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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDK #0220/01 0541303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231303Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1904
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000220 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/RSA, AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC SOCI PHUM PINR KDEM KISL ECON
SG 
SUBJECT: SENEGAL FEBRUARY 2009 SCENESETTER 
 
 ¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Senegal is preparing to hold local 
elections amid an atmosphere of slowly building social unrest 
due to ongoing economic difficulties, poor management of the 
country's public finances, and disillusionment with Senegal's 
overall governance.  The Senegalese are known for and proud 
of their democratic tradition, but the country's democratic 
institutions have deteriorated of late.  Senegal is a 
predominantly Muslim country (commonly estimated at 93 
percent), but the Senegalese are proud of their tradition of 
religious tolerance.  Despite high rates of poverty and 
illiteracy, Senegal has historically maintained a fair degree 
of political stability and coherence.  As a result, the 
country has long punched above its weight class as a 
diplomatic player on the continent and a sought-after partner 
internationally.  After having hosted the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit last March, Senegal is 
serving as the chair of the Ummah, which ostensibly expands 
President Wade,s influence to the entire Muslim world. 
Senegal is our closest ally in Francophone Africa and visibly 
supports the United States in promoting peace through UN and 
AU peacekeeping operations and cooperation in combating 
terrorism.  With U.S. training and assistance, Senegal has 
become one of the world's top ten contributors of 
peacekeepers.  Wade has disappointed his western partners and 
many of his fellow African leaders, however, by supporting 
the recent coups in Mauritania and Guinea. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The GOS must recover from two years of lackluster 
economic growth, the result of high food and energy prices 
last summer and the self-inflicted damage of poor governance, 
corruption, and rampant off-book expenditures.  In December, 
Senegal barely passed its second review under it IMF Policy 
Support Initiative (the U.S. abstained).  Significant reforms 
must be implemented quickly if the program is to stay on 
track. Senegal aspires to become a more significant trading 
partner, but its producers have yet to make serious efforts 
to tap into the U.S. market, preferring to focus their 
exports on regional and European countries.  The U.S. 
commercial presence in Senegal is relatively small, 
especially considering the country's regional importance. 
The overall economic malaise, especially in the agriculture 
and fishing sectors, has resulted in mass (and dangerous) 
illegal migration of Senegalese to the Canary Islands (and, 
hence, the European Union), a thorny issue for the GOS. 
Senegal must improve the investment climate and push forward 
more vigorously with reforms to strengthen a fragile 
judiciary and legislature that are often subject to political 
influence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A WEAKENING DEMOCRACY 
--------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) Senegal has long benefited from a reputation for a 
commitment to democracy.  The reality has always been more 
nuanced, but the trends have been distinctly negative in the 
last few years.  After 30 years in the opposition, President 
Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced "wahd") was elected in 2000 in an 
historic election that saw the peaceful removal of the 
country's independence party -- the Socialist Party -- from 
office.  Wade quickly fell out with other leaders in the 
coalition of parties that supported his election and 
proceeded to gather power in the presidency in a system that 
was already overly centralized.  In 2007, Wade won a second 
term with 56 percent of the vote in a field of 15 candidates 
(one of whom, Idrissa Seck, was his former protege, Chief of 
Staff, and Prime Minister.  Wade recently returned Seck to 
the fold).  In spite of this victory, the election 
represented a loss of public support for Wade. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Twice-postponed parliamentary elections took place 
a few months later that year, but most of the major 
opposition parties boycotted them, alleging irregularities in 
the presidential election and assuming more of the same for 
the legislative round.  This resulted in the ruling 
Senegalese Democratic party (PDS) and its allies capturing 
131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly turning the 
country into a virtual one-party state.  Moreover, following 
these elections, President Wade reestablished a national 
Senate, reversing his 2001 elimination of that body.  Under 
the current format, the President chooses 65 of the 100 
senators with 35 chosen by indirect suffrage.  Thus, since 
coming to power President Wade has reinforced the authority 
of the Presidency and reduced the legislature to a 
insignificant rubber stamp, a fact made stark by the 
President's decision to modify the constitution to allow for 
the removal of the then president of the National Assembly, 
after the incumbent supported the convocation of the 
 
