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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09COPENHAGEN61, DANISH REPLY TO DEMARCHE ON DISCOURAGING NEW DEALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09COPENHAGEN61 2009-02-02 15:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Copenhagen
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCP #0061 0331506
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021506Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4749
UNCLAS COPENHAGEN 000061 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EEB/ESC/TFS - SONATA COULTER AND NEA/IR - SARAH GROEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETTC PREL DA IR
SUBJECT: DANISH REPLY TO DEMARCHE ON DISCOURAGING NEW DEALS 
IN IRAN'S ENERGY SECTOR 
 
REF: A. 08 STATE 125575 
     B. 08 COPENHAGEN 650 
     C. 30 JAN 09 COULTER E-MAIL 
 
1. (SBU) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 4. 
 
2. (SBU) The Charge was convoked on February 2 by MFA 
Political Director Carsten Damsgaard to follow up on our 
demarche regarding the present or planned pursuits of a 
Danish company, Haldor Topsoe, to sell catalytic converters 
to Iran for use in oil refineries (Refs A and B).  Damsgaard 
stressed that Denmark continues to support a tough stance on 
Iran's nuclear program and fully supports ongoing P-5 efforts 
to tighten economic sanctions, adding that Denmark will seek 
to build EU consensus on a firm approach toward Iran if P-5 
efforts do not prosper.  He said that, in response to our 
demarche, he had met last week with the senior management of 
Haldor Topsoe to apprise them of the Danish government's 
stance on Iran and to share the concerns raised in our 
demarche.  Damsgaard stated that Haldor Topsoe officials are 
weighing the consequences of doing business with Iran but 
made no commitments. 
 
3. (SBU) Damsgaard noted that the MFA has learned that three 
U.S.-based companies are also engaged in business in Iran in 
a similar field as Haldor Topsoe.  He stated that, just as 
the Danish government is willing to speak to its companies 
about its position on Iran and on the risks of doing business 
with Iran, Denmark would appreciate similar outreach efforts 
by the USG with American firms that may be doing business in 
the Iranian energy sector.  In particular, he cited three 
specific companies: UOP (a division of Honeywell); Albemarle, 
a company he claimed to be a direct competitor of Haldor 
Topsoe in selling catalytic converters; and KBR.  We note 
that these three companies, like Haldor Topsoe, were listed 
in the French "Coordinated National Measures" framework paper 
that we understand may have helped drive the original 
demarche (Ref C).  Although Damsgaard did not reveal the 
source of his information about the three companies, we 
suspect it came from his meeting with Haldor Topsoe 
executives. 
 
4. (SBU) Action request: Post would appreciate Department 
guidance on a response to Denmark's request that the USG 
weigh in with the three American companies in the same manner 
that the MFA weighed in with Haldor Topsoe. 
MCCULLEY