VZCZCXRO3111
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0229/01 0571036
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261036Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3610
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9119
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7305
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3579
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JCS FOR ADM. MCMULLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 
TAGS: MARR MOPS BR PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN, CHAIRMAN OF 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, MARCH 1-2, 2009 
 
Classified By: DCM LISA KUBISKE.  REASON: 1.5(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The CJCS visit to Brazil comes at an 
important time for our strategic partnership.  With Nelson 
Jobim as Defense Minister, Brazil has, for the first time, 
effective civilian leadership and a mandate to modernize its 
armed forces.  With a new defense strategy published in 
December, it will be making key decisions, notably on the 
purchase of new fighter aircraft that will affect the nature 
of our relationship for years to come.  In spite of the Lula 
administration's political aloofness on defense matters and 
the Foreign Ministry's spring-loaded position of keeping the 
U.S. at arms length in defense and security matters, our 
current military-to-military relations are very good and 
improving.  While some Brazilian leaders still find it 
politically convenient to portray the U.S. as a potential 
adversary, most of the Brazilian military is well apprised of 
the potential benefits of partnership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  The relationship between the United States and Brazil 
is as productive and broad-based as it has ever been, the 
result of the excellent relationship between former President 
Bush and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, new cooperation 
mechanisms on biofuels, business issues, and economic 
matters, and our shared goals of fostering hemispheric 
stability, promoting democracy, developing a consensus on 
next steps regarding climate change, and achieving a mutually 
satisfactory conclusion to the Doha round of WTO 
negotiations.  U.S.-Brazil cooperation on foreign policy 
issues is often limited by the GOB's unwillingness to speak 
out against anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere 
(Venezuela and Cuba), take key steps to address key issues 
such as nuclear proliferation and counterterrorist concerns, 
and expand its international leadership in meaningful ways. 
Operational cooperation on law enforcement issues, such as 
counternarcotics, container security, and intelligence 
sharing, are highlights of the bilateral relationship. 
Brazil's ethanol program has made it a global model for 
alternative energy and offers potential for bilateral 
cooperation on an important strategic issue. 
 
¶3.  (U) With approval ratings hovering near 80 percent, 
President Lula is more popular than at any other point since 
he took office in 2003.  Continuity and legacy are the 
guiding lights of Lula's second term.  Lula continues to 
shape his legacy as a friend of the poor and builder of a 
foundation for prosperity for the lower and middle classes 
through broad social welfare programs and a vast, new 
economic growth program of public works and growth 
incentives.  At the same time, Lula has failed to promote 
needed reforms to abolish a political culture of corruption, 
clientelism, and spoils. 
 
¶4.  (U)  The United States and Brazil share the basic goals 
of fostering hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, 
preventing terrorist and drug transit activity, supporting 
international non-proliferation regimes, and have been 
working together to try to achieve a mutually satisfactory 
conclusion to the Doha round of WTO negotiations. Many 
Brazilian leaders take a cautious approach to relations with 
the United States, sometimes falling back on shopworn Latin 
American leftist rhetoric about excessive U.S. influence. 
Brazil maintains an active dialogue with Venezuela and Cuba, 
has worked hard to restore relations with Bolivia, and has 
stood firmly on the principle of respect for sovereignty in 
responding to the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador, 
preferring to work through the Organization of American 
States.  The attainment of a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council has been a central goal of Brazil's foreign 
policy. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Brazilians are historically less attuned to 
developments in the United States than many other Latin 
Americans are, but have recently shown a high degree of 
interest in events in the U.S., especially in the 
Presidential election.  Expectations for the Obama presidency 
are high, particularly in terms of the U.S. relationship with 
Latin America.  President Lula has invited the President 
Obama to visit Brazil early in his administration and will 
visit Washington March 17.  In discussing the election with 
Brazilians, post has emphasized the continuity of interests 
on key foreign policy issues and the continuity of the 
fundamental interests -- regional stability, promotion of 
 
BRASILIA 00000229  002 OF 004 
 
 
democracy -- that Brazil shares with the U.S.  The GOB 
stresses continuing and hopefully expanding the base of 
cooperation built up between the U.S. and Brazil in recent 
years. 
 
SECURITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  At President Lula's direction, Brazil has completed 
a new defense strategy document to set an overall course on 
security issues.  Published on 17 December 2008, it has three 
main elements: modernization of the armed forces, 
revitalization of defense industries and implementation of a 
new regime of national service.  For the Brazilian military, 
the key result of the strategy process has been the 
reintegration of defense goals into the country,s overall 
development strategy and political dialogue.  We expect that 
an important result of the new strategy will be an increase 
in funding devoted to national defense, which has been 
under-resourced since the end of the military government over 
twenty years ago.  The worldwide economic downturn has, 
however, affected Brazil; therefore, boosts to defense 
spending may be less than the military would consider ideal. 
The resurgence of importance of the Brazilian military 
presents a unique opportunity to increase our bilateral 
cooperation and defense partnership.  Several issues will be 
key in determining the degree to which we will succeed in 
enhancing our partnership. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The first potential watershed in achieving a more 
robust defense relationship with Brazil will be the decision 
on a next generation fighter aircraft.  Boeing's F-18 Super 
Hornet is a finalist along with the French Rafale and Swedish 
Gripen.  A decision will be made in June 2009, with a final 
contract award in October.  It would be difficult to 
overstate the significance of Brazil's Air Force committing 
to a U.S. aircraft as its primary fighter for the next 
generation.  Boeing's proposal combines cutting-edge 
technology with a strong package of industrial cooperation. 
While the Super Hornet is clearly Brazil's best option both 
because of its capabilities and the advantages that 
interoperability with the U.S. military will bring, it is 
currently perceived as an underdog in the competition.  Many 
of Brazil,s political leaders remain uncomfortable with the 
idea of a close security relationship with the U.S. and 
believe France would be a better strategic partner.  This 
view is not shared among the military, where the Super Hornet 
is generally seen as Brazil,s best option.  To be 
successful, Boeing will have to make a strong case that its 
offset package offers economic benefits to Brazil far greater 
than its competitors.  The Brazilian MOD and Air Force have 
stated clearly that these benefits must include substantial 
transfers of technology.  Unfortunately, some Brazilian 
decision makers believe that the U.S. will not transfer 
superior military technology to Brazil.  Several Cold War era 
denials of military items (e.g. Harpoon missiles) and recent 
headaches with commercial exporters of military items 
(Honeywell gyros) are cited to reinforce this perception, 
although the USG has already approved technology transfers in 
support of Boeing,s bid that meet all Brazilian requirements. 
 
¶8.  (U)  There are a number of areas with prospects for 
immediate cooperation.  Brazil is stationing a police officer 
and considering stationing a Navy officer at Joint 
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South.  The Brazilian military 
has participated in several major exercises, including UNITAS 
and PANAMEX with several more in prospect. Brazil has invited 
U.S. personnel to train at its jungle warfare school in 
Manaus, and there will be two USSOCOM soldiers in the jungle 
course this year which will mark the first U.S. students in 
just over a decade.  The Brazilian navy has shown interest in 
vessels for coastal patrol and in improving their maritime 
situational awareness capabilities. 
 
¶9.  (C)  We are in the process of pursuing information 
sharing agreements with Brazilian services -- potentially 
leading to a GSOIA.  The Ministry of Defense has formally 
presented us with its proposed changes to the draft GSOMIA 
text.  OSD has offered to host the first of the reciprocal 
visits in May 09.  Then, Brazil will host us, after which, 
with a text approved by both side, we can sign the agreement. 
 It should be noted MinDef Jobim has explicitly stated to us 
the agreement must be signed between the MOD and OSD in order 
 
BRASILIA 00000229  003 OF 004 
 
 
for him to be able to leave his own Foreign Ministry out of 
the process. 
 
¶10.  (C) We have been stalled on our Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA) for almost a year because of the Ministry for 
External Affairs, failure to take action and the MOD's 
unwillingness to burn political capital to push this.  While 
this situation is unlikely to change in the near term, we 
should remind the Brazilians that the DCA is important for 
future partnership, especially as it can shorten the process 
of approval for various future cooperative activities. 
Brazil has signed a large number of similar agreements in the 
last two years, so ours would not be a precedent and could be 
seen in the context of normal friendly mil-mil relations. 
 