DAKAR 00000220  002 OF 005 
 
 
President's son Karim to testify before the National Assembly 
regarding the activities of a national infrastructure agency 
which he heads.  In 2007 and 2008, Wade pushed through a 
number of other constitutional changes to help him 
consolidate power and expand the size and remuneration of his 
cabinet. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Furthermore, it is widely believed that the 82-year 
old Wade is maneuvering so that his son can succeed him as 
president.  The first stage in the planned succession is 
reportedly Karim Wade's election as Mayor of Dakar following 
the March 22, 2009 local elections.  Karim has never held 
elected office, but is on the electoral list for the city 
council of Dakar.  Assuming the ruling party wins, as is 
expected, political bosses on the council and who serve as 
the equivalent of borough presidents are expected to select 
Karim to become the next mayor.  Observers speculate that he 
would then use this position to catapult himself to the 
presidency in 2012, if not sooner. 
 
SENEGAL'S UNIQUE BRAND OF ISLAM 
------------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) Senegal is 93 percent Muslim, and it has 
traditionally been resistant to religious extremism.  One 
reason for this moderation is Senegal's distinctive and 
flexible interpretation of Islam.  Another may be its 
geographic position at the western edge of the Islamic world. 
 But perhaps the principal reason is the pervasive influence 
of Sufi brotherhoods that are hostile to external influences 
that they perceive as undercutting their own stature.  The 
majority of Senegalese identify themselves with one of the 
four principal Brotherhoods (Tidjane, Mouride, Qu'adria and 
Layenne).  Religious chiefs are called marabouts.  Followers 
(or talibes) are expected to attach themselves to a marabout, 
creating a filial allegiance, often for life.  In many ways 
the marabouts have replaced the traditional village chiefs. 
Talibes, whether 5-year old street children or successful 
industrialists, are expected to return significant portions 
of their income to their marabout.  Politicians use these 
affiliations to advance their policies. 
 
SENEGAL'S ECONOMY: AN ACHILLES HEEL 
----------------------------------- 
¶7.  (SBU) In Senegal more than half the population lives in 
poverty and one-third to one-half have no reliable 
employment.  The country, which ranks 153rd of 177 countries 
on the UN Human Development Index and which remains highly 
aid-dependent, continues to face severe economic and social 
challenges which could ultimately undermine stability if not 
properly managed.  Sustained economic growth of eight percent 
or more is needed to even approach the Millennium Development 
Goal of halving poverty by 2015.  By way of comparison, 
annual economic growth was two percent in 2006 and below five 
percent in 2007 and 2008.  The agricultural sector, which 
employs 60 percent of the population, is weak and unreliable; 
fishing, another major source of livelihood, has also been 
depressed mostly due to diminishing fish stocks.  Large 
numbers of young people see emigration as a panacea, as shown 
by the flight in recent years of thousands of Senegalese, via 
small and dangerous boats, to the Canary Islands -- an entry 
to the European Union.  The investment climate is not 
attractive, in part due to a lack of transparency in the use 
of public sector resources, including by a quasi-state 
infrastructure agency headed by Karim Wade. 
 
¶8.  (U) Senegal is facing a serious budget crunch and has 
turned to donors for assistance.  In 2007-2008, the country 
had an unanticipated $350 million (or more) internal deficit, 
which put at risk the country's Policy Support Instrument 
with the International Monetary Fund.  Most traditional 
donors, for their part, are hesitant to provide budget 
support without greater transparency and accountability of 
expenditures by the GOS.  The Senegalese, especially urban 
dwellers, have suffered from recurring and significant 
shortages and price fluctuations in gasoline, cooking fuel, 
vegetable oil, rice, sugar, cement, and transportation 
services. This has led to widespread and increasingly intense 
criticism of the Government and sometimes violent public 
demonstrations. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES START IN NEIGHBORHOOD 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶9.  (SBU) Senegal devotes major efforts to maintaining 
stability on its borders.  Wade, a committed Pan-Africanist, 
has worked hard to expand Senegal's role on the continent and 
in world affairs and his government actually provides real 
 
