VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDK #0252/01 0581135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271135Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1948
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS DAKAR 000252 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: Senegal: Are the Electoral Rolls Corrupt? 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 24, Embassy Pol staff debriefed two 
computer experts who audited the national electoral database on 
February 10-11, 2009.  The audit was requested by the coalition of 
opposition parties and was conducted with the concurrence and 
support of the Ministry of Interior that runs the database and 
organizes all elections in Senegal.  The experts concluded that the 
database is irredeemably flawed.  For the first time, it seems as if 
the opposition has concrete evidence of at least incompetence or, at 
worst, fraud that may cast a shadow over the reliability of the 
elections results.  End Summary. 
 
What's in a name? 
------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Prior to the 2007 presidential elections, the opposition 
had conducted an audit of the electoral database containing all 
registered voters and did not find anything amiss.  Two weeks ago, 
they repeated the same process audit but this time they seemed to 
have been less fortunate.  The leading expert on the team, Iba 
Gueye, told Embassy, "I don't know what led me to ask to see a 
breakdown of the list by family names."  Upon closer inspection, 
Gueye discovered 17,825 family names, this in a country where the 
number of family names is very limited (many Senegalese are named 
Ndiaye "njaay" or Diop, "joop").  Gueye continued, "By the looks of 
it, real Senegalese names were taken and then new ones were created 
by adding and removing letters.  Take for example the name Balde (of 
which there were 49,824 entries in the database); in the list Balde 
is preceded or followed by variants such as BALD, BALDECK, BALDEF 
BALDA or BAL DEE.  What worries me the most is that all these names 
represent legally registered voters, who have been assigned to 
polling stations and who have legitimate national identity and voter 
cards.  But, clearly these names are not Senegalese.  What's worse 
is that the list is full of such variants that cannot realistically 
be accounted for by claiming that they are there because of a 
clerical or data entry error."  Gueye added that when they asked for 
the addresses of the aforementioned voters the system failed to 
respond. 
 
Inconsistencies 
---------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The auditors noted that on February 2, 2009 there were 
4,818,913 registered voters; an increase of 62,571 from the January 
31, 2007 audit when the figure was 4,756,342, "logically, these all 
should be newly registered voters."  But when they conducted a 
search of new voters, the computer tech at the Ministry found only 
6,715 new voters in the database; a discrepancy of 55,856 voters 
"who may or may not be real."  Furthermore, the recent creation of 
three new regions meant that a total of 872,407 voters have to have 
their cards reprinted to reflect the new administrative entities in 
which they live.  If this figure is added to the 6,715 newly 
registered voters it should lead to the conclusion that only 934,311 
new voters cards need to be printed.  When auditors questioned the 
Ministry's card production unit they were told that 1,416,716 cards 
have been printed since January 31, 2007. 
 
Cosmetic biometry 
----------------- 
¶4. (SBU) President Abdoulaye Wade recently lauded the digitization 
of the electoral process with the introduction of digital 
fingerprinting for voter cards.  However, the auditors observed that 
neither the card printing unit nor the voter registration unit was 
linked to any sort of biometric database.  Thus, with only text 
files that are not backed up by any biometric security features 
these two units could, conceivably, create and modify entries at 
will.  Meanwhile, even though the voter card is bar-coded, it is 
very unlikely that any polling station will be equipped with barcode 
readers or computers.  In fact, during the last Presidential 
election Poloff witnessed votes being counted by candle light 
because the school at which the voting station was located had no 
electricity. 
 
Rejection and Manipulation 
-------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) The Ministry of Interior has already said that it will 
ignore the findings of the auditors because the latter did not 
present a report to the GOS at the conclusion of their mission. 
Furthermore, the Minister of Interior, Cheikh Tidiane Sy, has 
rejected the opposition's demand that an ultraviolet spray be used 
instead of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting.  The auditors 
insist on using the spray, which was used in Bosnia, because it is 
more reliable than indelible ink which can be rendered ineffective 
by rubbing grease on one's finger prior to dipping it into the ink. 
It is also interesting that Minister Sy's son, Mame Ousmane Sy, is 
President Wade's IT advisor and is allegedly the guru who tinkers 
with the electoral data base; a fact confirmed by an Embassy contact 
who was an advisor to the President. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶6. (SBU) Leading members of the opposition have told Poloff that 
they are putting in place "brigades" that will physically prevent 
registered foreigners (Guineans from Conakry or Bissau) from voting. 
 Each candidate has been instructed to remain at his polling station 
and an "informal identification process" will be in place to limit 
fraud.  As the elections approach the rhetoric is getting more and 
more inflammatory and this might pave the way to election day 
violence, especially if the opposition can use the results of the 
audit to somehow persuade the public that the ruling party is using 
fraud to assure itself of victory. 
 
Bernicat