VZCZCXRO4688
RR RUEHAST RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #0202/01 0481946
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171946Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3577
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3561
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7295
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9109
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000202 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KGHG EAGR EFIN ECON BR
SUBJECT:  BRAZIL'S REVISED CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATING TEAM AND VIEWS 
ON MEM AND 2009 
 
REF:  A) 2008 BRASILIA 1462, B) BRASILIA 28 
 
BRASILIA 00000202  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
(U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT INTENDED FOR 
INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Brazilian climate change negotiating team 
for 2009 is significantly different than the one for 2008.  Most 
importantly, Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Under Secretary 
for Policy Everton Vargas (who is going to Germany) will be replaced 
as head of the team by Ambassador Vera Barrouin Machado and 
Environment Minister Carlos Minc has replaced Marina Silva.  These 
changes may present an opportunity for closer collaboration between 
the United States and Brazil during this critical year.  Moreover, 
key MRE officials indicated a reluctance to continue the Major 
Economies Meeting (MEM) - or something similar - during this year. 
END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On January 29, ESTH Counselor discussed the ongoing 
negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) with two key officials from the Ministry of External 
Relations (MRE):  Special Ambassador for Climate Change Sergio 
Barbosa Serra and Director of the Environmental Policy and 
Sustainable Development Division Andre Odenbreit Carvalho.  MRE 
leads the Government of Brazil's (GOB) climate change negotiating 
team, though it consults with the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), 
the President's Office (Casa Civil), the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCT), and other interested governmental agencies. 
 
THE REVISED NEGOTIATING TEAM 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The GOB negotiating team in 2009 is significantly 
different than that started 2008.  Long time international 
environmental negotiator, MRE Under Secretary for Policy Everton 
Vargas, will soon turn over that position and the lead role in the 
UNFCCC negotiations to Ambassador Vera Barrouin Machado, who just 
returned from the Brazilian Mission to the Holy See.  (NOTE: 
Earlier Post had heard that MRE's Under Secretary equivalent for 
Energy and Science, Ambassador, Andre Amado, might replace Amb. 
Vargas as head of the climate change negotiating team.  Now, it is 
clear that Amb. Machado will fill that role.  END NOTE.)  Amb. 
Machado has some experience with UNFCCC issues (see biographic 
information in paragraph 13 below), having led the Brazilian 
delegation to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in New Delhi in 
2002 and the delegation to the Conference of the Parties of the 
Montreal Protocol in Sri Lanka in 2001.  She also has had experience 
in handling energy issues - particularly nuclear matters - which 
could be helpful to her.  She will have her hands full because, in 
addition to climate change, her portfolio will include Europe, the 
United States, Canada, and international organizations. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Further, the Environment Ministry has had a remarkable 
makeover with the replacement in May of 2008 of the ideological 
Marina Silva by the much more pragmatic Carlos Minc as Environment 
Minister.  Minc is credited with persuading President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva in December 2008 to include domestic targets on 
reduction of deforestation in the GOB's National Plan on Climate 
Change (REFTEL A).  In conversations with Minister Minc, his deputy 
Isabella Monica Vieira Teixeira, and head of the Climate Change 
Secretariat Suzanna Kahn they all seem open to exploring new 
approaches and taking on a more ambitious and robust position at the 
UNFCCC.  All three have roots in the NGO community. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Many members of the GOB negotiating team remain in place 
from 2008.  Serra and Odenbreit continue as key players, both of 
whom report to the Director of MRE's Environment Department Luiz 
Figueiredo Machado, who has been a working group chair under the 
UNFCCC process.  Figueiredo Machado in turn will report to Amb. 
Machado.   Dr. Thelma Krug was replaced by Suzana Kahn Ribeiro at 
the Environment Ministry.  However, Krug still keeps her hand in the 
matter through her new position as Director of the International 
Relations Office of the National Institute on Space Research (INPE). 
 INPE is a subsidiary body of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MCT).  Also from MCT, Dr. Jose Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, the 
Executive Secretary of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Climate 
Change, is a long-standing member of the negotiating team.  Miguez 
focuses his efforts on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Not officially part of the GOB negotiating team, the 
Brazilian Congress has played a relatively modest role in shaping 
climate change negotiating positions.  The Congress has established 
a mixed commission on climate change with members from the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies, and it did send a handful of its 
members to attend the UNFCCC's meeting in Poznan in December 2008. 
Although to date the Congress, as well as state and local 
governments, the private sector, NGOs, and academia have had little 
influence over the development of the GOB's negotiating positions, 
Congress will have to approve any agreement, and may serve as a 
 
BRASILIA 00000202  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
conduit for the views of other groups during the approval process. 
 