DAKAR 00000220  003 OF 005 
 
 
resources (financial, material, and humanitarian) to its near 
neighbors.  Wade immediately recognized and defended the coup 
leaders in both Mauritania and Guinea, officials explained, 
partly out of fear of the potential for disruptions 
(including potential violence toward Senegalese emigrants in 
Mauritania), and a resulting influx of refugees to Senegal. 
Also, the sometimes erratic behavior of Gambian President 
Jammeh, who rules the strategically located strip of land 
that virtually cuts off the southern third of Senegal, raises 
concerns over The Gambia's stability.  More widely, during 
the OIC Summit, Wade mediated a quickly-discarded peace 
agreement between Chad and Sudan.  He has also involved 
himself in Zimbabwe's political upheavals by lending 
President Robert Mugabe his unequivocal support. 
 
CASAMANCE CONFLICT 
------------------ 
¶10.  (SBU) Internal conflict in Senegal's southernmost region 
of the Casamance has regional security implications because 
it borders The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.  In the last year 
there has been a decrease in rebel military operations by the 
armed group of the Movement of Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance (MFDC) as compared to the last two-to-three years, 
although banditry sometimes accredited to the MFDC has been 
on the rise.  The area remains relatively calm and the 
general population is able to move about freely and conduct 
their daily affairs.  Most of the attacks the MFDC have 
conducted are assaults on travelers and commuters for 
personal gain in the form of cash, cell phones, food and 
personal goods, rather than for ideological reasons.  The 
peace process is moribund at this time due to government 
inaction.  Observers speculate that Wade has decided the MFDC 
is no longer a significant threat and opted to let the 
organization wither on the vine.  This is a potentially risky 
strategy and the absence of a conclusive peace agreement 
impedes economic development in the region, creating a poorly 
governed space that narcotics traffickers and other organized 
criminals can exploit.  The USG continues to support a 
resolution to the conflict by working with civil society and 
providing conflict resolution training for interlocutors of 
the GOS.  Apart from the risk to the country's security, the 
conflict in the Casamance deprives Senegal of huge economic 
potential in tropical agriculture and tourism. 
 
U.S. ASSISTANCE 
--------------- 
¶11.  (SBU) In addition to supporting the Casamance peace 
process, U.S. assistance to Senegal has focused on Muslim 
outreach, health, education, export promotion, natural 
resources management, promotion of women's rights, good 
governance, and decentralization.  Almost 200 Peace Corps 
Volunteers ) the largest such contingent in any country - 
are involved in health, education, environmental protection, 
and micro-enterprise programs.  Post,s model Muslim outreach 
program includes assisting daaras (Koranic schools); sending 
imams, marabouts, and Islamic scholars to the United States 
on International Visitor programs and donating Arabic-, 
French- and English-language materials to Islamic schools and 
libraries. 
 
¶12.  (U) In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the United States provided 
about USD 52.12 million in assistance to Senegal, including 
USD 15.8 million under the President's Malaria Initiative 
(PMI), USD 3.9 million to combat HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, 
and USD 1.3 million for middle school construction, 
textbooks, and scholarships for girls. 
 
COMMITMENT TO REGIONAL SECURITY/COOPERATION WITH U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶13.  (SBU) Senegal has been a loyal partner and has served as 
an operational base for every U.S. deployment to the region. 
The GOS has supported United States interests by deploying 
peacekeeping troops to the Gulf War, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, 
the Central African Republic, East Timor, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and, most recently, Sudan.  Senegal was the first 
African nation to sign up for the African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI) (now the African Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance (ACOTA)) program that provides 
military assistance and training to African militaries with 
the capability of participating in peacekeeping operations, 
principally in Africa.  ACOTA complements the largest 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This has paid major dividends through 
the engagement of Senegalese troops in their traditional 
areas of interest (Cote d'Ivoire) and in areas of traditional 
 
DAKAR 00000220  004 OF 005 
 
 
interest to us (Liberia).  Senegal is now one of the leading 
contributors to UNAMID with 633 troops and is training more 
to increase that number to 1,600. Senegal is also a 
participant in the Center of Excellence in Stability Police 
Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy and had 123 stability police 
trained at that facility. 
 
