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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000240

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2028
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: THE DENIAL DILEMMA: OPPOSITION CLAIMS "VICTORY" IN REFERENDUM LOSS

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, FOR REASON 1.4(D)

¶1. (C) Summary: The political opposition's reaction to
President Chavez's successful February 15 constitutional
referendum has largely been one of denial -- lamenting the
government's electoral advantages while spinning the outcome
as somewhat of a victory for the opposition. Opposition
parties have advised their followers to view the
unprecedented number of "No" votes as a sign that they are
gaining electoral ground, and to blame Chavez for "stealing"
the election. A minority of more thoughtful opposition
activists are focusing less on Chavez's use of state
resources for electoral campaigns and more on the
opposition's need to reach out to Chavez's political base
with a viable and appealing alternative vision. February
referendum voting patterns suggest that the opposition
actually lost some ground in areas where they polled well in
the November 2008 state and local elections. Opposition
leaders' rationalizing, while helpful to morale, inhibit the
opposition from thinking realistically about how to expand
their electoral base to mount a future challenge against the
emboldened pro-Chavez electoral machine. End Summary.

-----------------------------------------
OPPOSITION BLAMES EVERYONE BUT THEMSELVES
-----------------------------------------

¶2. (C) At a post-election democracy forum February 19,
opposition activist and former Christian Democrat (COPEI)
presidential candidate (1988) Eduardo "El Tigre" Fernandez
laid out a ten-point assessment of February 15 lauding
opposition "wins" and decried unfair play by the Government
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV). He pointed
out that the "No" had won in most big urban centers --
including Zulia, Miranda, and Tachira States -- as well as in
greater Caracas, and argued that GBRV electoral campaign
abuses prior to the actual balloting were "unprecedented."
Fernandez contended that the opposition needs to create a
democratic alternative to Chavismo that appeals to more
Venezuelans, but offered only vague suggestions on how to
accomplish such an objective.

¶3. (C) In the same forum, Maria Corina Machado, President
of the SUMATE electoral NGO, called for "reflection" among
the opposition and insisted that voters and even election day
workers and witnesses had been subject to "high levels of
intimidation" by the GBRV. She advocated for greater
education among election workers to avoid election day fraud
-- in the future. Machado also warned that polls were
unreliable and self-fulfilling, suggesting that the polls
indicating growing support for "Yes" immediately prior to the
vote had convinced "No" voters to stay home.

¶4. (C) UNT party activist Yenny Freitas sent a mass email
February 18 to opposition supporters, advising them that the
"No" had sent a clear message to Chavez and that "we are
narrowing the gap between Chavismo and the opposition." She
compared the 4.2 million votes opposition unity candidate
Manuel Rosales obtained in the 2006 presidential election to
the 5.2 million the "No" received on February 15, concluding
that the opposition has grown in strength -- under "unequal
and atypical" campaign conditions. Freitas added that the 32
percent abstention rate was relatively low, showing
widespread participation, and that Chavez is defeatable in
2012 and "he knows it." She noted that the opposition would
wield a significant check against Chavez's power if they can
win a majority of seats in the 2010 National Assembly
elections, advising that curbing abstention was crucial to
achieving this.

------------------------------
OPPOSITION NEEDS A RENOVATION
------------------------------

¶5. (C) More thoughtful members of the opposition
acknowledge the need for rethinking opposition strategies.
Baruta Mayor and Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Secretary General
Gerardo Blyde told the Charge February 20 that the opposition
needs to offer more than "anti-Chavismo" to voters. He noted
that in his mayoral campaign he won slight majorities in
Baruta's barrios by campaigning over the course of 70 days
and offering both programs and affection. Blyde said his
municipality has a program conceding titles and small home
improvement credits to longtime residents of municipal lands.
He said Baruta is also putting in sewers, street lights, and
small parks in traditionally neglected neighborhoods. He
said opposition governors and mayors need to demonstrate over
the next four years that they can offer a better quality of
life, especially to Venezuela's poor.

¶6. (C) UNT youth activist Jaqueline Nunez told Poloff
February 19 that she was not surprised by the referendum
outcome but that she was hopeful it would put pressure on the
opposition to "renovate" itself. She complained that within
the opposition, the party old-guard leadership enforced
strict party discipline and was reluctant to allow the
younger members to climb the ranks. Nunez also pointed out
that the party leadership frequently suggested strategy
discussions, but would always find a reason to postpone the
meetings until it was too late. She opined that it was
hypocritical for the opposition parties -- including her own
-- to criticize Chavez for violating the alternation of power
clause in the constitution when they effectively do the same.

¶7. (C) Democratic Action (AD) Secretary General Henry Ramos
warned in his February 20 press conference that the
opposition should not perceive February 15 as any sort of
success, pointing out that the number of voters who favored
Chavismo grew by more than those who supported the "No." He
admonished that the opposition should not view the referendum
as "a glorious triumph that does not exist" and instead
should analyze the results "without distortions or lies." He
added that the opposition "shouldn't kill the messenger" for
his statements, which go against what most of the "No" bloc
have argued. Ramos pointed out that the opposition had
triumphed before under similar electoral campaign abuses by
the GBRV. Ramos also said his party would not support
"unsuccessful presidential candidates," a clear shot at
Maracaibo Mayor and former 2006 consensus opposition
candidate Manuel Rosales.

-------------------------
OPPOSITION LOSING GROUND?
-------------------------

¶8. (C) Poll numbers from the National Electoral Council
(CNE) website indicate that the opposition lost ground in
some regions where they triumphed in the November 2008 state
and local elections. Of the five states where opposition
governors won in November, all but Tachira State saw either a
relative increase in support for Chavismo or a decrease in
the percentage of votes for the opposition compared to 2008.
In Nueva Esparta State -- traditionally a bastion of
opposition strength -- opposition governor Morel Rodriguez
swept the November elections with 57.64 to PSUV candidate
William Farinas' 41.69, but the "No" vote narrowly won with
50.76 percent compared to 49.23 percent who voted "Yes." The
"Yes" triumphed in affluent Carabobo State and Caracas voted
by 52.44 and 51.97 percent respectively, despite both regions
voting strongly in favor of opposition gubernatorial
candidates in November. The "No" vote carried eight states
in the November 2007 referendum, but only five in the 2009
referendum.

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COMMENT
-------

¶9. (C) Although the opposition was able to turn out an
unprecedented number of "No" votes on February 15, the
parties appear to be neglecting the fact that Chavez's
support grew even more. Such thinking suggests that the old
guard party leadership is out of touch with the electoral
reality, while some of the younger opposition party members
-- and certainly the student activists -- are more apt to
discuss the opposition's weaknesses, particularly its lack of
appeal among poor Venezuelans. Nevertheless, the opposition
remains a viable political force, and this seeming
generational gap could give rise to a new slate of civil
society groups-cum-parties to replace the discredited old
faces in the opposition. The parties' continuing focus on
Chavez "stealing" the election is unlikely to gain any
traction among the broad Venezuelan electorate, and only
serves to distract them from the daunting task of beginning
to prepare for local and National Assembly elections in 2009
and 2010, respectively. End Comment.

CAULFIELD