MAJOR ECONOMIES MEETING (MEM) PROCESS 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Serra and Odenbreit said the GOB looked at the MEM process 
in 2008 as a mixed bag.  On the positive side, it provided a 
valuable exchange of ideas.  However, the downside was that the MEM 
process created a parallel negotiating track.  In particular, they 
did not like the negotiating of a joint statement at the end of the 
process last year.  Also, they felt uncomfortable with the 
membership being overwhelmingly from the rich, Annex I countries. 
They said that the GOB team felt uncomfortable as they and the few 
other developing countries attempted to shoulder the obligation of 
representing the interests of the other G-77 members at MEM.  The 
GOB prefers to have the negotiations occur in one place, under the 
UNFCCC process. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) They both see 2009 as being packed with meetings leading 
up to the Copenhagen meeting at the end of the year.  Serra and 
Odenbreit felt that continuing the MEM process this year would be 
counterproductive because it would both (1) consume precious time, 
and (2)lead to a negative and unfavorable reaction from those 
countries excluded from the process. 
 
INTEREST IN MEETING WITH USG COUNTERPARTS 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Serra and Odenbreit expressed interest in meeting USG 
counterparts.  They said the first opportunity would be on the 
margins of the climate change conference in Tokyo, February 12-13. 
They would welcome a visit of senior USG climate change officials. 
Similarly, they would be interested in a video conference with USG 
officials 
 
MORE ITEMS: NAT'L PLAN, COMPARABILITY, COMPLIANCE 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The National Plan on Climate Change has quantitative 
targets on reducing Amazon deforestation, which is the primary 
source of Brazil's greenhouse gas emissions.  Nonetheless, Serra and 
Odenbreit were skeptical that it would have an impact on the GOB's 
position not to take on emissions targets in the UNFCCC 
negotiations.  COMMENT.  While MRE is reluctant to change its 
position on this issue, Environment Minister Minc has mused in 
public about taking such a step.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Serra opined that comparability would be one of the 
tougher issues to resolve.  He said it was important that the 
international community be able to accurately compare differing 
efforts to reduce emissions.  However, he thought it might be 
difficult to integrate the United States into the process, though he 
did not elaborate on his reasoning. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Compliance was also a critical subject, according to 
Serra. He said that the G-77 members were disappointed with the 
number of countries not meeting their Kyoto Protocol targets.  The 
GOB was waiting to see the Europeans' proposal on the subject of 
compliance. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FOR VERA BARROUIN MACHADO 
 
¶13.  (U) She was born on July 14, 1946 in Rio de Janeiro, and in 
1967 she married Ronald Crivano Machado, an engineer.  They have one 
son and two grandchildren.  She entered into the Brazilian 
diplomatic service in 1968.  In Brazil, she has served as the Deputy 
Director of the Division of Conferences, Organizations and General 
Matters (1970), the International Relations Advisor to the National 
Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) (1970), and the Director of the 
Division of Asia and Oceania (1983).  At Brazilian posts overseas, 
she has served as a Second Secretary in Mexico (1974), Second 
Secretary in Madrid (1976), Minister Counselor in Washington (1986), 
Consul General in Miami (1991), Ambassador in New Delhi (1999-2004), 
and Ambassador to the Holy See (2004-2008).  She has taken part in 
United Nations' conferences and worked with specialized UN agencies, 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN 
Economic Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). 
Further, she has led Brazilian delegations to various international 
meetings, including those regarding cooperation between developing 
countries (Manila, 1981), on commerce (Ljubljana, 1981), and nuclear 
cooperation between Brazil and the Argentine, which led to the 
introduction of a nuclear safeguards system (Rio de Janeiro, 1987), 
the Conference of the Parties of the Montreal Protocol (Sri Lanka, 
2001), and Conference of the Parties of UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (New Delhi, 2002). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The changes in the Brazilian climate change negotiating 
 
BRASILIA 00000202  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
team may offer good opportunities for working together to achieve 
common goals.  Also, the new team members may be open to new ideas 
and approaches.  Clearly, the Environment Ministry seems more 
ambitious than it was a year ago.  Post strongly encourages USG 
climate change officials to visit Brazil early to meet with 
counterparts.  We see significant advantages from coordinating 
positions with Brazil.  See REFTEL B.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL