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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, IIP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON OIIP BR
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 2: 
INSTITUTIONAL STRAINS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 0177 
     ¶B. 2008 STATE 115233 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: As Brazil takes an increasingly prominent 
place on the international stage, its Foreign Ministry, known 
widely as Itamaraty after its headquarters building, finds 
itself in a difficult transition, with new institutional 
challenges.  Itamaraty is struggling to meet President Lula's 
up-sized foreign policy objectives without adequate financial 
and personnel resources, even as it strains to incorporate 
hundreds of young and increasingly more diverse diplomats who 
are changing the character of Brazil's diplomatic corps. 
These changes represent both a challenge for U.S. engagement, 
as we seek to broaden and deepen our relationship with an 
already-stretched ministry, and an opportunity for us to 
reach out in new ways to an increasingly diverse cohort of 
Brazilian diplomats. 
 
¶2. (C) This is the second in a series on understanding 
Brazil's Foreign Ministry.  Along with the institutional 
challenges described here, Itamaraty is dealing with changes 
in foreign policy ideology put in place by Lula and his three 
principal foreign policy implementers (ref A) and with 
inter-agency competition that has begun to erode Itamaraty's 
primacy in foreign policy (septel).  End summary. 
 
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Straining Under the Weight of Global Aspirations 
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¶3. (C) Itamaraty has been unable to keep up with the 
aggressive expansion of its operations and involvement on the 
world stage orchestrated by President Lula, FM Amorim, and 
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Garcia over the last six 
years.  Despite an increase in budget and personnel by over a 
third since 2003, domestic staffing remains skeletal. 
Itamaraty's expanding organizational chart--44 new 
administrative units have been created in Brasilia--masks a 
persistent and severe shortage of personnel and resources. 
 
¶4. (C) The Africa Department (covering countries in both 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa) demonstrates the challenge 
Itamaraty faces.  A focus of Lula's expanded outreach, 
relations with Africa have boomed.  Brazil has opened 17 new 
embassies in Africa since 2003, accompanied by a somewhat 
smaller expansion in the number of African countries 
represented in Brasilia.  In September 2007, the Africa 
Department numbered 10 diplomats from top to bottom.  It now 
numbers 17.  However, eight of the current positions are 
filled by third secretaries, almost always trainees at 
Itamaraty's Foreign Service school, the Rio Branco Institute, 
who work part-time as interns.  Third secretaries are now a 
standard feature in most Itamaraty offices, and incentives 
aimed at enticing diplomats to staff the new one- and 
two-officer posts abroad are resulting in more domestic slots 
unfilled by full-time diplomats.  Africa Department head 
Fernando Simas Magalhaes told PolCouns that the combination 
of short staffing and expanded relations is making it 
difficult to follow-up on Lula's many initiatives in the 
region. 
 
¶5. (C) Other Itamaraty departments and offices face similar 
constraints.  Some recent examples that have come to our 
attention: 
-- The head of the Europe Department, staffed by 10 diplomats 
(including two third secretaries), described to PolCouns 
problems similar to those faced by the Africa Department, 
saying that it was essentially impossible to do any serious 
follow-up on a 2007 trip by Lula to several European 
countries. 
 
BRASILIA 00000180  002 OF 003 
 
 
-- On the functional side, the International Organizations 
Department numbers 14 diplomats (two third secretaries) who 
handle the OAS and most UN matters (although some specialized 
agencies, like the IAEA and UNHRC, are handled by other 
offices). 
-- The Transnational Illicit Activities office (COCIT) is 
staffed by four diplomats, who manage the bilateral and 
multilateral work covered at State by INL, G/TIP, and some 
offices in IO and PM. 
-- The Division on Antarctica, Oceans and Space has no 
prospective replacement for its director and is relying on 
Rio Branco interns to get by, which is causing serious delays 
in our efforts to negotiate new space cooperation agreements. 
-- All politico-military, nuclear energy and weapons, and 
disarmament issues are handled by the five-diplomat Division 
on Disarmament (DDTS) and Sensitive Technologies within the 
International Organizations Department, with Ambassador 
Marcos Pinta Gama in the Secretary General's office handling 
liaison with the Defense Ministry and weighing in on most 
bilateral pol-mil matters.  DDTS Director Santiago Mourao 
told us recently he is facing the departure of three of his 
officers in the next months and hoping for, but not assured 
of, quick replacements. 
 
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A Broader Overseas Presence 
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¶6. (C) The effort to expand south-south relations has led to 
a substantial increase in Brazil's presence, with 48 new 
missions opened worldwide since 2003.  Most of these are one- 
and two-officer posts, however, and overseas staffing remains 
weighted toward South America, Brazil's traditional trading 
partners, and multilateral institutions.  Brazil's largest 
missions are in Washington (28 diplomats) and Buenos Aires 
(27).  With Brazil's expanded role in the Doha round, its 
mission in Geneva now numbers 23 diplomats, while New York 
houses 21.  Representation in developed countries (Paris with 
14, Berlin and London with 13 each, Tokyo with 11) still 
generally outnumbers that in key emerging economies (China 
has 11 diplomats, India only 8).  Combined with the staff 
shortages in Brasilia, the result is that many of Lula's 
presidential overtures often stall or are slow to get off the 
ground.  However, Brazil's expanded presence may provide U.S. 
missions new allies in effecting change; especially in Latin 
America, but also increasingly in Africa, Brazilian diplomats 
are often helpful partners in advancing shared objectives, 
even when their Brasilia headquarters is less forthcoming. 
 
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Flood of ELOs Brings Diversity, Training Issues 
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¶7. (C) Itamaraty's effort to keep up with its growing 
obligations is creating strains of its own.  The large 
expansion in the diplomatic corps (from 1,024 in 2003 to 
1,380 in 2008) will continue, with an express intent to 
"democratize" the corps, which still at times has the 
character of a family business--it is rare to meet anyone 
above the counselor level who does not have a relative, and 
often several, also serving in the Foreign Ministry. 
Itamaraty has instituted a small affirmative action program 
to attract more Afro-Brazilians and other "minorities," 
lowered from 60 percent to 50 percent the final grade on its 
entrance exam required to avoid elimination, and dropped 
requirements that candidates pass French and English tests to 
be eligible for diplomatic training.  (Note: English and 
Spanish are still required languages for Itamaraty diplomats, 
who are often impressively fluent in both, and less often in 
French, but only rarely in other languages.  End note.) 
 
¶8. (C) At the same time, Itamaraty has instituted significant 
 
BRASILIA 00000180  003 OF 003 
 
 
changes to its initial training in an effort to hurry 
diplomat trainees through the system.  What was until 
recently a solid three-year course of academic 
study--essentially equivalent to a bachelor's degree--has 
been reduced by two-thirds.  Trainees now spend eighteen 
months at Rio Branco, but only six months are spent in 
full-time study.  The remaining year is spent at Rio Branco 
in the mornings and in an internship (as third secretary) at 
Itamaraty in the afternoons.  Even so, diplomats tell us the 
joke in the halls of Itamaraty is that Rio Branco, which is 
having its foundation reinforced because of structural 
problems, is sinking under the weight of the trainees, who 
now total four times more than just a few years ago.  In the 
short term, the changes to the depth of training may cause 
some slack in Itamaraty's generally deserved reputation as 
the premier diplomatic corps in the region.  In the long 
term, however, Itamaraty will benefit from a more diverse 
corps of junior officers, in terms of background as well as 
regional and ethnic origin. 
 
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Comment: Expect Frustration, and Seize the Opportunity 
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¶9. (C) The winds of institutional change buffeting Itamaraty 
are likely to intensify.  As demands on its diplomatic corps 
increase with Brazil's growing global outreach, in the near 
term a simple lack of staff and resources is likely to 
combine with competing ideologies and bureaucratic rivalries 
to make engaging Itamaraty an even more labor-intensive 
endeavor.  Nonetheless, the Foreign Ministry is on a track 
toward growth in both numbers of staff and diversity, opening 
new opportunities for the USG to increase our outreach to 
Itamaraty.  Ref A noted a proposal for increased outreach to 
Rio Branco and suggested the possibility of an exchange 
program.  In addition, we intend to respond favorably to a 
proposal by Itamaraty itself, under the rubric of our Joint 
Action Plan to Eliminate Racial Discrimination, that the 
United States fund an IV program for Afro-Brazilian trainees 
at Rio Branco. 
SOBEL