The official rate is currently 3.8. 
Since the currency floats freely, unofficial rates do not vary 
much from the official rate, although they are usually a tenth 
of a somoni higher.  End note.)  Schimmelpfennig said that there 
is almost nothing the National Bank of Tajikistan can do to halt 
the slide of the somoni, given its relatively small reserves and 
the sheer size of the macroeconomic forces it is up against. 
Even if it had the ability to protect the currency, however, he 
strongly advised the Bank to let the slide continue, acting only 
to ensure that the decline was smooth.  While the decline hurt 
imports, it nevertheless boosted domestic production.  He was 
reluctant to predict where the somoni would be trading at year's 
end, but said he would not be surprised if the "real effective 
exchange rate" against a basket of world currencies would likely 
drop by 10% or 20%. 
 
10. (U) Schimmelpfennig said that as a result of worsening 
 
DUSHANBE 00000241  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
macroeconomic conditions and declining revenues, the external 
financing gap for the country's budget would be $135 million 
this year.  He was recommending that the IMF contribute $51 
million toward closing that gap, with other donors offering $74 
million in direct budget support.  The IMF also predicts a 7% 
drop in trade, which some donors thought was optimistic. 
 
Bright Spots?  Not Many 
 
11. (U) Schimmelpfennig said that there are a few potential 
bright spots in the Tajik economy.  One was that domestic 
non-cotton agricultural production may receive a boost due to 
plummeting world cotton prices and the increased cost of food 
imports.  A great deal of Tajik food comes from Russia; while 
the somoni has held relatively stable against the ruble, its 
decline against other world currencies may make it more 
difficult to purchase imports.  Schimmelpfennig said he has 
already seen some limited evidence that government leaders 
recognized the importance of diversifying the agricultural 
sector, and this was an issue the IMF would follow up on.  He 
added that there has also been some positive inertia in the 
domestic construction sector, even in Dushanbe, which appears 
not to have slowed much due to the financial crisis.  As the 
crisis prolongs, however, this may change.  (He expressed some 
surprise that the construction of the Somoni Hotel, financed by 
a Turkish firm, is continuing around the clock.)  He added that 
inflation was expected to come in at 12-13% in 2009, 
 
Audit Results Expected Soon 
 
11. (SBU) During a question-and-answer session after the IMF 
presentation, Schimmelpfennig gave a status update on three 
major audits commissioned in the wake of the misreporting 
scandal.  The audit of the National Bank had been completed, and 
he expected that its key findings would be published on the 
bank's website within the next month.  (Note: in an earlier 
conversation IMF country director Luc Moers told Econoff that 
the bank, which could use its own discretion in deciding what 
findings were considered "key," might choose not to make 
negative conclusions public (ref B).  End note.)  He said there 
would be no surprises, although he added -- to some raised 
eyebrows in the room -- that "the key for everyone will be to 
take a little bit of a leap of faith in the authorities that 
everything is on track." 
 
12. (SBU) The audit of the Barki Tajik has been completed and 
should be published soon.  The audit of the Talco aluminum 
company, the nation's largest industry, has still not been 
conducted.  Three firms have submitted bids.  Under Tajik law 
the country is obligated to select the lowest bid, which in this 
case comes from the "mid-tier" London-based firm Moore Stephens, 
out of its Moscow office.  Schimmelpfennig admitted, however, 
that he would be much more comfortable if the audit were 
performed by Big-Four firm Ernst and Young, whose bid was 
$150,000 higher.  He appealed to donors in the audience to 
consider providing that funding.  (He had assurances from the 
Tajik government that there would be no problem accepting Ernst 
and Young provided the gap was met by a donor.) 
 
13. (SBU) Comment: Earlier predictions by the IMF, echoed by 
Tajik Goverment officials, that Tajikistan was shielded from the 
global crisis have now gone by the board, and all eyes are on 
the economic situation in Russia.  The next major economic 
indicator to watch will be how many Tajiks return to Russia to 
work later in the spring, and how much remittances pick up 
during that time.  Now that Tajikistan has successfully 
completed the Staff Monitoring Program demanded after the 
misreporting scandal, which the IMF says has led to some 
improvements in banking governance and Finance Ministry 
oversight of state enterprises, the IMF is looking to move 
forward with the PRGF; it will make a proposal to its board in 
the first week of April.  We would withhold judgement on the 
advisability of a PGRF until the Central Bank's audit is posted. 
 End Comment. 
JACOBSON