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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA167, PMDB WINS TOP CONGRESS POSTS, COULD GET 2010 VEEP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA167 2009-02-10 12:14 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO7265
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0167/01 0411214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101214Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3513
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7368
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6075
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0446
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7670
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0847
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9062
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7248
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3510
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000167 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2024 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: PMDB WINS TOP CONGRESS POSTS, COULD GET 2010 VEEP 
CANDIDATE SLOT 
 
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 1414 
     B. 07 BRASILIA 2233 
     C. 07 RIO DE JANEIRO 559 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4 d. 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
(PMDB) 
consolidated its position as kingmaker for the 2010 
presidential 
election after winning the presidencies of both houses of 
Congress 
on February 2.  While the PMDB will remain faithful to 
President 
Lula and the Workers' Party (PT), the lead party in the 
government 
coalition, in an alliance that has benefited the PMDB 
immensely, 
allegiance may come at the price of the vice-presidential 
slot on 
the ticket.  In Brazilian political time, October 2010 is a 
long way 
off and other scenarios could play out.  The PMDB could 
persuade 
Minas Gerais governor Aecio Neves to leave the Brazilian 
Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB) and run as its candidate.  In a much 
less 
likely scenario, the PMDB backs the candidacy of Sao Paulo 
governor 
Jose Serra of the PSDB, the lead opposition party.  No matter 
who 
wins the election, one thing is sure: the PMDB will be 
invited to 
join the next government.  The PMDB, a non-ideological party, 
brings 
no ideological baggage or policy demands into an alliance. 
It only 
requires seats at the cabinet table and jobs at the public 
trough. 
PMDB participation in the government has no foreign policy 
ramifications for the USG, although key PMDB figures are 
generally 
more favorably inclined towards partnership with the US than 
their 
PT counterparts.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  On February 2 former president and current senator 
Jose 
Sarney (PMDB, of Amapa) and federal deputy Michel Temer 
(PMDB, of 
Sao Paulo) were elected to third non-consecutive terms as 
president 
of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, respectively.  Sarney's 
victory also had the collateral effect of rehabilitating 
Senator 
Renan Calheiros (PMDB,of Alagoas), Sarney's chief 
behind-the-scenes 
ally who was forced out of the Senate presidency in a 2007 
corruption scandal (ref B). 
 
PMDB Positioned to Demand Veep Slot with PT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (SBU) The PMDB was already Brazil's most powerful party, 
with 
more governors, more senators, more deputies, more mayors and 
more 
members than any other party.  It has six cabinet ministers 
and 
countless political appointees throughout the government, 
especially 
in resource-rich state firms such as Petrobras and others 
(Ref C). 
If the PMDB was already the indispensable ally in Brazilian 
politics 
(ref A), it is even more so with Sarney and Temer at the 
helms of 
Congress, and can rightfully flex its muscles and demand the 
vice 
presidential slot on the PT ticket that is likely to be 
 
BRASILIA 00000167  002 OF 003 
 
 
headed by 
Dilma Rousseff.  Likely picks from the PMDB include Rio de 
Janeiro 
governor Sergio Cabral, Rio de Janeiro mayor Eduardo Paes, 
National 
Integration Minister Geddel Vieira Lima, Defense Minister 
Nelson 
Jobim, and Michel Temer. 
 
No PMDB Presidential Material in Sight 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) The PMDB does not now have a viable presidential 
candidate, 
and its modus operandi is to ally with winners in exchange for 
spoils such as cabinet appointments and directorships of 
large state 
firms, which in turn gives the party the ability to appoint 
its 
members throughout lower levels.  The PMDB does not impose 
ideological conditions - including foreign policy -- and 
willingly 
supports an administration as long as its terms are met, as 
it did 
under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) and, 
more 
recently, in President Lula's second term.  Above all the 
PMDB wants 
to be in the government coalition.  The PMDB is in an enviable 
position: it understands that by dint of its size the winner 
must 
invite it to join the government or face an ungovernable 
Congress. 
 
PMDB Has Done Well in Government Coalition 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU)  According to Cristiano Noronha of the Arko Advice 
political consulting firm, the PMDB understands that it has 
benefited from its alliance with Lula and the PT, riding the 
crest 
of a wave of personal and government popularity that has now 
reached 
record highs.  As a member of the government coalition, the 
PMDB has 
recovered from a contraction that took place over years, 
mainly in 
terms of PMDB local office-holders.  For a party that is 
unlike 
traditional parties in that it is above all a confederation 
of local 
bosses, it was a worrisome trend.  For this reason, Noronha 
believes 
the PMDB will stay with the Lula coalition through the 2010 
elections. 
 
The Aecio Neves Question 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (SBU)  Some analysts, including Noronha, believe it is 
possible 
the Minas Gerais governor Aecio Neves could leave the PSDB to 
run as 
the PMDB presidential candidate.  The party has already 
formally 
invited him to do so but he diplomatically demurred.  But 
Noronha 
ruled out the possibility that Neves might become a vice 
presidential candidate with a PT running mate.  At the same 
time, 
Noronha believes Neves might accept the veep slot on a 
"purebred" 
ticket with Jose Serra, which many view as a sure winning 
combination. 
 
Least Likely Scenario: PMDB Plus PSDB 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (SBU) Finally, there is the scenario in which the PMDB 
runs with 
the PSDB, but there is no reason to believe at present that 
 
BRASILIA 00000167  003 OF 003 
 
 
the PMDB 
will break faith with the Lula government and support the PSDB 
candidate in the 2010 general elections.  But in Brazil we 
cannot 
rule anything out a year and a half before the elections. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  The PMDB is an immensely powerful giant, 
but 
seems unable to lead; it only follows.  It has no original 
program 
of its own other than being in power.  The heavy lifting of 
formulating policy falls to others, and the PMDB willingly 
plays a 
supporting role.  To the extent that the PMDB tends to 
strengthen 
clientelistic patterns of political behavior and may diminish 
voter 
decisions based on ideological considerations in favor of "me 
first," pork barrel ballot box decisions, the PMDB's 
ascendancy is 
not a positive development.  However, with no ideological ax 
to 
grind, the PMDB is an open and accessible interlocutor for 
the USG, 
and we have built productive relationships with top PMDB 
figures 
such as Jose Sarney, Nelson Jobim, Energy Minister Edison 
Lobao, and 
Education Minister Fernando Haddad. 
SOBEL