VZCZCXRO2711
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0073/01 0351253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041253Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8237
INFO RUEHIC/OIC COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1140
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2791
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1235
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3307
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 000073 
 
STATE FOR AF/E JLIDDLE & INR/AA FEHRENREICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KIRF KISL KDEM KPAO PHUM PGOV TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA'S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
 
Refs: A) 2008 Dar es Salaam 837, B: Dar es Salaam 40 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000073  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary and Introduction:  Tanzania's current religious 
identification demographics are 62 percent Christian, 35 percent 
Muslim and three percent other (traditional beliefs, Hindu, Sikh, 
Baha'i).  The Tanzanian state does not gather religious 
identification census data as a matter of policy.  The state and the 
ruling party have a strongly secular tradition.  Religious 
identification statistics dating from the colonial administration, 
which is reflected in commonly referenced USG publications 
(Background Notes, etc.) for lack of any official post-independence 
data, indicates a split of roughly one-third each for Christian, 
Muslim and traditional (with negligible numbers for other faiths). 
Muslims predominate along the coastal strip and the autonomous 
Zanzibar archipelago.  Christians dominate the interior, except for 
a few Muslim towns established during the days of the Middle East 
slave trade.  Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital and principal 
city, is mixed but increasingly Christian. 
 
¶2. (U) Tensions are somewhat on the rise between Muslims and 
Christians in Tanzania, though not worryingly so.  Political leaders 
see it in their self-interest to build broad coalitions of Muslims 
and Christians, as opposed to mobilizing along religious lines.  At 
the same time, there are competing groups, often divided along pro- 
and anti-government lines, which cut across religious affiliation. 
 
 
¶3. (U) To continue augmenting our outreach efforts with  faith 
communities throughout Tanzania, we have created a new Public 
Diplomacy Specialist (PDS) position within the Public Affairs 
section, replacing an existing Cultural Affairs Specialist position. 
 One-third of this position is devoted to implementing programming 
to encourage faith communities to consider favorably U.S. policies 
and programs.  Our staffed - but not funded nor resident - American 
Presence Post on Zanzibar also has the potential to make lasting 
gains in this regard. 
End Summary and Introduction. 
 
Christianity: Dominant, but Fractured 
 
¶4. (U) Over the past forty eight years since independence, growth in 
the Muslim community has kept pace with population growth, while the 
Christian community has grown much more rapidly at the expense of 
those who formerly identified with traditional African religions. 
Given that those who self-identify as followers of traditional 
African faiths now account for less than 3 percent of the 
population, and converts from Islam are extremely rare, Christian 
growth is nearing a plateau.  Consequently, "poaching" among the 
memberships of rival Christian denominations appears to be on the 
rise, according to anecdotal information. 
 
¶5. (U) As regards practice, both Islam and Christianity in Tanzania 
are noted for including elements of traditional African beliefs in 
daily practice (usually with the stern disapproval of their 
respective formal faith leadership).  While Muslim practice is 
deeply rooted in culture and family traditions going back centuries, 
many Christians have adopted their religious identification only 
recently, and so tend to mix-in elements of the traditional beliefs 
followed by their forebears to a greater degree than their Muslim 
compatriots. 
 
¶6. (U) Religious demographic data for Tanzania in various United 
States Government publications (State's Background Notes, CIA World 
Fact Book, etc.) reflect figures from the British colonial 
administration.  As a matter of policy, the Tanzanian state refuses 
to pose religious identification questions in its census.  A variety 
of private polls agree that the present proportion of Tanzanians who 
self-identify as Christian is about 62 percent (up from the late 
colonial era figure of 33 percent).  While we suspect that religious 
practice has not changed as drastically as these figures indicate, 
self-identification has changed.  Christian proselytizers have 
enjoyed significant success in independent Tanzania. 
 
¶7. (U) The Christian community is informally divided between two 
groups.  Most of the members of the historic churches (Lutheran, 
Catholic, Anglican) come from families that have identified with the 
church and adopted its norms over generations.  These churches set 
up in Tanzania in the late 1800s/early 1900s.  Most of the members 
of the new, mainly evangelical churches are more recent converts 
from traditional faiths and so, naturally, retain many practices 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000073  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
carried over from their former set of beliefs.  These churches were 
established from the 1960s onwards, accelerating in recent years. 
 
¶8. (U) 6. (U) Catholicism is Tanzania's largest Christian faith. 
Tanzanian Catholics claim 8,500,800 members, or about one-third of 
all Tanzanian Christians.  The most heavily Catholic regions of the 
country are the far West great lakes dioceses (Sumbawanga 70, Bukoba 
67 percent), parts of the southern highlands (Mbinga 85 percent), 
parts of Central Tanzania (Mahenge 61 percent) and the far North 
(Moshi/Mt. Kilimanjaro, 57 percent). 
 
¶9. (U) The Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran churches have highly 
developed administrative structures and constitutions that provide 
for the selection and election of church leaders.  In addition to 
providing spiritual guidance, these churches offer social services, 
such as medical care and schools (students attend at a partially- or 
fully-subsidized cost).  Despite their more elaborate and 
institutionalized organizational structures, these religious 
institutions have faced a number of intra-denominational conflicts. 
 
¶10. (U) The Catholic Church, for example, has been engaged in an 
ongoing conflict with the Marian Faith Healing Ministry of Father 
Nkwera.  The Lutheran Church has had three experiences (in Pare, 
Northern, and East/Coast Dioceses) of rebel factions attempting to 
create their own separate dioceses stemming from complaints of 
misuse of resources and favoritism along ethnic lines.  In one case, 
a violent confrontation lasted from 1990-93 between followers who 
wanted to create a Meru Diocese and those who wanted to maintain a 
united Northern Diocese.  Since 1994, the Anglican Church has 
experienced intense disagreements over control of its Mwanza (Lake 
Victoria) Diocese. 
 
¶11. (U) For the roughly 140 other churches in Tanzania, this 
struggle to control resources can take on a more personal dimension. 
 In the smaller denominations, leadership depends more on preaching 
ability and entrepreneurial flare rather than on administrative 
capabilities.  The competition for followers among these churches is 
sometimes as intense as the struggles to control the resources that 
international church connections often bring.  While the larger, 
more bureaucratic churches are not immune, conflicts that seem more 
about controlling resources than about theological principles have 
been more prevalent among the smaller churches, often leading to a 
splintering of small churches into multiple micro-churches. 
 
¶12. (U) There are three primary interdenominational, Christian-wide 
associations.  The Christian Council of Tanzania is comprised of 
most of the protestant churches in Tanzania, including the Anglican, 
Lutheran, Mennonite, Moravian, Baptist, African Inland, and Brethren 
Churches.  The Dar es Salaam Union of Churches is an association 
comprised of the above-mentioned Protestant churches, and includes 
the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches in Dar es Salaam.  Finally, 
the Pentecostal Council of Tanzania includes the Tanzania Assemblies 
of God Churches, the Church of God in Christ, and other Pentecostal 
churches across the country.  The Tanzania Episcopal Conference 
(Catholic), the Christian Council of Tanzania, as well as individual 
Christian leaders, often make pronouncements and provide guidance on 
political and social issues that appear in the Tanzanian media. 
 
Islam: Well-Established, But Static 
 
¶13. (U) Islam arrived on Tanzania's Swahili coast and the isles of 
Zanzibar about a thousand years ago.  Today, Tanzania's Muslim 
community is estimated at 35 percent (about 14 million), while the 
one million inhabitants of the Zanzibar archipelago (Unguja and 
Pemba) are 98 percent Muslim.  Tanzania is mistakenly perceived by 
many outsiders as a predominantly Muslim country.  This perception 
is probably due to the fact that the capital and largest city is 
located on the predominantly Muslim coastal strip and has an Arabic 
name (Dar es Salaam translates as "Haven of Peace"). 
 
¶14. (U) In recent days, the Zanzibari government announced it would 
seek permission from the Union government to join the Organization 
of Islamic Conference (OIC) if ongoing internal discussions by the 
Union government concerning proposed OIC membership for Tanzania as 
a whole prove fruitless (ref b).  Zanzibar attempted to join the OIC 
several years ago, but was forced to withdraw by the Union 
government on the grounds that membership is incompatible with the 
Union's secular constitution.  Opponents of OIC membership, both 
secularists and Christian leaders, ask how such membership can now 
be squared with the constitution, since it has not been amended in 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000073  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
this regard. 
 
¶15. (U) Most Tanzanian Muslims follow Sunni traditions and are 
ethnically indigenous African (with the remainder being of Arab, 
Persian or South Asian origin).  There are also Shia Ismailis and 
Ithna-Asheris present, whose members are almost exclusively of South 
Asian origin.  There is also a smaller Ibadi sect that has a 
primarily Omani Arab membership. 
 
¶16. (U) Authority within the Muslim community generally comes from 
holding a leadership position in government-recognized Islamic 
organizations such as BAKWATA (Swahili acronym for National Muslim 
Council of Tanzania), or in organizations such as the Dar es Salaam 
Islamic club.  Other organizations not officially recognized by the 
state, such as the Muslim Writers Workshop and the Committee for the 
Defense of Islamic Rights, also create pathways for leaders to 
emerge by providing a platform to challenge the 
officially-recognized leadership. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Successful business people, intellectuals or politicians 
can also become influential within the Islamic community.  Sheikhs 
(mosque leaders) and muftis (Islamic law specialists) gain authority 
from their understanding of Islam.  This knowledge can be acquired 
through experience working, studying and teaching at local religious 
institutions, or it can be obtained through studying at outside 
Islamic institutions of higher learning.  Some Tanzanians pursue 
study at these institutions in Iran and Sudan.  This has created 
friction with the government due to suspicions that those studying 
in such places may have received subversive indoctrination. 
 
¶18. (SBU)  A number of Muslim community leaders, such as Sheikh 
Ponda Issa Ponda and Sheikh Juma Mbukuzi, have emerged because of 
their outspoken and bold criticism of the state and its relationship 
to Islam.  However, within the Umma (Islamic community) there is no 
set path that one must follow to obtain leadership accreditation. 
For example, former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the late Vice 
President Ali Omar Jumar, and leaders of BAKWATA have used their 
connections to the state to gain influence within Tanzania's Islamic 
community. 
 
¶19. (U) The multiple paths to assuming leadership positions in the 
Muslim community have resulted in the emergence of a variety of 
complementary and conflicting perspectives.  There is a general 
division between those who feel that Muslims have been held back and 
oppressed by the state and those who uphold the status quo 
relationship between their religion and the government.  This, 
coupled with a struggle to control resources and gain prestige 
within local Muslim communities, has led to a number of 
(occasionally violent) conflicts over the control of mosques, which 
usually pit a group of younger anti-status quo sheikhs versus older 
pro-status quo sheikhs who are often associated with BAKWATA. 
 
¶20. (U) The rise of Islam as a growing political force presents, on 
the surface, a bipolar struggle between the followers of Islam and 
Christianity, with similarities and differences in terms of 
political mobilization.  However, both religious communities consist 
of a number of competing groups, often divided along pro- and 
anti-government lines, which cut across religious affiliation. 
 
Traditional Beliefs: Diminishing, yet Pervasive 
 
¶21. (U) Those who self-identify as followers of traditional 
(animist) religions make up less than three percent of the 
population.  However, elements of traditional belief are widely held 
by many Tanzanian Christians and Muslims, especially in rural areas. 
 Unlike Christianity and Islam, traditional spiritual beliefs lack 
formal organizational structures and ties to resources from outside 
the country.  They tend to form no cohesive organization, as they 
are Balkanized among the various ethnic communities whose 
traditional beliefs and practices they uphold.  Leaders of 
traditional religions often gain their expertise serving an 
apprenticeship, usually under a family mentor.  Their formal 
education levels are often low or non-existent.  There is a 
widespread belief that some politicians and business leaders, while 
formally identifying with Christianity or Islam, will seek the help 
of traditional healers and spiritual leaders to obtain specific 
benefits (win an election, gain a contract, etc.). 
 