THE U.S.-SENEGAL AGENDA 
----------------------- 
¶14.  (SBU) Senegal represents the most important francophone 
partner of the United States in Africa.  For Senegal, the 
U.S. represents an attractive alternative to dependence on 
France.  Commercial ties between our countries should be much 
stronger.  However, there is a realistic appreciation among 
knowledgeable Senegalese that the U.S. is not likely to 
supplant France as its principal partner any time in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) On terrorism, Senegal was among the first African 
states to recognize the dangers posed to its own security by 
international terrorism.  It has cooperated actively with the 
United States in the fight against terrorism and has ratified 
12 of the 13 key anti-terrorist conventions and protocols 
identified by the U.S.  The National Assembly enacted 
counterterrorism legislation last year, but has yet to 
approve updated legislation (as directed by the regional 
central bank) to combat terrorist financing.  Intelligence 
sharing and vigilance along Senegal's borders is good and 
continues to improve through well-established channels.  We 
continue to raise our concerns with Senegal's leaders over 
the potential for unwanted influences from radical Muslim 
states, such as Iran. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) On counter-narcotics, Senegal's role as a regional 
hub, with an active international airport and port, as well 
as porous land borders make the country particularly 
vulnerable to infiltration by traffickers.  Senegal shares a 
long border with the two countries -- Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea -- that are arguably the twin epicenters of this 
growing regional threat to stability.  Nevertheless, Senegal 
has one of the most capable law enforcement and security 
apparatuses in the region, one which we seek to cultivate.  A 
recent INL-led interagency team recently visited Dakar to 
survey GOS law enforcement capacity with an eye toward 
recruiting Senegal to be a regional leader in the fight 
against narcotics trafficking. 
¶17.  (SBU) Post continues to scrutinize Senegal's 
relationships with Iran, Libya, Sudan, Venezuela, and China. 
Thus far, Senegal has managed to compartmentalize those 
relationships to ensure that they do not act to undermine 
Senegal's stability.  Post also continues to remind Senegal's 
leaders that too close an embrace will not be well understood 
nor appreciated in Washington.  Thus far, President Wade has 
been receptive to the message.  With respect to Iraq, Senegal 
was more neutral than during the first Gulf War, when it 
proudly provided troops to help evict Saddam from Kuwait. 
Senegal resisted French pressure to take a more critical 
posture, and in fact Wade publicly noted his satisfaction 
that Saddam had been removed from power.  Since diplomatic 
relations with China were re-established in October 2005, the 
Chinese have played an increasingly visible role as a 
development partner, and the market share of Chinese 
products, especially cheap consumer goods and equipment and 
vehicles has increased.  Chinese President Hu Jintao made a 
state visit to Senegal in February 2009 as part of a 
multi-country tour of Africa.  Large-scale foreign 
investment, however, has come mostly from France, the UAE, 
Sudan, Morocco, and India. 
 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
------------------ 
¶16.  (U) Potential investment and current businesses are 
hampered by Senegal's poor electricity supply, the slow pace 
of establishing an effective and transparent judiciary that 
understands commercial issues, needed education reform - 
especially the lack of vocational education - and burdensome 
labor laws that deter hiring and make dismissals for cause 
difficult.  Through our assistance programs and the donor 
community's Private Sector Working Group we are actively 
working with the GOS to advance much-needed policy reforms. 
 
BOTTOM LINE 
----------- 
¶17.  (SBU) Senegal under Wade is a good partner and generally 
sympathetic to U.S. interests.  Economically, Senegal wants 
to expand its ties to the U.S., especially in agro-industry, 
 
DAKAR 00000220  005 OF 005 
 
 
telecommunications, energy, and transport, but first needs to 
improve the business climate.  Bilateral relations remain 
warm, but expanding our areas of cooperation to additional 
sectors of mutual benefit will take effort.  We must press 
the government on the need to strengthen democratic 
institutions, improve governance, not provide support to coup 
leaders, recommit to economic reforms, and improve 
transparency and accountability in its public finances, while 
we work to strengthen the country's counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism capabilities and continue providing support 
for Senegal's peacekeeping efforts. 
BERNICAT