¶11.  (U)  In Nov 08 we conducted the first Bilateral Working 
Group for Defense (BWG-D) in over six years, and it came at 
an ideal time with stronger leadership in the MOD that is 
truly interested in building our defense partnership.  One of 
the main goals was to agree that such meetings should 
continue regularly as an ongoing dialogue. We will follow up 
the BWG-D with a technology security dialogue which will look 
to establish a channel for regular information exchanges on 
technology to demystify U.S. export controls and a means to 
address specific export control cases without political 
involvement. 
 
BRAZILIAN SENSITIVITIES 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U)  Fourth Fleet.  The April 2008 announcement of the 
reactivation of the Fourth Fleet caught Brazil by surprise 
and provoked much negative commentary.  Even many Brazilians 
not prone to accept the wild-eyed theories of U.S. intentions 
to invade the Amazon suspect that the announcement, coming as 
it did on the heels of the announcement that Brazil had 
discovered more oil off the Brazilian coast, could not have 
been a coincidence.  While Brazilian military leaders now say 
they understand the reasons for the Fourth Fleet's standup, 
President Lula has recently stated again that it poses some 
threat to Brazil.  Lula's statement was pure domestic 
politics, and his advisors have assured us that he 
understands the true nature and purpose of the Fourth Fleet. 
Nonetheless, the episode both demonstrates and has heightened 
Brazilian sensitivities with regard to U.S. military actions 
in the region. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Oil Field Discoveries.  In a similar vein, 
discoveries of oil off Brazil's coast have been cited as 
justifications for increasing Brazil's navy -- even to 
include a nuclear-powered submarine.  While the oil finds 
will almost certainly increase Brazil's future prosperity, we 
should seek to turn the strategic dialogue in Brazil away 
from fantasies that another country--potentially the United 
States--would try to seize the oil fields to a productive 
discussion of energy security and the importance of 
maintaining freedom of the seas. 
 
¶14.  (C)  The Amazon.  There is a portion of the Brazilian 
population, and military, convinced the United States has 
nefarious designs on the Amazon.  Fortunately, the rabid 
ultra-nationalists are in the minority, but this issue will 
never die as the famous internet hoax about a supposed U.S. 
social studies textbook which shows a map of the Amazon 
overlaid with the words "International Territory" continues 
to make the rounds every couple of years. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Terrorism.  Officially, Brazil does not have 
terrorism inside its borders.  In reality, several Islamic 
groups with known or suspected ties to extremist 
organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of 
carrying out financing activities.  Although there is good 
working-level law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. 
and Brazil on terrorism related activities, the official 
position of the government is to deny that Brazil has any 
terrorist activity. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Tri-Border Area (TBA).  Related to the above, 
Brazilians are wary of U.S. officials who say "terrorism" and 
"TBA" in the same sentence.  The new Brazilian come-back to a 
comment about the TBA is "which one?  We have nine tri-border 
areas."  The facts are there are probably more foreign 
intelligence capabilities in the TBA than there are 
 
BRASILIA 00000229  004 OF 004 
 
 
terrorists.  The real sleeping giant is So Paulo where a 
Middle Eastern population of over a million provides 
excellent opportunity to blend in with the crowd. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Indigenous lands.  The military does not like the 
fact that the government has given "sovereign" status to 
Indian lands, especially in border areas.  The current 
hot-button issue is the Serra Raposa do Sol area (northern 
state of Roraima border with Venezuela) where the government 
has ordered rice farmers out of Indian lands and sent the 
Army to enforce the policy.  Privately, Brazilian officers 
complain about this since the Army cannot stay in the area 
indefinitely and when it pulls out the farmers will move 
right back in.  That sentiment is coupled with the general 
opinion that the Indians don't produce anything but the 
farmers do, so the farmers should be the ones using the land. 
 Additionally, many officers believe the "sovereign" status 
of the land is an invitation to those who would use the 
border area for transnational crime since there is no state 
presence. 
SOBEL