¶22. (U) Major ethnicities known for loyalty toward their traditional 
beliefs are: in the North, Hadzabe, Maasai, Sandeawe, Chagga, and 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000073  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
Arusha; in far West Great Lakes region, Sakuma and Haya; on the 
coast, Zaramo and Makonde.  Tanzanians commonly consider the 
traditionally nomadic Hadzabe and Maasai to be the staunchest 
adherents of their respective traditional beliefs.  Many Tanzanians 
practice rituals derived from traditional beliefs during festivals, 
births, deaths, marriages, and other significant ceremonies, 
although they may self-identify as Christian or Muslim. 
 
Inter-faith Amity: Upholding Tanzania's Tolerant Traditions 
 
¶23. (U) A societal value of tolerance and a distaste for identity 
politics has influenced the conscious decisions of many of the main 
political actors and identity group members to eschew religious (or 
ethnic) mobilization.  Unlike in many other African countries, 
Tanzania almost never ask one another about ethnic or religious 
affiliation.  These societal values have emerged as one of founding 
President "Mwalimu" Julius Nyerere's most important contributions to 
national development.  It is worth noting that the ruling party has 
an informal policy of rotating presidential candidates between 
Christians (Nyerere and Mkapa, the first and third presidents) and 
Muslims (Mwinyi and Kikwete, the second and fourth presidents). 
 
¶24. (U) According to a REDET (Research and Education for Democracy 
in Tanzania) study (2001), very few people explained differences in 
education or employment in terms of religious bias.  With regard to 
questions concerning job placement, promotions and favoritism in the 
work place, respondents who felt religion was a factor ranged from 
one percent or lower.  For education, recent studies report that 
despite the differences in enrollment and pass rates in secondary 
school, only two percent of the survey respondents feel that Muslims 
are discriminated against because of their religion in terms of 
access to education. When asked: "what strategies could the 
government adopt to ensure a more equitable distribution of 
educational resources?" no one stated directly that there should be 
interventions on behalf of Muslims.  At the university level, while 
there are fewer Muslims than Christians (consistent with 
demography), there appears to be no difference in percentages 
regarding the pass rate.  In short, although disparities exist, most 
Tanzanians do not attribute these to be related to discrimination 
along religious lines. 
 
¶25. (U) That said, lately tensions have been somewhat on the rise 
between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania due to ongoing debates 
over khadhi courts (ref A) and Tanzania's proposed membership in the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (ref B).  An additional reason 
for increased tensions is the rise in political visibility and 
assertiveness of the Muslim community over the past 15 years.  These 
tensions, however, are mild.  Tanzanians routinely socialize across 
religious (and ethnic) lines. 
 
¶26. (U) The most active interfaith group, the World Conference on 
Religion and Peace, was established in 2000.  Other interfaith 
groups are The Peace and Reconciliation Council for Muslims and 
Christians and The Muslim and Christian Leaders Council for Peace 
and Religion, which is comprised of leaders from the Tanzania 
Episcopal Conference, the Christian Council of Tanzania and 
BAKWATA. 
 
Religion in Politics: No Political Polarization On Creed 
 
¶27. (U) There is a realization among both opposition and ruling 
party leaders that using religious appeals at a national level is 
likely to cause a strong counter-response and mobilization amongst 
the rival group.  The leaders of all the major parties feel that it 
is impossible to win power or to successfully govern without the 
support of both Muslims and Christians.  Therefore political leaders 
see it in their self-interest to build broad coalitions of Muslims 
and Christians, as opposed to mobilizing along religious lines. 
Nonetheless, Tanzanians tend to identify Civic United Front (CUF), 
whose strength is on Zanzibar (especially Pemba), as a Muslim party, 
while the leaders of mainland-based Chadema (also opposition) are 
notably Christian.  The ruling party is largely viewed as secular 
(except for its Zanzibar wing, which occasionally stresses an 
Islamic identity when it feels under political pressure to do so). 
 
¶28. (U) Tanzania's religious communities lack group consensus on 
political direction.  Divisions between, and within, both Christian 
denominations and Muslim mosques have rendered group solidarity on 
political issues virtually impossible.  This, in turn, creates a 
strong disincentive for party leaders to manipulate religion for 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000073  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
political ends, or, coming from the other direction, of particular 
religious affiliations substantially affecting the political 
process. 
 
Comment: Engaging with Tanzania's Faith Communities 
 
¶29. (SBU) Christian Tanzanians tend to perceive the United States as 
a friendly, Christian-majority ally (downplaying the United States' 
own secular political traditions).  Tanzanian Muslims are congenial 
as development partners and as eager development assistance 
recipients, however, many Muslims, and especially their faith 
leaders, tend to be wary and distrustful of U.S. foreign policy or 
of cooperation with us beyond the superficial.  When our engagement 
begins to touch on religion, such as providing books to madrassas 
(vetted for appropriateness with a Muslim civil society 
organization), hosting iftaars for destitute Islamic orphanages, or 
bringing Islamic Scholars to discuss Muslim Life in America, we 
invariably enrage the mainland Islamic scholars and media and endure 
vitriol in that Friday's Islamic press.  This is markedly less so in 
Zanzibar (see below). Anecdotal evidence also indicates that U.S. 
foreign policy, as it pertains to Somalia and the Middle East, is 
frequently a topic of discussion during Friday sermons in area 
mosques. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Over the past year, we have extended our MSP goals from 
exclusive Islamic community outreach to working with all faith 
communities.  Our greatest engagement with Tanzanian faith 
communities is through direct funding of faith-based organizations 
working on health related issues, especially HIV/AIDS.  Besides 
hosting Speakers Programs on Muslim Life in America, and Performing 
Arts Initiatives using Islamic music groups, we attend and fund 
seminars held by faith communities.  We routinely ask prominent 
faith leaders to open and close large embassy events.  The U.S. 
military chaplain from the Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti has made annual visits to Tanzania aimed at 
increasing his understanding of the country's interfaith dialogue. 
Our programming is dependent, however, on current events.  While we 
planned well in advance for the visit of an American Speaker on 
Islamic Studies scheduled to arrive in late January, all of our 
mainland Muslim contacts cancelled their participation in our 
programming due to the Gaza-Israel hostilities. 
 
¶31. (SBU) We have sustained engagement with the Islamic communities 
on the islands of Zanzibar.  Zanzibaris do not appear as defensive 
(or offended) about U.S. overtures as their mainland 
co-religionists.  This may be because Muslims are an overwhelming 
majority in Zanzibar.  However, Zanzibari support for our public 
diplomacy endeavors is often tepid.  Zanzibari disagreement over 
U.S. foreign policy is rarely shared with us officially by faith 
leaders we work with there.  Zanzibaris voice appreciation for our 
respect for Islam as shown by our Ambassador's Fund for Cultural 
Preservation grants which have restored three historically 
significant mosques over the past three years.  We also provided a 
large grant to an influential Islamic radio station on Zanzibar to 
promote the values of dialogue, tolerance, and peace to a wider 
audience. 
 
¶32. (U) To continue augmenting our outreach efforts with  faith 
communities throughout Tanzania, we have created a new Public 
Diplomacy Specialist (PDS) position within the Public Affairs 
section, replacing an existing Cultural Affairs Specialist position. 
 One-third of this position is devoted to implementing programming 
to encourage faith communities to consider favorably U.S. policies 
and programs.  Our staffed - but not funded nor resident - American 
Presence Post on Zanzibar also has the potential to make lasting 
gains in this regard. 
ANDRE