VZCZCXRO3368
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0125/01 0571411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261411Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8294
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2818
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3334
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1262
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0016
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1172
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000125 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/E JLIDDLE, INR/RAA FEHRENREICH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: PEMBA SIMMERS 
 
REFS: (A) 2008 Dar es Salaam 839 (B) 2008 Dar es Salaam 461 (C) 08 
Dar es Salaam 444 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000125  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Several recent Embassy trips to Pemba, the second 
principal island of the Zanzibar archipelago (holding about 40 
percent of the self-governing region's population) confirm that it 
remains among the least developed regions of Tanzania.  Persistent 
power problems and a rapidly declining agricultural-based economy 
combined with growing inflation and rising food costs make 
frustrations there palpable.  Although nearly all elected officials 
on Pemba are from the opposition CUF party, ruling party CCM chose 
to hold its 2009 Revolution Day celebrations there and sponsored a 
multi-day tour of the island by Tanzanian President (and CCM 
Chairman) Kikwete.  During his visit, Kikwete made locally 
inflammatory remarks about the continuance of CCM rule in Zanzibar 
beyond the 2010 elections.  Locals complain that more than 2,000 
mainland troops sent to the island for the Revolution Day ceremony 
and for Kikwete's protection detail will stay on the island through 
the 2010 election.  While this might not be true, it is symptomatic 
of the degree of mistrust that prevails.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) February 11-12 ZAO and Embassy Grants Officer traveled to 
the rural Zanzibari island of Pemba to follow-up on an Ambassador's 
Self Help grant of USD 3000 presented to a local cooperative to grow 
seaweed commercially (septel).  Whereas Pemba is the second 
principal island of the Zanzibar archipelago and holds about 40 
percent of the self-governing region's population, it remains among 
the least developed regions of Tanzania. Fundo Island, location of 
the seaweed cooperative grant, can be called the "Pemba of Pemba." 
It is reachable only via an hour-long boat ride, followed by a 
several hundred meter walk across a knee-deep coral shelf. 
Nonetheless, about 3,000 people reside there in three villages.  It 
supports a single elementary school, also shared by the scattered 
inhabitants of three adjacent, even more remote islands.  The Sheha 
(local administrator) of Fundo said that we were the first foreign 
officials ever to visit the island, and the log book of the small 
immigration outpost in the port of Wete where we embarked confirmed 
this: the two-dozen or so entries of foreigners making the trip over 
the last few years listed mostly Europeans and a few Japanese who 
stated as their purpose of travel "scuba diving."  Meanwhile, 
Zanzibar Affairs Specialist also made two trips to Pemba in 
mid-February to monitor the selection process for a USG-funded youth 
exchange program ("YES").  This report encompasses our collective 
observations. 
 
¶3. (U) Lack of good roads, a teacher shortage, poor phone service 
and other infrastructure issues plague Pemba, as they do much of 
rural Tanzania.  However, Pemba's main problem is power generation 
and delivery.  Even after the November debacle that left the 
island's two diesel-powered generators sidelined for a fortnight 
(ref A), the power plants still remain rickety.  Throughout this 
year, electricity never has flowed for more than 12 hours daily, and 
only then intermittently.  This has caused an upsurge of private 
generator use among those who can afford it.  However, fuel delivery 
to the island has not met the demand, so petrol for fishing boats 
more often than not comes from jerry cans sold out of the back of 
cars at black market prices.  Power for refrigeration throughout the 
island has been among the first things sacrificed by small 
businessmen, so even when fisherman do make the petrol investment 
and go to sea despite the expense, their catch must be sold and 
consumed right away.  A prominent fish exporter told us that this is 
the worst market he has had to endure in 20 years of doing business. 
 A Tanzanian NGO worker based in Dar es Salaam bragged to us how 
cheap she was buying fish, and we later saw her at the airport 
trying to check in excess baggage full of seafood. 
 
¶4. (U) Meanwhile, state control of the clove industry in Zanzibar, 
most of it coming from Pemba, has long remained a source of 
resentment against the CCM-controlled government. That complaint has 
grown more acute.  Cloves are harvested once a year, starting around 
Oct-Nov. and shipped around the beginning of the new year.  This 
year, the government cut the price from TSH 3,000 per kg to TSH 
1,800 per kg (while growers claim the dock price in Mombasa, Kenya, 
is the equivalent of TSH 16,000 per kg).  Many growers have gotten 
out of the business, and few are re-planting.  Locals claim that 
state-control of the clove business is a deliberate move by the 
ruling CCM party to punish Pemba for its support of opposition party 
CUF. 
 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000125  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  (U) In Pemba's capital of Chake Chake (population about 35,000), 
there is only one functioning restaurant, few taxis and no cold 
drinks to be found.  When the generator of the town's two hotels 
kicked on, ZAO saw several dozen local ladies come with buckets to 
collect water from the hotel's outdoor spigot.  The only local 
television station (government-owned) has ceased transmission, and 
the employees there no longer bother to show up for work. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Save the Children - UK (strictly protect) reports of 
dehydration and malnutrition in the remote, northeast peninsula 
above the town of Micheweni.  The NGO's Zanzibar Director confided 
to ZAO that she is nervous about the security of her staff, 
especially in that region.  She recalled that in May of 2008 
following collapse of the reconciliation talks between CCM and CUF 
(called "Muafaka") and the short term arrest of "Pemban elders" for 
treason, some rural communities blocked the provision of food aid 
and threatened staff, saying that the problems were political and 
needed to be solved through pressure on the regional and national 
government.  Currently Save the Children is implementing a cash 
transfer program in that district.  The expatriate overseeing it 
said that there seemed to be increased numbers of police check 
points, but he had not encountered any trouble. 
 
¶7. (U) Adding to the tension, in January the ruling CCM party 
decided to hold its Revolution Day anniversary at the Gombani 
Stadium in Chake Chake, followed by a multi-day tour of the island 
by Tanzanian President (and CCM Chairman) Kikwete.  (NOTE: The 1964 
"revolution," which featured indiscriminate violence against Arabs 
and others considered pro-Sultanate, had few supporters on Pemba. 
Historical resentments are still fresh.  END NOTE.)  During his 
Pemba visit, Kikwete made locally inflammatory remarks about the 
continuance of CCM rule in Zanzibar beyond the 2010 elections and 
hailed the "benefits that continue to spring from the revolutionary 
Zanzibari government."  Heretofore, most opposition CUF members and 
their Pemban supporters reserved their ire for Zanzibari President 
Karume because Kikwete at least paid lip service to reconciliation. 
That he should now come during bad times and praise "progress" was 
at best perceived as callous.  Worse, at one Pemban CCM rally 
attended by Kikwete and Karume, a perhaps over-zealous speaker 
boasted that in 2010 CCM would have an absolute majority on Unguja 
and "take 8 of the 19 House seats on Pemba."  CCM currently has no 
House of Representatives seats on Pemba, and many Pembans are 
wondering aloud about the specificity of a possible vote count 
almost two years before the election. 
 
¶8. (U) Adding greatly to the tension on Pemba is the widely repeated 
story that 2,000 troops arrived in Pemba from the mainland the week 
prior to Revolution Day, moved into existing army camps, and have 
not departed.  There is fear that they will remain through the 2010 
election.  Officials deny this is the case. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: ZAO did not personally notice more security 
personnel during his visit to Pemba (although under "normal" 
circumstances, there are more check points and more troops per 
capita than around Dar es Salaam or on the main Zanzibar island of 
Unguja, itself a veritable armed camp when compared to the laid-back 
mainland.).  If there were more troops on Pemba, they must be 
hunkered down in garrison, as the streets of Wete and Chake Chake 
were as desolate as ever due to the economic shut-down.  Embassy 
Defense Attache commented that garrisoning 2,000 troops in a new 
location for a prolonged period would be unrealistic given known GOT 
military budget limitations.  What is important, however, is that 
the belief that there is an "occupation force" on Pemba is 
widespread and even repeated by Pembans resident in the main island 
of Unguja. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Even assuming the added troop figure is true, and given 
the common belief that they all would be registered to vote, 2,000 
votes would not be enough to swing the outcome for CCM.  Such an 
influx of troops would, however, be a formidable force for 
intimidation.  In the build-up to the 2000 and 2005 elections, large 
numbers of security personnel were brought into Unguja and Pemba. 
In addition to physical intimidation during voting, there also were 
reports of women and children from the families of opposition 
leaders being rounded up as "hostages" to curtail opposition 
activities.  At the very least, there were confirmed reports that 
families in some Pemba districts fled their homes due to the 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000125  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
increased presence of security personnel. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  With or without additional troops, conditions on Pemba 
are bad, and government boasts that times are good ring hollow, or 
worse, sound like taunts to those whose quality of life appears to 
be deteriorating.  Zanzibar Affairs Specialist heard renewed 
rumblings for Pemban secession from Zanzibar (ref B).  No one speaks 
of an independent Pemba, a ludicrous concept given its small size 
and economic weakness.  Rather, Pembans seek to disassociate 
themselves from the rule of Unguja/Zanzibar and instead associate 
directly with the mainland, like Mafia island further to the south, 
which administratively is part of the mainland's Coast Region. 
 
¶12. (U) A CCM District Commissioner with whom ZAO spoke seemed to 
earnestly believe that the planned Norwegian-funded power cable from 
Tanga on the mainland would be completed before 2010 and all would 
be well.  The Norwegians have not publicly promised such a deadline, 
however.  Although the Norwegians have informally told their USG 
counterparts at the Millennium Challenge Corporation that the 
fabrication of the planned cable is actually ahead of schedule in 
Norway, their prior experience with projects in Tanzania has caused 
them to remain publicly cautious; thus, they maintain that their 
cable project will be completed sometime "in 2011."   Meanwhile, an 
expatriate from Tanga told ZAO that Tanga, the presumed source of 
power to Pemba, was currently facing severe power shortages of its 
own.  It is clear that Pemba will be the battleground in the lead-up 
to the 2010 elections, but just how CCM (and CUF) intend to fight 
that battle remains to be seen. END COMMENT. 
 
ANDRE