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Viewing cable 09DHAKA155, MEDIA REACTION: ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAKA155 2009-02-12 08:45 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO9844
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV
DE RUEHKA #0155/01 0430845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120845Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8283
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1002
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0015
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2516
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 8778
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1970
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0683
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2754
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0351
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1639
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0358
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0999
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/PB 
STATE FOR SCA/PPD, PA/RRU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KMDR KPAO PGOV PREL MOPS EWWT BG IN BM
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER'S VISIT TO 
DHAKA 
 
DHAKA 00000155  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Richard Boucher's February 7-8 visit to Bangladesh received 
extensive coverage in the local media, both English and vernacular. 
(See septel for a further readout on the visit.)  This was the first 
visit to Bangladesh by a senior State Department official since new 
administrations took office in Washington and Dhaka.  Newspaper 
editorials focused on A/S Boucher's comments at a press conference, 
where he stated that the U.S. was looking at ways to assist 
Bangladesh in protecting its maritime borders.  Those newspapers 
that understood the offer in the context of our broader engagement 
on counterterrorism (CT) and other development assistance generally 
praised the idea.  Many newspapers, however, especially ones with an 
anti-U.S. stance, misinterpreted A/S Boucher's comments to mean the 
U.S. intended to initiate joint naval patrols in the Bay of Bengal. 
Editorials from these newspapers criticized A/S Boucher's comments 
as an attempt by the U.S. to establish a military presence in the 
Bay.  In addition to misinterpreting A/S Boucher's comments, many 
newspapers, quoting the Prime Minister's press secretary, reported 
that A/S Boucher told Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that the U.S. 
would assist Bangladesh to try alleged war criminals from the 
country's 1971 Liberation War.  In fact, A/S Boucher did not discuss 
this issue during this meeting.  We are reaching out to the 
government, media and other key influencers to set the record 
straight on both the maritime boundary and war crimes issues.  End 
summary. 
 
2. A selection of media reaction follows: 
 
A. "REGIONAL TASKFORCE TO CURB TERRORISM: U.S. ASSISTANCE WILL BE AN 
ADDITIONAL INSPIRATION" an editorial in the February 9 generally 
neutral vernacular daily JAI JAI DIN: 
 
"The United States will provide assistance to law enforcement 
agencies so that the terrorists cannot operate on Bangladeshi soil. 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher expressed this 
intent after his meeting with the Home Minister and State Minister 
for Home Affairs during his short Dhaka visit.  If the U.S. shares 
its experience with Bangladesh, we think that it will improve our 
law enforcement agencies....We think that the U.S. will profoundly 
realize Bangladesh's need for uprooting international terrorism and 
will advise other South Asian countries to form a counterterrorism 
regional taskforce." 
 
B. "BOUCHER'S TRIP TO DHAKA: A MATTER OF TWO NEW ADMINISTRATIONS 
GETTING ACQUAINTED," an editorial in the February 10 generally 
neutral English newspaper THE DAILY STAR: 
 
"The just-concluded visit to Dhaka by U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher should be 
considered significant for several reasons.  The most basic, of 
course, relates to the fact that, in both Washington and Dhaka, new 
governments have taken over.  Incidentally, both the Obama 
administration and the Hasina government have come to office with 
promises of change.  Against such a background, the Boucher visit 
was an opportunity for the new men in Washington to get a measure of 
the new team in Dhaka.  In similar manner, it was a chance for the 
Awami League-led government to get some insights into the thinking 
of the new Democratic administration in the United States....  The 
Boucher visit reflects current U.S. thinking on some contemporaneous 
issues relating to Bangladesh.  For Bangladesh, it is a point where 
a fresh sense of dynamism can be injected into its diplomacy." 
 
C. "PRANAB-BOUCHER VISITS WILL HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT" an analytical 
report in the February 11 AL-leaning vernacular daily SANGBAD: 
 
"Boucher assured Bangladesh that the U.S. will continue to provide 
assistance in counterterrorism, economic development, climate change 
and other areas.  He cited this assistance as an assurance of the 
Obama administration's desire to have warm relations with 
Bangladesh.  Boucher is an expert in South Asian politics and has 
influence in the new U.S. administration.  This visit will 
strengthen relations between the two countries." 
 
D. "U.S. OFFER ON MARITIME BOUNDARY SECURITY NOT A WISE ONE" an 
editorial in the February 10 AL-leaning vernacular DAILY SHAMOKAL: 
 
 
DHAKA 00000155  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
"U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher said that the 
United States is interested in providing Bangladesh assistance in 
protecting its maritime borders.  Bangladesh may need to ensure 
maritime border security, but if we call on the U.S. Navy to do this 
task, it may invite trouble.  Policy makers in Bangladesh should 
think about this carefully.  Bangladesh may need international as 
well as U.S. assistance in determining its exclusive economic zone 
in the Bay of Bengal, but no military assistance is required to 
ensure maritime security." 
 
E. "BOUCHER'S VISIT AND A PROPOSAL" an editorial in the February 10 
generally anti-West Bangla vernacular daily INQILAB: 
 
"Bangladesh and the United States have long maintained excellent 
relations.  The U.S. might have offered assistance to Bangladesh to 
protect its maritime boundary out of good will.  However, we would 
like to say with the utmost humility that we do not need assistance 
from any country, including the U.S., to protect Bangladesh's 
maritime boundary.  There has been a long-standing rumor that the 
U.S. wants to establish a military base in the Bay of Bengal. 
Bangladesh has never paid heed to this.  But now questions may arise 
whether the U.S. offer of assistance is a substitute for 
establishing a permanent military base.  Bangladesh should reject 
this offer in the national interest.  If the U.S. takes control over 
the Bay, it would be difficult to free it from U.S. control. 
Bangladesh should not take any risks in this regard." 
 
F. "U.S. MARITIME CO-OP WITH BANGLADESH IS WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING" 
an editorial in the February 10 left-leaning, anti-U.S. English 
daily NEW AGE: 
 
"When visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher 
expressed his country's willingness to help Bangladesh patrol and 
protect its maritime boundaries, the offer had a terrifying 
resonance though dressed in the clothing of goodwill.  At a 
pre-departure press conference, even as Boucher sought to explain 
that his country had no plans to establish a permanent military base 
in Bangladesh, he brought up the possibility of cooperation in this 
area.... While the U.S. asserts its naval and military dominance in 
the Indian Ocean through its military base in Diego Garcia - one of 
the largest US military bases in the world - this dominance would 
extend into the Bay of Bengal if Bangladesh were to accept this 
evidently innocuous offer." 
 
G. "BOUCHER'S DHAKA VISIT: THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MOVE CAUTIOUSLY " 
an editorial in the February 10 Jamaat- and BNP-leaning vernacular 
daily NAYA DIGANTA: 
 
"Any joint Bangladesh-U.S. patrols of Bangladesh's maritime boundary 
might raise concerns in China and Burma.... There is a fear that 
Bangladesh may enter in the Indo-U.S. sphere of influence to deter 
Chinese influence in the region.   Bangladesh should not be involved 
in fights among the major powers.  China is helping Bangladesh to 
strengthen its navy and China is also Bangladesh's time-tested 
friend." 
 
MORIARTY