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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019 
TAGS: ENRG IAEA KNNP TRGY ETTC AR BR
SUBJECT: KEY BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR OFFICIAL DISCUSSES POSSIBLE WAY 
FORWARD ON IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ISSUE 
 
REF:  (A) 2008 RIO DE JANEIRO 0295, (B) BRASILIA 34 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  On February 4, Othon Pinheiro, Director-President 
of Eletrobras Termonuclear S.A., briefed the Ambassador on a new 
concept for indirect monitoring rather than intrusive inspections as 
a way to provide the IAEA with assurances about the nature of 
Brazil's nuclear activities.  This would be in lieu of an Additional 
Protocol.  He had raised this with the Ministry of External Relations 
(MRE) last year, and the Ambassador raised it with Defense Minister 
Nelson Jobim on February 5.  Both were non-committal, though neither 
rejected the idea outright.  COMMENT.  If Washington agrees, then the 
upcoming visit to Brazil of IAEA Director General El Baradei could be 
an opportunity to try to explore this possible path forward.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) At a meeting with the Ambassador on February 4, Othon Luiz 
Pinheiro da Silva, Director-President of Eletrobras Termonuclear S.A. 
(who completed a 30-plus year career in the Brazilian Navy as an 
admiral), outlined his thoughts on how to provide the international 
community assurances about Brazil's nuclear activities without 
agreeing to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional 
Protocol.  The Ambassador had requested this meeting when at the end 
of a meeting on February 2 to discuss U.S. industry interest in 
Brazil's civilian nuclear expansion plans Pinheiro had brought up his 
new concept.  Pinheiro is sometimes called the new "nuclear energy 
czar" in Brazil, though he downplayed his role, describing himself as 
just one of various actors in the circle of decisionmakers.  He 
emphasized the importance in this field of the Civilian Cabinet 
Minister Dilma Rousseff, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Minister of 
Mines and Energy Edson Lobao, and Minister of Science and Technology 
Sergio Resende, as well as Ambassador Andre Amado, the Ministry of 
External Relations' (MRE) Under Secretary equivalent for Energy and 
Technology.  Further, the National Commission on Nuclear Energy 
(CNEN), Industrias Nucleares Brasileiras (INB) and Eletrobras were 
critical entities with regards to building and operating nuclear 
power plants. 
 
BACKGROUND ON HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE 
 
¶3.  (C) Pinheiro provided his take on how Brazil reached the current 
position with regard to an IAEA Additional Protocol.  Prior to 1997, 
the Government of Brazil (GOB) had refused to sign on to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because they viewed it as asymmetrical 
and unfair in its treatment of nuclear weapons states and the others. 
 He characterized the view then as the NPT was a tool for the nuclear 
weapons states to suppress the other countries.  Then President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso came to power and he signed the NPT and 
obtained Congressional approval.  Earlier, both Brazil and Argentina 
ended their clandestine weapons programs, restored democratic rule, 
and created in 1991 the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).  In 1997, Brazil, Argentina, 
ABACC and the IAEA concluded the Quadpartite Agreement that still 
governs their relationship.  ABACCC allowed regular inspections of 
Brazilian and Argentine declared sites to provide both countries 
assurances on their nuclear activities. 
 
¶4.  (C) Now Brazil faces calls that it agree to an IAEA Additional 
Protocol with its more intrusive inspection regime.  Pinheiro claimed 
that the Brazilian constitution prohibits allowing such inspections, 
which could be made anywhere and not just at declared sites.  He did 
not provide details with respect to this contention that an 
Additional Protocol would violate the constitution.  (NOTE.  MRE's 
Director of the Division on Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies 
Santiago Mourao told UNVIE Amb. Greg Schulte in October 2008 that he 
did not see a technical problem with Brazil signing an intrusive 
Additional Protocol; however, there were difficulties of a political 
nature.  Similarly, key figures in the nuclear energy sector in Rio 
de Janeiro saw no technical reason precluding Brazil signing such an 
agreement (REFTEL A).  END NOTE.)  Pinheiro was quick to add that he 
did not see any interest in Brazil to move towards nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD? 
 
¶5.  (C) Pinheiro had been thinking about the matter of providing 
assurances to the international community without having intrusive 
inspections.  He commented that besides violating the Brazilian 
constitution, the intrusive inspections called for by an Additional 
Protocol actually could lead to nuclear proliferation as the many 
inspectors involved from different countries would be able to see and 
 
BRASILIA 00000201  002 OF 002 
 
 
learn highly-sensitive and dangerous technologies.  He said that the 
way forward would be to have monitoring indirectly through sensors. 
These sensors would detect the presence of nuclear material, he 
confidently explained.  Fissile material is hard to hide undetected, 
he said.  The particles given off by nuclear material are very 
difficult to block and so off-site monitoring can be an effective 
tool, he explained.  Thus, the monitoring would not be intrusive, no 
inspectors would be physically entering undeclared sites, though they 
would still "visit" declared sites.  Pinheiro said he had consulted 
with a colleague of his at ABACC, an inspector named Dr. Carlos Feu 
(strictly protect), and they thought this system would give 
reasonable assurance of no unauthorized working with or diversions of 
nuclear materials. 
 
¶6.  (C) Pinheiro said he had raised this concept with officials in 
the MRE last year, saying it might be an alternative way to go.  He 
encouraged them to talk with Dr. Feu of ABACC.  The MRE officials 
neither approved of the concept nor disapproved it.  He added that it 
might be more difficult to advance the concept since the release in 
December of the new National Defense Strategy (REFTEL B), which calls 
for the GOB not to agree to any new restrictions on nuclear energy 
until others comply with their obligations (read - the nuclear 
weapons powers make progress on disarming). 
 
NON-COMMITTAL DEFENSE MINISTER - NO FAN OF THE IAEA 
 
¶7.  (C) At a meeting on February 5 with Defense Minister Jobim (who 
is clearly a pivotal figure on nuclear issues), the Ambassador 
brought up his discussion the day before with Pinheiro.  He asked 
Jobim whether this idea might be a way to proceed forward with the 
IAEA.  Jobim thought it was interesting, but was non-committal. 
Also, the Ambassador inquired about who else within the GOB would 
move on this issue.  Jobim responded that any discussion of these 
issues should go through him exclusively, and "not through MRE." 
 
¶8.  (C) The topic of the IAEA did lead Jobim to launch into a 
criticism of that agency, saying that in a recent incident they had 
overreached.  In that case, the IAEA had wanted to interview a 
Brazilian scientist because he had written about how to produce 
nuclear weapons, apparently as an academic think piece.  Jobim was 
dismayed to find that the Ministry of External Relations had actually 
been helpful to the IAEA in trying to set up a meeting with the 
scientist.  He declared that he became engaged and put an end to 
allowing any interrogation of the scientist by IAEA inspectors. 
 
PINHEIRO - A PRACTICAL PERSON WITH PRACTICAL ADVICE 
 
¶9.  (C) As he repeatedly underscored, Pinheiro is first and foremost 
an engineer.  He looks for practical solutions.  This was exemplified 
in how he developed a way for IAEA inspectors to visit Brazilian 
sites, while at the same time protecting confidential information. 
In that instance, he introduced the use of material to cover parts of 
the equipment, but allowing enough to be viewed by the inspectors to 
accomplish their task.  He said that then IAEA Director General Hans 
Blix had liked the idea.  "We can make things transparent and still 
keep secrets," Pinheiro stated. 
 
¶10.  (C) Pinheiro advised that Brazil needed to be treated like 
Japan, Germany and other developed countries, and not like Iraq and 
Iran as countries trying to develop nuclear weapons.  Any agreement 
with the IAEA for additional oversight / monitoring / inspection 
would have to entail a different way of inspecting. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶11.  (C) Pinheiro offers an interesting concept on how to proceed 
forward with providing assurances to the international community 
about Brazil's nuclear activities while addressing their concerns 
about intrusiveness.  The tepid responses - though not rejections - 
from MRE and the Defense Ministry mean that more groundwork needs to 
be done in Brazil, Vienna, and Washington would be required if there 
is interest in moving the concept to the next stage.  The upcoming 
visit of IAEA Director General El Baradei could be a good opportunity 
to try to explore this possibility further.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL