VZCZCXRO1168
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #0102/01 0440914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130914Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3440
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0584
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON ALTON, 
AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM SNAR ASEC GV
SUBJECT: CONAKRY RESPONSE - ASSESSING THE NEED FOR 
INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING 
 
REF: STATE 05448 
 
¶1.  (U) In response to reftel request, Post submits the 
following information regarding assessed needs for increased 
law enforcement and judicial training in Guinea.  Post notes 
that the USG has suspended aid to Guinea, with the exception 
of humanitarian and democracy assistance, in response to the 
December 23 coup d'etat and the subsequent installation of a 
military junta. 
 
-------------- 
KEY CHALLENGES 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Guinea's civilian law enforcement faces a wide 
range of challenges, both internal and regional.  Conakry is 
rated as critical for crime, which is largely due to the high 
frequency of theft, assault, and general banditry.  Such 
crime occurs primarily in the capital, but also throughout 
urban centers in the interior.  Many of these crimes are 
committed by individuals in uniforms who are believed to be 
military personnel, but may also be members of the police 
force, or bandits who bought easily acquired uniforms. 
Gang-style elements exist in the capital, largely defined by 
ethnicity or nationality. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Over the past 18 months, drug trafficking has grown 
exponentially in Guinea, causing the country to emerge as a 
regional hub for such activity.  Guinea's notoriously porous 
borders make smuggling of goods (counterfeit and otherwise) 
and human trafficking significant problems.  Available 
statistics are unreliable, but contacts estimate that several 
hundred individuals are trafficked in Guinea annually, both 
internally and trans-nationally. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) During the recent wars that engulfed the region, 
Guinea served as a transit point for arms trafficking. 
International scrutiny and regional stability significantly 
reduced this practice, although some arms trafficking may 
still be occurring.  Domestic and transnational terrorism 
networks in Guinea are not remarkable.  However, the French 
believe they may be pushed south of the Sahel due to 
successes by U.S. and international partners.  Additionally, 
it is not clear how important Guinea is to Hezbollah or 
Hamas--or even Al Qaida. 
 
------------------------ 
HOST GOVERNMENT CAPACITY 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Guinea's police force is generally incapable of 
addressing the challenges described above.  A police strike 
in 2007 followed a military mutiny in 2008, in which military 
personnel killed at least 12 police officers, largely 
stripped the civilian police forces of remaining training 
facilities and equipment while damaging any existing 
inter-agency enforcement initiatives.  In addition, many 
police officers may now feel threatened by their military 
counterparts, rendering them incapable of countering rampant 
crime committed by others in uniform.  Currently headed by a 
military general, who is a member of the ruling military 
junta, the civilian police forces lack any consistent 
training programs, supply system or finances.  The police 
have been under-resourced and under-trained for years, and 
they have now been further marginalized by the military 
regime. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Endemic corruption throughout all levels of the 
police and the government make effective law enforcement 
difficult.  Low salaries combined with inadequate training 
contribute to this problem while increased narcotics 
trafficking means that opportunities for corruption have 
increased exponentially.  Corruption extends to the Ministry 
of Justice, with the result that corruption generally goes 
unpunished.  Due to the underlying lack of rule of law, all 
but the most horrendous of crimes (e.g. kidnapping, murder) 
go un-prosecuted.  This environment often discourages police 
forces from even attempting to launch major anti-crime 
initiatives. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Guinea's police force is severely understaffed 
 
CONAKRY 00000102  002 OF 003 
 
 
throughout the country.  Most urban centers outside of 
Conakry have only a handful of officers for populations of 
25,000 to several hundred thousand people.  The former 
government launched a major recruitment effort in late 2008, 
but the military junta reportedly lacks the resources to pay 
salaries to these new officers.  The Ministry of Security 
condones the practice of taking on "volunteer" police 
officers who wear uniforms, but generally do not carry 
firearms.  The fact that these individuals are generally 
unpaid contributes to rampant corruption.  In addition, some 
of these "volunteers" have been on the force for years 
awaiting fulfillment of promises of permanent employment, 
which have yet to materialize. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) A small number of mid-level police commanders 
possess a certain level of technical knowledge, often gained 
from attending training programs abroad.  The vast majority 
of police officers have little to no policing skills due to 
the lack of a training program.  Basic training is a 
three-month program that includes segments on human rights, 
women's rights, and riot control.  Agents are supposed to 
undergo a nine-month training course while judicial police 
are supposed to undergo an 18 month course.  However, the 
Guinean Police Academy is non-operational and any training 
efforts are haphazard at best. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) What little equipment remaining in the control of 
the civilian police forces is generally in poor condition.  A 
small number of motor vehicles service all of Guinea, and are 
subject to frequent breakdowns.  Side arms are not maintained 
and the majority is circa 1940. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Under the military junta, the civilian policing 
forces (traditionally aligned with the Ministry of Security) 
are being reconstructed under both Security and now a newly 
formed Ministry of High Crimes and Anti-Drugs.  It is unclear 
how responsibilities and resources will be divided.  The 
President of the military junta recently authorized all 
security personnel to shoot anyone believed to be involved in 
drug trafficking, child trafficking, money laundering, or 
armed robbery.  It is unclear who is included in the security 
forces.  To date, no security personnel have tested this 
authority. 
 
--------------------- 
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Guinean policing services would benefit immensely 
from all forms of training.  Basic police training programs, 
including how to construct programs, could immediately 
improve the quality and professionalism of the police. 
Leadership knowledge for mid-level officers would serve to 
reinforce and grow policing services.  These types of 
training programs should target precinct police officers, 
Anti-Gang police, and Judicial Police. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Specialized training, such as narcotics 
interdiction and customs inspections, would align with both 
Guinean objectives and other potential international donor 
support.  This training would target the Anti-Drug Office 
(OCAD) and customs police (seaport, border, airport). 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Judiciary training, in any form, targeting all 
layers of the Ministry of Justice would serve not only to 
professionalize the judiciary but also to provide remedies to 
victims.  The current judiciary functions without a 
generalized body of legal knowledge and with minimal 
finances. 
 
---------------------------- 
HOST GOVERNMENT AS A PARTNER 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Before the installation of the military junta, the 
Guinean Government was keenly interested in USG assistance 
for law enforcement programs.  They repeatedly requested help 
with training, general guidance, equipment, and supplies. 
The new military regime has also expressed interest in 
working with the USG, but our current bilateral policy stance 
makes such cooperation difficult, if not impossible.  The 
 
CONAKRY 00000102  003 OF 003 
 
 
political situation remains fluid and it is unclear how long 
the current regime will stay in power.  Guinea would be a 
willing partner, but it will be several months before we will 
know whether or not the country will be able to install a 
legitimate government in the near-term. 
 
--------------------------- 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The French have provided a number of training 
programs for police over the years.  They are currently 
training 90 police inspectors at the Anti-Riot base for one 
month, a program that was initiated before the December 23 
coup d'etat.  The training focuses on investigative 
techniques. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Many international partners are currently 
reviewing their bilateral assistance programs in response to 
the coup, although the USG and Japan are the only countries 
to date to have announced a bilateral suspension of aid. 
Before the coup, Spain and the United Kingdom were interested 
in exploring programs targeting anti-narcotics initiatives. 
 
---------------------------- 
REGIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) There are no regional training centers in Guinea, 
nor is Embassy aware of any plans to construct one. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) Embassy point of contact is Regional Security 
Officer Phil Nazelrod (224-65-10-43-77 or 
nazelrodpw@state.gov). 
RASPOLIC